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By bringing the frame problem to bear on psychology, Fodor argues that the 
interesting activities of mind are not amenable to computational modeling.  Following 
exegesis of the frame problem and Fodor‟s claims, I argue that underlying Fodor‟s 
argument is an unsatisfiable normative principle of rationality that in turn commits him 
to a particular descriptive claim about the nature of our minds.  I argue that the 
descriptive claim is false and that we should reject the normative principle in favor of 
one that is at least in principle satisfiable.  From this it follows, I argue, that we have no 
reason for thinking the activities of our minds to be, as a matter of principle, 
unmodelable.  Drawing upon Baars‟ Global Workspace theory, I next outline an 
alternative framework that provides a means by which the set of engineering challenges 
raised by Fodor might be met.  Having sketched this alternative, I turn next to consider 
some of the frame problems arising in practical reason and decision-making.  Following 
discussion of the nature of emotion and its influence on practical reason and decision-
making, I argue that consideration of emotion provides one means by which we might 
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 Drawing upon the frame problem of A.I., Fodor argues, quite famously, that the 
“interesting” activities of mind are not amenable to computational modeling.  I will 
argue that we have no reason for thinking Fodor to have made the case for his 
pessimistic conclusion with respect to the unmodelability of our minds.  Furthermore, I 
suggest that there are plausible alternatives available that once explicated and brought 
to bear might provide a means by which at least some of the “interesting” operations of 
mind might come to be modeled in computationally feasible terms.  
 In Chapter 1, I provide an overview of the frame problem.  Both the original 
formal incarnation of problem that arose in artificial intelligence and various 
philosophical interpretations or variants of the problem are reviewed.  I next set out the 
underlying structure of the puzzle, arguing that “the” frame problem is not one problem 
but is instead a constellation of related problem instances.   
 In Chapter 2, I consider in greater detail  Fodor‟s version of the frame problem as 
well as his application of it to computational psychology.  In presenting Fodor‟s 
argument for his pessimistic conclusion - that the interesting activities of mind are not 
amenable to computational modeling – I disentangle a number of distinct argument 
strains.  In so doing, I argue that Fodor‟s argument relies, at base, upon a particular 
normative principle of rationality.  This normative claim, I argue in turn, commits Fodor 
to a particular descriptive claim about the nature of our cognitive processes. 
 In Chapter 3, I focus on assessing Fodor‟s argument.  Briefly, Fodor argues that 
our cognitive processes are unmodelable because we at least sometimes arrive at 
conclusions rationally.  Since anything that arrives at conclusions rationally, he 
continues, must be capable of solving the frame problem and no system that solves that 
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problem can be modeled, it follows, he concludes, that our cognitive processes are not 
amenable to modeling.   
I argue that the normative principle of rationality undergirding Fodor‟s 
argument is untenable because it is in principle unsatisfiable.  I next argue that the 
descriptive claim – that we ever arrive at conclusions rationally (in Fodor‟s sense) – is 
false.  Taken together, I conclude that it is more reasonable to think that we should reject 
Fodor‟s normative rationality principle as overly demanding in favor of one that is, at 
least in principle, satisfiable by the likes of us.  Any weakening of the demands of this 
rationality principle, I argue, effectively undermines Fodor‟s argument for the 
pessimistic conclusion.  Specifically, by weakening the demands of the normative 
rationality principle, I argue that Fodor‟s arguments against the feasibility of the massive 
modularity of mind and heuristics approaches to modeling are no longer compelling.  
And so, I conclude that since we have no reasons for rejecting these approaches tout 
court, as Fodor suggests due to their “irrationality,” we have no reason of principle for 
thinking the operations of mind not amenable to modeling. 
There are, however, a number of in practice (as opposed to in principle) 
challenges raised by Fodor with which any proposed strategy for modeling the 
operations of mind must contend.  To this end, I will consider an alternative model – 
namely Baars‟ Global Workspace framework.  I will start by setting out Baars‟ account 
and turn next to considering how bringing this approach to bear might help in 
contending with some of the particular engineering challenges (e.g., the input routing 
and heuristic selection problems) raised by Fodor.  By way of further fleshing out Baars‟ 
proposal, I will consider both Gigerenzer‟s “fast and frugal” heuristic approach and 
Barrett‟s discussion of modules as metaphorical enzymatic systems.  When these 
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accounts are integrated into Global Workspace theory, a picture begins to emerge as to 
how a computationally modelable system might contend with the input routing and 
heuristic selections problems without the need for a central (and thus frame-problem-
infected) executive to be posited.  And so, when fleshed out, I suggest that Global 
Workspace theory might provide a plausible account, and an alternative unconsidered 
by Fodor, of how at least some of the “interesting” activities of mind might come to be 
modeled.  
   In Chapters 4 and 5, I consider in greater detail some instances of the frame 
problem that arise in practical reason and decision-making, ultimately suggesting that 
emotion might be one means by which we contend with some of the problems arising in 
this domain.  I begin this discussion, however, by setting out a number of prima facie 
objections to the very idea of bringing emotion to bear on the frame problem.   
 The first objection, the “irrelevance” objection, reduces to the claim that since all 
emotions are either belief-identical or belief-dependent and since (as Fodor argues) all 
instances of belief-fixation are infected by/with frame problems, then bringing emotion 
to bear on problems that arise elsewhere would serve only to import a frame-problem 
ridden operation into some other domain.  As such, the objection continues, the very 
idea that bringing emotion to bear might help us understand how it is that we might 
contend with some of the frame problems that arise in practical reason and decision-
making is an obvious non-starter. 
 In response to this concern I begin by providing an overview of the propositional 
attitude approach to emotion in philosophy and its counterpart cognitive appraisal 
theory in psychology, both of which maintain that emotions are belief-identical or belief-
dependent.  Following a review of some of relevant empirical evidence in support of the 
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conjecture, I outline a set of standard puzzles for this approach.  Having outlined this, I 
argue that given the inability of such “cognitivist” accounts to contend with the set of  
puzzles discussed and given the problematic nature of much of the empirical evidence 
relied upon in support of cognitive appraisal theory, we have no reason for thinking that 
all emotions are belief-identical or belief-dependent.  I will argue then that with respect 
to the irrelevance objection, if at least some of what the emotions are are belief-
independent, then there should be no reason to think that these should, when brought to 
bear, serve only to import frame problems from one domain into another.  
 Next, I consider the support for automated appraisal theories of emotion.  In 
contrast to the cognitivist account, automated appraisal theory maintains that emotions 
are undertaken by innate, automated, autonomous and plausibly modularly realized 
learning and appraisal operations – the “basic emotion” or “affect programs.”  
Following a review of the evidence in  support of this account, I argue that while 
automated appraisal theory fails to provide a complete answer to the question of “what 
the emotions are” it does provide a partial response to this question.  That is, we have 
reason, or so I will argue, for thinking that at least some of what the emotions are are 
undertaken by automated, autonomous and modularly realized learning and appraisal 
operations.  As modularly realized, these activities should be amenable to modeling.  If 
so, then if emotion does influence and inform practical reason and decision-making, we 
have no reason to think that it should serve only to import prior frame problem infected 
operations into this other domain.  It remains, of course, to be seen whether emotion 
actually informs practical reason and decision-making in ways relevant to helping us 
contend with the frame problems that arise in that domain. 
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 In Chapter 5, I consider the second of two broad challenges to the idea of 
bringing emotion to bear.  This objection reduces to the claim that even if emotion is 
(even in part) undertaken by operations that are uninfected by the frame problem and 
even if emotion actually does influence practical reason and decision-making, we have 
no reason to think that these influences should be beneficial.  At worst, the influences of 
emotion would be detrimental to the proper operations of practical reason and decision-
making and at best, these influences would afford on balance no more benefit than 
detriment.  And so, the objection continues, even if emotion does influence practical 
reason and decision-making and does so without importing frame problems into this 
domain, we have no reason to think that such influences should help in any way to 
expedite or increase the accuracy of the these operations (and at least prima facie reason 
to think them detrimental or neutral). 
 With respect to this second broad challenge, I set about in Chapter 5 providing 
reasons for thinking that emotion might help us in contending with some of the frame 
problems that arise in practical reason and decision-making by helping to both expedite 
and increase the accuracy of these operations (i.e., helping us to contend with both horns 
of the dilemma).  To this end, I begin by presenting an overview of some representative 
empirical findings and detailed discussion of Bechara & Damasio‟s somatic marker 
hypothesis.  Having set out the general claims of Bechara & Damasio‟s account, I 
integrate this model with the existing Global Workspace framework discussed in 
Chapter 3.  When integrated, I will argue that emotion might be one means by which we 
contend with some of the frame problems that arise in practical reason and decision-
making.  Specifically, I will argue that emotion appears to influence and inform practical 
reason and decision-making in ways relevant to helping us to contend with the 
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attentional direction, problem-sequencing, ends-selection, meta-planning and Hamlet‟s 
problem instances of the frame problem. 
 I next argue that the emotion-based heuristics outlined are simple and 
noncompensatory (relying on only one cue).  As such, we have every reason to think, or 
so I will argue, that these heuristics should be far less computationally burdensome and 
thus far more expeditious than the “rational” alternative.  From this, I conclude that 
bringing emotion to bear on these instances of the problem should help us in contending 
with the tractability horn of the dilemma posed by the frame problem.   
I next consider the question of how normatively “good” we might expect such 
heuristics to be.   I begin by noting a prima facie objection with respect to the normative 
goodness of any simple heuristic.  Drawing upon discussion by Gigerenzer, I argue that 
we have no reason for thinking that just because an heuristic is simple that it must 
necessarily also be inaccurate.  That is, we have no reason to think that all “quick” 
heuristics must be “dirty” (i.e., inaccurate).  As such, I conclude we have no reason in 
principle for thinking that the emotion-based heuristics proposed must be too inaccurate 
to satisfy a suitably weakened normative rationality principle.  Rather, following further 
discussion of Bechara and Damasio‟s findings I argue that the emotion-based heuristics 
proposed increase the accuracy of practical reason and decision-making and are thus 
sufficiently normatively “good.”  As such, we have reason, I conclude, for thinking that 
these heuristics should satisfy (a suitably weakened) normative rationality principle and 
thus the second horn of the dilemma posed by the frame problem. 
I then argue that at least some of what the emotions are are undertaken by 
automated, autonomous and plausibly modularly realized operations of emotional 
learning and appraisal.  Furthermore, I will argue that we have reason to think that these 
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inform and influence practical reason and decision-making in ways that appear to help 
us in contending with both horns of the dilemma posed (i.e., both in expediting and 
increasing the accuracy of these operations).  It follows from this, I argue, that bringing 
emotion to bear on the puzzle might provide one promising approach (of likely a 
number of others) by which to come to understand how we contend with some of the 
frame problems that arise in the practical domain. 
Finally, I consider a set of open questions.  I argue that emotion is quite 
automatically exploited to influence and direct manifold operations, including those of 
memory encoding and search, non-trivial planning and assent or opinion fixation.  
These automated influences, I suggest, should help to expedite the operations of 
memory encoding, memory search, complex and multi-stage planning and opinion-
fixing.  In any case, relying on these heuristics, I argue, should be far less 
computationally burdensome and thus far more expeditious than the rational 
alternative.  I provide reason for thinking that relying on these heuristics should be a 
sufficiently normatively “good” strategy as well - thus helping to increase the accuracy 
of the operations.  However, while I provide reason for thinking this likely, there is, as of 
yet, no direct empirical evidence bearing on the question.  As such, the question must 
remain open. 
It should be noted at the outset that I am not claiming to have found a way to 
“solve outright” the frame problem – whatever that might mean.  Nor am I suggesting 
that emotion “solves” the frame problem.  I am not providing a complete computational 
model of mind, nor even an exhaustive account of all of the ways that emotion might 
influence cognition.  Rather, my aims are modest.  My first aim to provide reason for 
thinking Fodor‟s pessimism to be unwarranted insofar as we have no reasons for 
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thinking that the operations of mind are necessarily mysterious and unmodelable.  Nor 
do we have reason for thinking that the modules and heuristics approaches to modeling 
should be rejected tout court.  Put somewhat differently, I argue that nothing could solve 
the frame problem as interpreted by Fodor.  This suggests, of course, that we don‟t solve 
that problem either.  If so, then we must be contending with the problem in some other 
way. I argue that we might successfully do so by exploiting heuristics.  My second aim is 
to suggest that one of the ways that we contend with some of the instances of the frame 
problem that arise in practical reason and decision-making is by heuristically exploiting 
emotion.  And so, I am claiming only that consideration of emotion helps us understand 
how we might contend with some instances of the frame problem that arise in practical 
















CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING THE FRAME PROBLEM 
 Suppose that we consider a few objects arranged on the desk in front of us.  For 
simplicity, only four objects will be considered: a coffee cup, a book, a note pad and a 
magazine.  As things stand the coffee cup is on the desk and has nothing on top of it. 
The note pad, which has nothing on top of it, is resting atop the book, which is itself only 
on top of the desk.  Finally, the magazine is resting on the desktop and has nothing on 
top of it.  Pictorially the scene looks something like this: 
     Note Pad 
Coffee cup    Book    Magazine 
 
 Suppose now that we are set the task of making it so that the book is on top of 
the magazine (perhaps we want to jot down a note or tidy the desk).  That is, we want to 
the resultant situation or scene to look something like this: 
Book 
Coffee cup    Note Pad    Magazine 
 
 Determining a sequence of actions (i.e., a plan) that will rearrange the contents of 
the desktop to the above configuration is a rather trivial task.  Intuitively, one need only 
unstack the note pad from the book and place the book on top of the magazine.  Suppose 
however, that one wished to treat the situation and task more formally.  For example, 
suppose that one wished to fully automate the process so that it might be accomplished 
by a machine (i.e., a robot).1 
 
 
                                                     
1 The following presentation is drawn from various formal discussions of the frame problem.  
Most notably the accounts presented by McCarthy & Hayes (1969), Janlert (1987), Shanahan 
(1997), Morgenstern (1996), Horty (2001) and Russell & Norvig (1995).  Most commentators, in 
explicating the formal structure of the puzzle, relate strikingly similar sets of axioms, frame 
axioms and situations and rely on a seemingly standard “blocks world” presentation from which 
the above example is drawn. 
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THE SITUATION CALCULUS 
 In following McCarthy and Hayes, let us attempt to provide a more formal 
treatment of the problem by introducing the apparatus of the situation calculus (SC).  
Before so doing, however, some terminology must be introduced.  The ontology of the 
situation calculus includes (1) situations defined as “the complete state of the universe at 
an instant of time,” (McCarthy & Hayes, 1969 p.18) (2) fluents, which are defined as a 
“function whose domain is the space of situations,” (McCarthy & Hayes, 1969 p.19) and 
which are perhaps more readily understood to be the situation-dependent properties of 
objects, and (3) actions, the results of which alter the values of fluent.  The language of the 
situation calculus includes the predicate Holds and the function Result. (McCarthy & 
Hayes, 1969 p.22)  That a particular facts obtains in a situation s is articulated by the 
expression Holds (, s).  Likewise, Result (s) expresses the situation resulting from the 
execution of an action (action-sequence or plan)  in situation s. 
 In order to provide a formal description of our toy situation outlined above, two 
fluents need to be introduced.  Let On(x,y) express that object x is on top of object y, and 
let Clear(x) express that object x is free to have something stacked on top of it.  And so, 
the following provides a minimal description of the initial state of our desk. 
THE INITIAL SITUATION s0 
Holds[On(Cup, Desk), s0]   Holds[Clear(Cup), s0]   
Holds[On(Magazine, Desk), s0]  Holds[Clear(Note Pad), s0] 
Holds[On(Book, Desk), s0]   Holds[Clear(Magazine), s0] 








 Some formal account much also be given of the actions of moving one object 
from atop another and of moving one object onto another.  While this could be 
accomplished by using only one action Move (x,y) to express both stacking and 
unstacking, discussion will be far clearer if two distinct actions are allowed.2  Let 
Unstack(x,y) express the action of unstacking object x from atop object y and let 
Stack(x,y) express the action of stacking object x on y.  Given the actions of Stack and 
Unstack, the consequences of the execution of these actions may be expressed by the 
following axioms. 
The Stack axiom: 
 
x,y,s(Holds[Clear(x),s] & Holds[Clear(y),s] & ~(x=y))  Holds[On(x,y), Result(Stack 
(x,y),s)] 
 
If, in the initial situation, it is the case that object x has nothing on top of it, object y has 
nothing atop it, and the objects are distinct, then the consequence of stacking object x 
upon object y will be that object x is on top of y. 
 
The Unstack axiom: 
 
x,y,s(Holds[On(x,y),s] & Holds[Clear(x),s] & ~(x=y))  Holds[Clear(y), Result(Unstack 
(x,y),s)] 
 
If, in the initial situation, it is the case that the object x in on y and there is nothing on top 
of x, then the consequence of unstacking object x from object y is that there will be 
nothing atop y. 
 
THE PLANNING PROBLEM 
 With the above in place, let  be composed of: 1) the seven sentences describing 
the initial situation s0 and 2) the above axioms describing the consequences of stacking 
and unstacking objects.  Further, let  represent the goal state or proposition.  In this 
                                                     
2 That is, Horty‟s (2001) presentation of the problem in which two actions stack and unstack are 
used in place of Shanahan‟s (1997) more concise but less accessible move action. 
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case,  would be the aim of having it be the case that the book is on top of the magazine - 
Holds[On(Book, Magazine)].  The planning problem, Horty explains, is the “problem of 
finding an action sequence  whose execution in the initial state s can be proved from 
the information in  to yield a state in which the goal proposition  holds.”(Horty, 2001 
p. 339)  That is, the planning problem is the problem of determining a sequence of 
actions – in this case the execution of a sequence of actions of unstacking and stacking on 
the initial and subsequent situations for which it can be established that  Holds[, 
Result(, s)]. 
 At the beginning of the discussion, when presented with the task of rearranging 
the items on the desk, we were able to determine a simple sequence of actions  that 
would result in the desired goal state  (the book being on the magazine).  Specifically, 
by unstacking the note pad from the book and then stacking the book on the magazine 
the desired arrangement is achieved.  More formally, we conjectured that the following 
would hold 
Holds[On(Book, Magazine), Result(<Unstack(Note Pad, Book),Stack(Book, Magazine)>, 
s0)] 
 Given the discussion of the planning problem, it should be possible to determine 
the feasibility of such a plan by establishing that the above sequence of actions and 
subsequent results are derivable from the contents of .  That is, it should be possible to 
establish that: 
 Holds[On(Book, Magazine), Result(<Unstack(Note Pad, Book),Stack(Book, 
Magazine)>, s0)] 
 A serious difficulty now arises.  , given its contents, cannot yield such a result. 
From the contents of , specifically, that in the initial situation both On(Note Pad, Book) 
and Clear(Note Pad) hold, and equipped with the unstack axiom it can be established 
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that the consequence of unstacking the note pad from the book in the initial situation 
will result in the book being clear. (Horty, 2001)  Formally,   Holds[Clear(Book), 
Result(Unstack(Note Pad, Book), s0)] 
 That  contains the sentences Holds[Clear(Cup) s0] and Holds[Clear(Magazine) s0], 
when taken in conjunction with the fact presented above (that unstacking the note pad 
from the book will result in the book being clear) appears to provide us with sufficient 
resources to achieve the goal state of Holds[On(Book, Magazine)].  And so, given that it is 
already known that the coffee cup and magazine are clear and that the unstack axiom 
establishes the fact the after unstacking the book is clear, we appear to be but one stack 
away from realizing our goal.  Since we need only stack the book on top of the magazine 
to complete the task, it should be possible to use the stack axiom to establish that: 
Holds[On(Book, Magazine), Result(Stack(Book, Magazine), Result(Unstack(Note Pad, 
Book), s0))] 
 And so, it should be possible to establish that the consequence of unstacking the 
note pad from the book and stacking the latter on the magazine will result in the book 
being on the magazine.  A difficulty arises McCarthy and Hayes note, when we notice 
that while the magazine was known to be clear in the initial situation s0 the system does 
not know that it remains clear in the state, call it s1 which results from the unstacking of 
the note pad from the book in s0.  For  to be satisfied would require that the system be 
capable of determining that the magazine remains clear in the state following the 
unstacking of the note pad from the book.  More formally, it needs to be established that: 
Holds[Clear(Magazine), Result(Unstack(Note Pad, Book), s0)] 
 That the magazine remains clear in the resulting state, however, cannot be 
established with only the available contents of .  As Horty explains, 
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[T]his intermediary step seems perfectly natural from the standpoint of one‟s ordinary 
reasoning about actions… In fact, however, nothing in  allows this intermediary step 
to be derived – and indeed, the step should not be derivable as a matter of logic, for it is 
always possible, at least, that [the unstacking of one object from another will interfere 
with the fluent status of the third.] (Horty, 2001 p. 340) 
 
 That is, it is quite consistent with the contents of  that unstacking the pad from 
the book could result (somehow) in the coffee cup mysteriously coming to be atop the 
magazine.  As Shanahan notes, “Although [ is able to] capture what does change as a 
result of an action, [it fails] to represent what doesn’t change.”(Shanahan, 1997 p.4)  
FRAME AXIOMS 
 Perhaps this problem might be solved by the addition to  of supplementary 
axioms that would allow the value of certain fluents unaffected by an action to be made 
explicit.  Let us then include in  the following frame axioms. 
For the Clear fluent in our toy scenario, the following frame axioms should suffice: 
 
x,y,z,s Holds[Clear(x), s0) & ~(x=z)  Holds[Clear(x), Result(Stack(y,z), s0)] 
 
If, in the initial situation, object x has nothing on it and object x and z are distinct, then 
the consequence of stacking object y on object z is that object x is (i.e., remains) clear.  
More simply put, object x will remain clear unless something is stacked on it. 
 
x,y,z,s Holds[(Clear(x), s0)]  Holds[Clear(x), Result(Unstack(y,z), s0)] 
 
If, in the initial situation object x is clear and object x and z are distinct, then the 
consequence of unstacking object y from z is that object x is (i.e., remains) clear.  Put 
another way, object x will remain clear even if other objects are unstacked. 
 
 Taken together these two axioms establish that clear objects remain clear unless 
something is stacked upon them.  For completeness two additional frame axioms should 
be incorporated that will capture the persistence of objects once stacked.  For example, if 
x is stacked on y and w is stacked on z, axioms are needed to guarantee that x will 




x,y,z,w,s Holds[(On(x,y), s0) & ~(x=z)]  Holds[On(x,y), Result(Stack (z,w), s0)] 
 
If in the initial situation object x is on object y and x and z are distinct then the 
consequence of stacking object z on w is that object x is (i.e., remains) on top of y. 

x,y,z,w,s Holds[(On(x,y), s0) & ~(x=z) & ~(y=w)]  Holds[On(x,y), Result(Unstack(z,w), 
s0)] 
 
In the initial situation, if object x is on y and object x and v and y and w are distinct, then 
the consequence of unstacking z from w is that object x is (i.e., remains) on top of y. 
 
 The addition of these frame axioms to  appears to adequately solve the toy 
problem set out earlier.  That is, given the addition of these frame axioms it may now be 
established that: 
 Holds[On(Book, Magazine), Result(Stack(Book, Magazine), Result(Unstack(Note Pad, 
Book), s0))] 
 
 Since the addition of these four frame axioms, while admittedly cumbersome, 
has sufficiently solved this simple toy problem, there does not appear to be much of a 
problem after all.  Suppose, however, that only one additional action and one extra 
fluent are added to the original scenario.  Shanahan provides an accessible and colorful 
example. (Shanahan, 1997 p.9) 
 Let Color(x,c) express that object x has the color c and let Paint(x,c) represent the 
action of painting object x the color c.  As with stacking and unstacking the 
consequences of painting an object can be expressed by the formalism:  
Holds[Color(x,c), Result(Paint(x,c))] 
 Modifying only slightly Shanahan‟s example, let us suppose that in the initial 
situation all of the objects are white.  And so, five additional sentences must be added to 
the description of s0. 
Holds[Color(Coffee Cup, white), s0]  Holds[Color(Note Pad, white), s0] 
Holds[Color(Book, white), s0]   Holds[Color(Magazine, white), s0] 
Holds[Color(Desk, white), s0] 
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 Intuitively, stacking and unstacking an object should not affect its color, nor 
should it affect the color of any other object.  Additionally, painting an object should not 
affect the color of any other object, nor should it affect the arrangement of itself or any 
other object.  However, given Horty‟s discussion, given only the contents of , such 
intuitively obvious results cannot be established.  Just as axioms are required to establish 
that clear objects remain clear and stacked objects remain stacked after an unrelated 
action is performed, so too must additional axioms be added to  to account for 
persistence after painting. 
x,y,c,s Holds[(Color (x,c), s]  Holds[Color(x,c), Result(Stack(x,y), s)] 
  
If in some situation object x is c colored, then the result of stacking x on y will be that 
object x is (i.e., remains) c colored. 
 
x,y,c,s Holds[Color(x,c), s]  Holds(Color(x,c), Result(Unstack(x,y), s)] 
 
If in some situation object x is c colored, then the result of unstacking x from y will be 
that object x is (i.e., remains) c colored. 
 
x,y,c,s Holds[(Color(x, c1), s) & ~(x=y)]  Holds[Color(x, c1), Result(Paint(y, c2), s)] 
 
If object x is c1 colored and objects x and y are distinct then the result of painting object y 
will be that object x is (i.e., remains) c1 colored. 
 
 The addition of the Paint action also requires the addition of the following frame 
axioms to account for, respectively, the fact that stacked objects will remain stacked and 
clear objects will remain clear when any object is painted. 
x,y,z,c,s, Holds[On(x,y), s]  Holds[On(x,y), Result(Paint(z,c), s)] 
 
x,y,c,s, Holds[Clear(x), s]  Holds[Clear(x), Result(Paint(y,c), s)] 
 
 Likewise, axioms should be required to account for the persistence of each 
object‟s color following the stacking, unstacking and/or painting of an unrelated object 
or objects.  Shanahan notes of the necessity of these axioms: 
17 
 
In the general, because most fluent are unaffected by most actions, every time we add a 
new fluent we are going to have to add roughly as many new frame axioms as there are 
actions in the domain, and every time we add a new action we are going to have to add 
roughly as many frame axioms as there are fluents in the domain.  [Thus] the total 
number of frame axioms required for a domain of n fluents and m actions will be of the 
order of n x m. (Shanahan, 1997 p.5)  
 
 And so, the fact that the number of frame axioms necessary for the satisfaction of 
a goal proposition grows with surprising rapidity as fluents and actions are added lays 
the foundation of the original incarnation of the frame problem as discussed by 
McCarthy and Hayes.  Specifically, the inclusion of frame axioms will result in success 
only in situations in which there are a very limited number of fluents and actions.  Once 
a problem is presented that requires more than a few actions and fluents, such as the 
vast majority of problems in need of solving in the world (i.e., any non-contrived and 
non “toy” scenario), the number of frame axioms necessary is vast and quickly becomes 
computationally unmanageable.  Understood in this manner the original incarnation of 
the frame problem becomes one of how to formally contend with the problem of how to 
reason about the effects of actions without having to contend with an unmanageably 
vast set of frame axioms. (Shanahan, 1997 p.5) 
THE QUALIFICATION PROBLEM 
 In addition to the ramification and persistence problems outlined above, there is a 
related difficulty of a somewhat more traditionally philosophical nature that is often 
incorporated into the frame problem – the qualification problem.   
 By way of introducing this variant or aspect of the puzzle, consider the action 
axioms of stack, unstack and paint.  The stack axiom for instance, x,y,s(Holds[Clear(x),s] 
& Holds[Clear(y),s] & ~(x=y))  Holds[On(x,y), Result(Stack(x,y),s)] states that given that 
the conditions are satisfied that object x is clear, object y is clear and x and y are distinct, 
the result of stacking x on y will be that x will be on y.  These (pre)conditions are 
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included to eliminate the possibility of the system attempting to lift an object that has 
something on top of it or to stack something on top of an object that already has 
something upon it as well as to rule out any attempts at stacking something on top of 
itself.  A difficulty arises when it becomes apparent that the list of conditions 
incorporated into the antecedent of the axiom is, as written, incomplete and cannot be 
made complete. (Horty, 2001) 
 Just as in our toy example, the conditions of non-identity and “clearness” must 
be met before an object may be stacked on top of another, there are countless other 
conditions the satisfaction of which could be as relevant to the satisfaction of its goal.  
For example, it is possible that the book is particularly heavy, while the magazine is 
particularly fragile.  The book might be so heavy that it cannot be lifted.  Or it might be 
so heavy as to crush the magazine.  It is possible that painting an object will cause it to 
dissolve or that some of the objects are somehow attached thus making it impossible to 
unstack one from another.  To cite two examples common throughout much of the 
literature, it is possible that the one of the objects is in fact an explosive device which 
will detonate if picked up, unstacked or painted or perhaps the objects are so highly 
lubricated that any attempt to stack, unstack or paint them will be unsuccessful.  Taken 
further, it is possible that the objects are mere holograms.  And, taken to the extreme, it 
is possible that there is a Cartesian demon who prefers the objects white and in the 
initial configuration, thus possibly stymieing any attempt at painting, stacking and 
unstacking.  Any of these possibilities might make it the case that any attempt at 
stacking, unstacking and/or painting an object would be ultimately unsuccessful.  Put 
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another way, there are an indefinitely large number of possible circumstances which, 
were they to obtain, could make stacking, unstacking and painting unsuccessful.3 
 The upshot of the above discussion is that the action axioms originally 
incorporated into , those with only minimal conditions that need to be satisfied, while 
suitable to our simple toy case are entirely insufficient.  In order to suitably qualify the 
axioms, the antecedents of each must include an exhaustive and indefinitely large listing 
of such conditions or qualifications that must be satisfied before it can be determined if 
an action will ultimately be successful.  By way of example, consider the Stack axiom. 
The original axiom 
x,y,s(Holds[Clear(x),s] & Holds[Clear(y),s] & ~(x=y))  Holds[On(x,y), Result(Stack 
(x,y),s)] 
A (partially) qualified axiom 
 
x,y,s(Holds[Clear(x),s] & Holds[Clear(y),s] & ~(x=y)) & Holds[~Hologram(x), s] & 
Holds[~Hologram(y), s] & Holds[~Fragile(x), s] & Holds[~Fragile(y), s] & 
Holds[~Explosive(x), s] & Holds[~Explosive(y), s] & Holds[~Glued(x), s] … & 
Holds[~Lubricated(x), s] & … )  Holds[On(x,y), Result(Stack(x,y),s)] 
 
 The difficulty becomes immediately apparent.  There are, in fact, Horty notes, 
two related problems here that need consideration.  The first is that the list of 
(pre)conditions or qualifications that must be included in the antecedent of any axiom is 
necessarily indefinitely large.  The second problem arises even if a suitably semi-
exhaustive listing of qualifications is incorporated into the antecedent.  Specifically, the 
system would need to exhaustively verify or certify that each (pre)condition has been 
                                                     
3 McCarthy in “Circumscription – a form of nonmonotonic reasoning” presents a case of 
“cannibals and missionaries” in which the goal is to strike upon a plan in which missionaries are 
ferried by rowboat from one bank to another without being eaten to illustrate the problem.  
McCarthy points out that in order for the problem to even get off the ground a set of ceteris 
paribus clauses about the normal workings of rowboats, oarlocks, rivers and the like need to be 




satisfied before being able to draw any conclusion.  Given that the number of axioms 
required to solve even a trivial toy scenario grows with alarming rapidity with the 
introduction of fluents and actions and since each axiom requires that an indefinitely 
large number of preconditions be verified, the computational burden on a system 
attempting to contend with even the simplest of tasks is enormous. 
 The frame problem, in its original technical formulation, is then in fact a 
constellation of several interrelated sub-puzzles.  The first constituent and the parent or 
umbrella puzzle, the planning problem is the problem of determining a sequence of 
actions , derivable from a systems‟ , the execution of which in some situation s will 
result in the satisfaction of some goal proposition . 
 There are, however, a number of ways in which a formal system can fail in 
contending with the planning problem.  First, a system can fail at the projection or 
ramification task.  Trivially, any system engaged in planning must be capable of 
effectively reasoning about the consequences of its proposed plans.  The difficulty posed 
by the ramification problem is rather straightforward.  Granting a plausible solution to 
the qualification problem, it is fairly simple to provide a system with a set of axioms that 
will allow it to reason effectively about the intended consequences of its actions.  It is, 
however, incredibly difficult to design a system (i.e., include all the necessary axioms) 
that can efficiently and effectively reason about and account for the unintended (i.e., 
non-obvious) consequences of its actions.  This is of significance for some of these 
unintended consequences might be relevant to the ultimate success of the plan in 
satisfying the goal proposition.  In order to rectify this difficulty frame axioms – axioms 
that make explicit the unintended as well as intended consequence of actions - are 
incorporated.  The problem with this solution is that for even the most trivial of tasks the 
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number of frame axioms needed to account for all of the (possibly germane) 
consequences is vast (i.e., indefinitely large) and computationally unmanageable.  The 
problem becomes then one of how to generate successful action plans without having to 
contend with an unmanageably large set of frame axioms.  More broadly, the problem is 
one of how to design a formal system that is capable of bringing to bear those 
consequences of its proposed plans that are relevant without engaging in the 
computationally intractable task of considering and assessing each and every 
consequence. 
Second, systems can fail in contending with the planning problem by failing to 
adequately contend with the persistence problem – the problem of “efficiently 
determining which things remain the same in a changing world.” (Morgenstern, 1996 
p.99)  Specifically, the persistence problem is one of how a formal system is to efficiently 
and effectively update the contents of its belief-set in light of the changes and non-
changes that result (or that would result when considering plans hypothetically) from 
the adoption of a plan.  Put another way, the persistence problem is one how to reason 
about and account for those facts and beliefs that do and do not change as the result of 
the execution of some plan (e.g., acting or fixing a belief).  Similar to the discussion 
above, frame axioms might be brought to bear to make explicit what facts and beliefs 
will not change and which will as a result of the execution of some plan, however (and 
as in the above) the number of such axioms that would be needed would be vast and 
when implemented would become computationally unfeasible.  The problem then is one 
of how to engineer a system that can efficiently and effectively update the relevant 
beliefs/facts without engaging in the computationally burdensome task of exhaustively 
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considering and updating the totality of the contents of its /belief-set (including the 
“updating” of those things that remain unchanged) for every plan considered.4 
Third, systems can fail in contending with the planning problem by failing to 
adequately contend with the qualification problem.  This problem, roughly the flip-side 
of the ramification problem, is the problem of effectively reasoning about the 
(pre)conditions necessary for the successful execution of an action.  As with the 
ramification problem, in order to determine whether a given action sequence will 
succeed, frame axioms must be incorporated which allow the system to reason about 
and verify that both the obvious and non-obvious preconditions necessary for the plan 
to succeed are satisfied.  But, once again, the number of frame axioms needed (even in 
toy cases) is vast and quickly becomes computationally unmanageable.  And so the 
qualification problem is the dual puzzle of how to engineer a formal system that (1) 
possesses suitably qualified axioms and (2) is capable of expeditiously and effectively 
verifying that the relevant preconditions necessary for a plan to succeed obtain.  
SITUATING THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PLANNING PROBLEM: INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS 
 The above introduction to the planning and frame problems has purposefully left 
rather vague the extent of the computational burden faced by any formal system 
engaged in planned action.  In order to get a more complete understanding of the nature 
of these puzzles and an idea of just how computationally burdensome they really are, it 
will be helpful to examine the intrinsic complexities of a number of formulations of the 
planning problem: the planning problem under complete information, planning under 
uncertainty and planning with “sensing” under uncertainty. 
                                                     
4 Some, most notably Morgenstern and Janlert, and Haugeland take the persistence problem to be 
the frame problem. 
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 Problems in the complexity class NP are those admitting of algorithmic solutions 
in polynomial time by means of a nondeterministic Turing machine that is, a Turing 
machine with the capacity to reference an “oracle” – a fictional but theoretically useful 
mechanism that makes instantaneous and invariably correct guesses (Papadimitriou, 
1993 p. 46 & p.172).  Problems solvable by nondeterministic machines in polynomial 
time are solvable by deterministic (that is, standard and non-oracular) Turing machines 
in super-polynomial time.  In fact, to be in the class NP just is to admit of a Non-
deterministic Polynomial time solution.  Quite generally, problems admitting 
deterministic polynomial time (those problems in the complexity class P) algorithmic 
solutions exhibit reasonable run-time performance.  Those problems admitting of 
nondeterministic polynomial time algorithmic solutions that is, those admitting only of 
deterministic super-polynomial time algorithmic solution (the problems in complexity class 
NP) exhibit, in general, unreasonable run-time performances.  Harel explains, 
As far as the algorithmic problem is concerned, a problem that admits a reasonable or 
polynomial time solution is said to be tractable, whereas a problem that admits only 
unreasonable or exponential-time solutions is termed intractable.  In general, intractable 
problems require impractically large amounts of time on relatively small inputs, 
whereas tractable problems admit algorithms that are practical for reasonably size 
inputs. (Harel, 1996 p.166) 
 
We have now a more precise means by which to determine whether or not a 
problem is an “intractable” one.  Any problems admitting of nondeterministic polynomial 
time algorithmic solution – that is, deterministic super-polynomial time solution - are 
intractable and are practically unsolvable for even very small inputs. 
With some of the basic terminology in place, let us consider first an instance of 
the planning problem in which the system has complete information.  Specifically, let us 
assume that the system has an exhaustive account of the values of all fluents in the initial 
situation S0  and  a sufficiently stocked such that the values of all fluents in subsequent 
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situations can also known.  Put another way, such a system is engaging in planning 
under the condition of complete certainty of both the way things are and the way things 
would be were some action undertaken.  It has been established that the planning 
problem under complete information is NP-Complete meaning that this problem is in 
the complexity class NP and that there exists a polynomial time reduction of this 
problem to SAT (the known NP problem of determining the satisfiability of sentences in 
proposition logic).  Baral, Kreinovich & Trejo (2000) offer the following proof.  
Establishing that planning under certainty is in the class NP is fairly straightforward for 
one need only establish that the activity of verifying that a solution to the problem will 
succeed is complete-able in deterministic polynomial time (i.e., by a standard Turing 
machine).  In Baral‟s terms, for a given situation  ascertaining whether or not a 
satisfactory plan exists requires that the validity of the formula P(,) (where P(,) is 
interpreted as “plan  succeeds for situation ” be determined.  To establish that this 
problem is in the class NP it must be shown that 1) the quantifier runs only over plans of 
finite and tractable length, and 2) the property P(,) is certifiable in deterministic 
polynomial time.  The first condition Baral notes follows immediately for only plans of 
finite and polynomial (tractable) length may be considered.  Plans of infinite length are 
disallowed as no evaluation could possibly be made with respect to their success and 
extraordinarily lengthy plans are proscribed because these are practically impossible to 
evaluate.  As to the second condition, that a plan  is successful in  can easily be 
certified in polynomial time. 
Specifically, since the initial state /(s0) is completely known, one need only 
inspect the state, call it s1, that results when the first action of the sequence is executed.  
Next, the state s2 that is the result of the execution of the second action in the plan 
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(applied to state s1) need be inspected.  Eventually, since the plans under consideration 
are of tractable lengths, at some situation sn one need only determine whether in this 
final state of affairs the goal proposition is satisfied.  Baral explains, “on each step of this 
construction, the application of an action to a state requires linear time; there are a 
polynomial number of steps in this construction.  Therefore, this checking indeed 
requires polynomial time.” (Baral, Kreinovish & Trejo, 2000 p. 255)  Since certification is 
in P, the problem is also solvable by a nondeterministic Turing machine in polynomial 
time.5  As such, the problem is solvable by a deterministic Turing machine in super-
polynomial time.  And so, the planning problem under complete information, Baral 
concludes is in the class NP.6  And so, the planning problem even under conditions of 
complete information is an intractable puzzle.  
While the planning problem under complete knowledge is difficult enough (i.e., 
NP-complete and therefore intractable) very few plans are actually formulated under the 
conditions of complete knowledge.  Rather, in most non-artificial environments, the 
values of at least some of the fluent will be unknown.  Planning under incomplete 
knowledge is, as a member of class of even more intrinsically difficult puzzles, a 
significantly more computationally burdensome task. 
                                                     
5 The idea here is fairly straightforward.  Consider SAT - the problem of satisfying some sentence 
of proposition logic (i.e., finding which assignments of T/F to predicates will result in the 
sentence being true).  While solving this puzzle is quite difficult – the brute force naïve algorithm 
of checking 2n possible assignments is the most efficient algorithm known – the issue of verifying 
or certifying a proposed solution once found is quite trivial.  One need merely insert the values 
and assess the sentence and determine if the sentence is true under this assignment.  Certification 
then takes place in polynomial time (in this case, linear time).  If certification is in P time, then a 
nondeterministic Turing machine (with access to an oracle) could solve the problem in P time – 
for it would always make correct assignments.  That is the problem has a nondeterministic 
polynomial time solution.  And so, SAT is NP. 
6 In fact, the planning problem under complete information has been shown to be NP-complete, 
which for present purposes means that it is a member of the class NP and is polynomial-time 
reducible to the satisfiability problem of proposition logic (SAT.)  
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Since the formulation of plans under uncertainty entails that the values of some 
fluents are unknown, the planning problem becomes one of determining whether an 
action-sequence 1 exists that will result in success for every set of values 2 of unknown 
fluents.  Given some situation , ascertaining whether a satisfactory plan 1 exists 
entails, Baral et al., (2000) explains, that the validity of the formula P() be 
determined.7   This problem has been established to belong to the complexity class 2P-
complete (alternatively NPNP) for it is of iterated complexity.  Planning under 
incomplete information is of iterated complexity for the problem of determining the 
values of the unknown fluents can be accomplished in polynomial time by a 
nondeterministic Turing machine (since such values are certifiable by a deterministic 
machine in P time).  Once the values of the unknown fluents are determined, the 
planning problem reduces to the “simple” problem of planning under complete 
knowledge.   
The values of unknown fluents, as determinable in nondeterministic polynomial 
time are determinable in deterministic super-polynomial time and as such this problem 
in isolation falls into the class NP.  Once these values are known the problem reduces to 
one of planning under complete knowledge which is a known NP-complete problem.  
And so, the planning problem under incomplete information is, as an NP-complete 
problem nested within an NP-complete problem, decidedly intractable. 
Suppose now that we consider the problem faced by a system that is capable of 
making conditional plans under uncertainty.  That is, suppose that we consider a system 
that is capable “sensing” or checking the values of various fluents after the execution of 
                                                     
7 P() is interpreted as:  plan  succeeds for the values  of initially unknown fluents in 
situation .  Baral, Kreinovich & Trejo, 2000 p. 257. 
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an action, and that is able to modify its conditional plans in light of what is finds.  Baral 
explains, 
In the presence of sensing, an action sequence may no longer be a predetermined 
sequence of actions: if one of these actions is sensing, then the next action may depend 
on the result of the sensing.  In general, the choice of a next action may depend on the 
results of all previous sensing actions.  Such an action is called a conditional plan. 
(Baral, Kreinovich & Trejo, 2000 p. 245)   
 
 As this version of the planning puzzle tracks most closely earlier discussion it of 
interest to note that this problem has been shown to a member of the class of problems 
PSPACE-Complete – a level of complexity above 2P-complete in the complexity 
hierarchy. 
The problem of planning under uncertainty with “sensing” may be reformulated 
as one of determining whether or not an action 1 exists such that for every possible 
result of “sensing” 2 there exists a second action 3 such that for every possible result of 
“sensing” 4 there exists a third action 5 and so on, such that at the end of the process 
the goal situation obtains.  More formally, the problem may be restated as one of 
determining the validity of “P() in which represent 
actions and the results of sensing actions and  runs over all possible values of un-
sensed (unknown) fluents.” (Baral et al., 2000 p.259).  For simplicity I will omit the 
particulars of the proof that this problem is in the class PSPACE-Complete as such detail 
would be counterproductive. 
It is, however, sufficient to note of this finding that, “a property whose existence 
question is PSPACE-complete probably cannot be verified in polynomial time using a 
polynomial-length „guess.‟” (Garey & Johnson, 1979 p.172).  That is, problems in the 
complexity class are approaching an extraordinarily high level of complexity – for it 
appears that since their solutions (once found) cannot even be verified in polynomial 
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time by a nondeterministic (i.e., oracular) machine – the certification problem is itself one 
that is at least as complex as those in the class NP.  Putting this another way, such 
problems are so hopelessly complex that the task of merely verifying just one proposed 
solution is itself intractable.   
The above is presented so that we have an unambiguous understanding of the 
nature of intractable puzzles, a further understanding of the nature of the planning 
problem, and to make quite clear that any formal system contending algorithmically 
with the planning problem (i.e., of providing complete and completely correct solutions) 
is faced with an inordinately complex and computationally unmanageable task.  
Specifically, the task is so computationally unmanageable as to be practically 
incomplete-able by even the most highly idealized of systems.    
While the planning/frame problem, as original presented, is a formal and 
somewhat technical problem or problem-set, the underlying puzzle is not a particularly 
technical one nor is the puzzle limited to the particular formalism of the situation 
calculus.  And so, having sketched the technical puzzle I will present what is sometimes 
termed the “philosopher‟s frame problem” with the aim of now discussing the problem 
in a more abstract, generalized and accessible way. To this end, I will consider the 
versions of the puzzle as discussed by Dennett, Haugeland, and Fodor.   
DENNETT‟S FRAME PROBLEM 
 Dennett offers a readily accessible set of scenarios that provide a less formal 
introduction to the puzzles underlying the frame problem.  He begins by asking us to 
consider a situation in which there is a room containing a wagon, a battery and a ticking 
time bomb.  Both the bomb and the battery are on the wagon.  We are next asked to 
29 
 
consider three robots, each of which is set the goal of retrieving the battery (its power 
source) from the room. 
 The first robot, R1, having hypothesized that pulling the wagon (atop which the 
battery rests) will result in the battery being removed from the room, enacts this plan.  
However, in executing this plan R1 is destroyed.  In pulling the wagon out of the room 
(atop which the battery rests) the bomb is also removed.  The robot R1, Dennett explains, 
“knew that the bomb was on the wagon in the room, but didn‟t realize that pulling the 
wagon would bring the bomb out along with the battery.  Poor R1 had missed that 
obvious implication of its planned act.” (Dennett, 1990 p. 147) 
 R1 then failed to account for the ramifications of the execution of the proposed 
action sequence.  R1, in short, failed to see the very relevance of the fact (a rather 
obvious unintended side-effect) that since the bomb too was on the wagon it would 
come along for the ride.   
 Since R1 was unable to enact a successful action sequence due to its inability to 
adequately project the ramifications of its plans, a second robot is created.  This new 
robot R1D1 is programmed to recognize not only the intended implications and 
consequences of its plans, but also the implications of any and all side effects of these 
plans.  In more technical terms, R1D1 has been provided with an exhaustive set of 
axioms designed to eliminate R1‟s reasoning gaffs with respect to the ramification 
problem.  However, this attempted correction of R1‟s deficiencies has its own 
shortcomings.  R1D1, being programmed to account for the non-obvious ramifications of 
its plans becomes mired in the computationally intensive process of generating all of the 
possible implications of its proposed action sequence.  Even assuming the set of 
implications to be finite in size, the amount of time required to complete these 
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calculations, as an instance of the previously discussed planning problem under 
incomplete knowledge, is excessive.  Dennett explains, noting that R1D1, 
Having just deduc[ed] that pulling the wagon out of the room would not change the 
color of the room‟s walls, [while just] embarking on a proof of the further implication 
that pulling the wagon out of the room would cause its wheels to turn more revolutions 
than there are wheels on the wagon [was destroyed by the bomb]. (Dennett, 1990 p. 
147)   
 
 And so while R1D1 is equipped in principle to generate all of the implications of 
its proposed action-plan – and thus evade the problem that stymied R1 by generating all 
of the potentially relevant ramifications of its plans - it is still doomed, precisely because 
it has no means by which to effectively limit the inferences that it draws.   
 Finally, in order to contend with the difficulties plaguing the first two robots, a 
third R2D1 is developed.  Unlike the previous models, R2D1 is imbued with the ability 
to distinguish between the relevant and irrelevant implications of its plans.  That is to 
say, R2D1 has been provided with some mechanism (i.e., a relevance metric) by which to 
categorize the implications of its plans into (1) those that are relevant to the satisfaction 
of its goals and (2) those that are not.  However, while R2D1 is much more richly 
programmed, it too fails miserably in contending with the planning problem.  
Specifically, though R2D1 is capable of inferring the implications of its proposed actions 
and it is capable of assessing which consequences are relevant (and which are not) it 
remains motionless, effectively cognitively/computationally paralyzed.  Specifically, 
since R2D1 is provided no means by which to determine which consequences are 
relevant (and thus which inferences it should bother making) beforehand, it is 
compelled to generate and consider every implication of its plans.  This is so because 
R2D1 can only make determinations of relevance a posteriori – that is after it has 
generated each ramification of its plan.  Dennett explains, 
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 “Do something!” [the programmers] yelled at it.  “I am” it retorted.  “I‟m busily 
ignoring some thousands of implications I have determined to be irrelevant.  Just as 
soon as I find an irrelevant implication, I put it on the list of those I must ignore …” and 
the bomb went off. (Dennett, 1990 p. 148) 
 
And so, while R2D1 has been provided with both an exhaustive set of axioms 
describing the effects (both changes and non-changes) that result from its plan and a 
relevance metric by which to discern which implications and effects are relevant and 
which are not, R2D1 troubles are by no means eased.  Rather, R2D1 is doubly troubled 
for not only must/can it generate an exhaustive set of the implications of its plans it 
must then assess each implication for its relevance.  Since the task of generating the set 
of implications is what caused R1D1‟s demise, and R2D1 must do this and then proceed 
to assess the relevance of each implication, it would appear that R2D1 has no hope of 
effectively and efficiently contending with the planning problem. 
Dennett takes the frame problem to be “a new, deep epistemological problem – 
accessible in principle but unnoticed by generations of philosophers – brought to light 
by the novel methods of AI, and still far from being solved.”(Dennett, 1990 p.142)  Given 
the claim that all three robots suffer from the frame problem it would appear that 
Dennett understands the problem to be a constellation of related puzzles.  Taken 
together, then, the frame problem for Dennett is the puzzle of designing a system that is 
capable of expeditiously generating a successful sequence of actions given some 
problem posed.  However, any system capable of successfully contending with the 
planning problem must be one that is capable of contending with the problem of 





HAUGELAND‟S FRAME PROBLEM 
 Haugeland suggests that the frame problem is the problem of “keeping temporal 
knowledge up to date, when there are side effects.”(Haugeland, 1987 p. 82)  In keeping 
with earlier discussion of the parent puzzle - the planning problem - Haugeland notes 
that any plan enacted in or on some original situation So will result in a consequent 
situation Sc.  Immediately, however, a problem arises for any formal system engaged in 
planned action – the persistence problem.  Most facts will remain unchanged in the 
resultant situation while others will change.  Consequently, Haugeland notes, any 
formal system engaged in planned action must be able to update a variety of its 
situational beliefs. (Haugeland, 1987 p. 82)  However, assuming the system‟s belief-set is 
of a non-trivial size, the task of exhaustively considering each belief and assessing 
whether each is to be updated is an intractable one.  The frame problem for Haugeland 
then  
Concerns how a system can ignore most conceivable updating questions and confront 
only „realistic‟ possibilities.  The issue is how to „home in on‟ relevant considerations, 
without wasting time on everything else the system knows.  Thus, the challenge is not 
how to decide for each fact whether it matters, but how to avoid that decision for 
almost every bit of knowledge. (Haugeland, 1987 p. 82) 
 
 In this respect, Haugeland‟s version of the frame problem echoes Dennett‟s 
discussion insofar as both claim the problem to be one of how to contend with the 
planning problem without exhaustively considering the system‟s belief-set (and the set 
of inferences from this) and without ignoring those beliefs/inferences that are relevant.  
Put another way, the challenge for both is how to engineer a system that successfully 
contends with the planning problem while avoiding the computational paralysis 




FODOR‟S FRAME PROBLEM 
 While considerable attention will be devoted to both Fodor‟s version of the frame 
problem as applied to belief-fixation and his critique of computational psychology, I will 
provide here only a brief introduction to his version of the problem.  The frame problem, 
Fodor suggests presents a “deep problem of rationality” that he terms Hamlet’s problem - 
the puzzle of determining “when the evidence you have looked at is enough.”(Fodor, 
1987 p. 140)   Given that any flexibly intelligent system will have to contend with the 
planning problem, the system must, if it is to generate reliably correct plans (i.e., 
satisfactorily contend with the problem), consider a “non-arbitrary sample of the 
available evidence.”(Fodor, 1987 p. 140)  Having to consider a non-arbitrary sample of 
evidence, Fodor argues, is tantamount to having to consider the totality of the system‟s 
belief set.  Since exhaustive consideration is untenable (as an intensively 
computationally demanding task) and considering only a sub-set of the belief-set, Fodor 
claims, is not a reliable means by which to plan and fix-beliefs, any flexibly intelligent 
computational system is faced with the problem of how to expeditiously and reliably 
arrive at correct conclusions (action-plans, belief-fixing).  Fodor explains, 
The frame problem is just Hamlet‟s problem viewed from an engineer‟s perspective.  
You want to make a device that is rational in the sense that its mechanisms of belief 
fixation are unencapsulated.  But you also want the device you make to actually 
succeed in fixing a belief or two from time to time; you don‟t want it to hang up the 
way Hamlet did.  So, on the one hand, you don‟t want to delimit its evidence searches 
arbitrarily (as in encapsulated systems); and, on the other, you want these searches to 
come, somehow, to an end.  How is this to be arranged?  What is a nonarbitrary 
strategy for delimiting the evidence that should be searched in rational belief fixation?  
I don‟t know how to answer this question.  If I did, I‟d have solved the frame 
problem.(Fodor, 1987 p. 140) 
 
 That is, Fodor takes the frame problem not to be the problem of generating the 
exhaustive set of all possible implications of a proposed plan.  Rather, like Dennett, he 
takes the problem to be one of how to engineer a system that is capable of generating 
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reliably successful plans (fix reliably correct beliefs) without having to exhaustively 
search and evaluate all of the implications of each proposed plan/commitment and 
without having to limit or truncate search arbitrarily.  
THE FRAME PROBLEM AS A GENERIC PUZZLE OF EXPEDITIOUS RELEVANCE DETERMINATION 
 While there is a multitude of examples and discussions as to the scope and 
nature of the frame problem, ranging from those that take the problem to be only the 
persistence problem to those that take the problem to be a constellation of related 
problems, there is an underlying puzzle shared by all accounts.  Each discussion, while 
differing in emphasis and focus, presents the frame problem as one of how to engineer a 
system that is capable of both expeditiously arriving at reliably correct conclusions 
about which “things” (i.e., plans, facts, beliefs, inferences and implications) are relevant.   
In support of the claim that the frame problem should be understood both as a rather 
generic puzzle and as a puzzle composed of a constellation of sub-problems (or problem 
kind) each of which instantiates the central problem of relevance determination, 
Glymour writes, 
The „frame problem‟ is not one problem, but an endless hodgepodge of problems 
concerned with how to characterize what is relevant in knowledge, action, planning, etc.  
Instances of the frame problem are all of the form:  Given an enormous amount of stuff, 
and some task to be done using some of the stuff, what is the relevant stuff for the task? 
(Glymour, 1987 p.65) 
 
RELEVANCE DETERMINATION AND A SET OF FRAME PROBLEM INSTANCES 
 While the frame problem is characterizable as the problem of expeditious 
relevance determination, there are, as Glymour suggests, numerous instances of the 
problem (i.e., frame-ish puzzles) that need to contended with by any system engaged in 
planned action, decision-making and belief-fixation.  While likely not an exhaustive list, 
the following presents a fair sample. 
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THE PROBLEM-SETTING OR META-PLANNING PROBLEM 
 Although each of the accounts outlined begins with a system that is previously 
set a task with which it must contend, (e.g., Dennett‟s robots are set the problem of 
getting the battery) the frame problem as the problem of relevance determination also 
arises in the realm of problem-setting.  Any flexibly intelligent system must be capable 
of guiding the kinds of ends and lines of inquiry that it will pursue.  That is, any 
intelligent system must be capable of determining which situations pose “problems” for 
it and which do not without exhaustively considering them all.  Put another way, the 
system must contend with the problem of determining what it should “think about” 
now without having to first “think about” everything.  Some situations – the relevant 
ones - need to be contended immediately with while others – the less pressing ones – 
need to be contended with eventually, while still others – the irrelevant ones – are to be 
ignored.  Without contending with this instance of the puzzle the system would be 
paralyzed before it even began being paralyzed by the problems raised by Dennett, 
Haugeland and Fodor.   And so, it would appear that any flexibly intelligent system is 
faced with the problem of expeditiously determining which lines of inquiry it will 
pursue (i.e., which situations it should treat as posing a problem and begin formulating a 
plan) and which it will not (i.e., which situations it should ignore).  
THE ATTENTIONAL-DIRECTION PROBLEM 
 There is, in any situation that a “sensing” system might find itself, some sub-set 
of all the “things” that might be attended are things that should be attended (i.e., that are 
relevant).8  That is, any system that is capable of directing its attention is faced with the 
                                                     
8 By “sensing” system I mean here any system that when engaged in a (conditional) planning task 
under uncertainty is capable of attending to (i.e., verifying) the values of fluents and adjusting its 
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frame problem instance (qua relevance problem instance) of determining which “things” 
it is to attend to and which it is to ignore.  Arriving at an all-things-considered 
conclusion about which “things” the system will attend is clearly computationally 
burdensome for so doing would require first that each “thing” be attended and second 
that a determination be made as to whether (or not) that “thing”‟ is worthy of attention.  
And so, the problem of attentional direction, as an instance of the frame problem, is one 
of how to design a system that will expeditiously attend to those “things” in its 
environment that are relevant (to either the problem of problem-setting or planning) 
while efficiently ignoring (i.e., not attending to) those that are not. 
THE MEMORY-ENCODING PROBLEM 
 Any finite system that is capable of encoding material to memory is faced 
immediately with the problem of determining which things are to be remembered (i.e., 
incorporated into its ) and which are to be ignored.  Assuming that memory is finite, it 
follows that not everything can be remembered.  If so, then some limiting mechanisms 
must be at play by which to direct which “things” are to be stored and which not.  
Managing the contents of memory in an all-thing-considered manner would require that 
a conclusion be reached with respect to the relevance of each “thing” considered.  The 
system would be faced with the computationally burdensome task of considering each 
“thing” and arriving at a conclusion as to whether or not it is relevant enough to be 
remembered.  The problem then is how to design a system that can manage the contents 
of memory by expeditiously determining which things – the relevant things – will be 
encode. 
                                                                                                                                                              
conditional plans accordingly. C.f. Baral, Kreinovich & Trejo (2000) for discussion of the 
computational complexity of the planning and conditional planning problem.  
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 Put another way, these two instances of the problem when taken together might 
form what might be call the extraction problem.  Given the contents of a system‟s 
environment and a finite memory store, how is the system to extract from its 
environment (attend to and encode) only those facts that are relevant to the successful 
determination of an action plan that satisfies a goal proposition. 
THE SEARCH PROBLEM 
 Any system engaged in planning is faced with the problem of finding those 
beliefs/facts stored in memory that are relevant to contending with the problem at hand.  
Given some problem posed some facts – the relevant ones - need to be brought to bear 
while most need not be.  Arriving at an all-things-considered conclusion about whether 
(or not) each member of the belief-set should be brought to bear (i.e., is relevant) is a 
clearly computationally burdensome task.   This is so, for assuming a non-trivially sized 
belief-set/memory store, the system would need to first access each member of its belief-
set and then arrive at a conclusion with respect to whether (or not) it is relevant to 
contending with the problem posed.  And so, any flexible system engaged in planned 
action is faced with the frame problem instance of how it is to expeditiously search 
memory (i.e., the belief-set), access and bring to bear those (and only those) facts that are 
relevant to contending with the problem posed.   
 Put another way the retrieval, access or search problem is the following:  Given 
all that a systems knows, believes or otherwise has stored (i.e., the contents of its ), how 
is the system to retrieve only those facts (i.e., some subset of ) that are relevant to the 
successful determination of an action sequence and thus satisfaction of some goal 




THE INFERENCE PROBLEM: 
 Most in line with earlier discussion of the frame problem and a variant of the 
search problem, any system capable of planned action is faced with the problem of 
expeditiously making and bringing to bear the relevant inferences from both any plan 
under consideration and its belief set.  Doing so presents a problem, for any system that 
attempts to arrive at all-things-considered conclusions about which inferences it should 
make is compelled to first exhaustively generate and second assess the complete set of 
producible inferences - a clearly computationally intensive task - as Dennett‟s examples 
illustrate.  And so, any flexibly intelligent system is faced with the problem of how it is 
to expeditiously make those (and only those) inferences that are relevant to contending 
with the problem posed. 
 Put another way, the inference or projection problem is the following:  Given all 
of the inferences that a system could produce from the contents of its , how is the 
system to produce only those inferences that are relevant to the successful determination 
of an action plan that satisfies the goal proposition. 
 As previous discussion outlined, the inference problem is further decomposable 
into the ramification, qualification and persistence/updating sub-problems discusses 
above.  Specifically, any flexibly intelligent system must be able to: (a) expeditiously and 
reliably infer the relevant ramifications of its plans without considering those that are 
(obviously) irrelevant; (b) expeditiously and reliably determine which preconditions 
need to be satisfied before a plan is enacted (i.e., the relevant ones) without exhaustively 
generating and verifying each qualification; and (c) expeditiously and reliably determine 
which beliefs need to be updated  (i.e., the relevant ones) and which persist without 
exhaustively evaluating (i.e., updating) the totality of the belief-set. 
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THE DECISION PROBLEM 
 Any system engaged in planning is faced with the task of ultimately deciding 
upon/enacting a course of action.   That is, any flexible system must determine when it 
is to stop thinking about a problem and/or its plans for contending with it and 
act/decide.  Arriving at an all-things-considered conclusion with respect to this instance 
of the problem is untenable since this will first require the system to first generate an 
indefinitely large set of plans, second to then evaluate the relevance of or assess the 
likely success of each before any plan is adopted and third to ultimately adopt/enact 
one plan.  And so, any flexibly intelligent system is faced with the problem of when it is 
to “stop thinking” about a problem and when it is to, in effect, stop planning and act. 
 In the next chapter, I will focus on Fodor‟s version of the problem with respect to 
the activity of belief-fixation.  So doing will serve to both situate previous discussion and 














CHAPTER 2: FODOR’S CHALLENGE, FRAME PROBLEMS AND COMPUTATIONAL  
PSYCHOLOGY  
 
Having introduced the frame problem and suggested both that it is reducible to a 
generalized puzzle of relevance determination and that the problem is best understood 
to be a constellation of related instances of a problem kind, I will next consider Fodor‟s 
argument that doxastic processes cannot be modeled in computationally feasible terms.  
Since Fodor‟s argument explicitly extends the frame problem to computational 
psychology, examining his arguments will serve the purpose of providing further 
insight into both the nature of the frame problem as well as the constraints that must be 
satisfied by any proposed solution. Since I will in the next chapter argue that Fodor‟s 
pessimism with respect to the model-ability of these processes is unwarranted, his 
argument will need to be unpacked. 
 Methodologically, while Fodor‟s discussion of the frame problem and his 
argument for the pessimistic conclusion with respect to the future of cognitive science 
might be presented individually, I see little benefit in taking this approach.  Since 
Fodor‟s argument is broadly reducible to the following: 
1. We (at least sometimes) fix beliefs in a normatively rational manner. 
 
2. Doing so requires that we contend successfully with the frame problem – qua the 
problem of expeditious relevance determination. 
 
3. Any system that satisfactorily contends with this problem engages in tasks that 
are not amenable to modeling in computationally feasible terms. 
 
4. Therefore, our doxastic processes are unmodel-able. 
 
I believe there to be every reason for presenting these discussions simultaneously.  
 Fodor (1983, 1987, 2000) argues for a rather pessimistic conclusion with respect to 
the future of cognitive science.  This pessimism most succinctly stated by Fodor‟s First 
law of the nonexistence of cognitive science (Fodor, 1983 p. 107) ultimately reduces to the 
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claim that while our cognitive processes are computationally realized, the “interesting 
activities of mind” (i.e., our doxastic processes) are not amenable to modeling in 
computationally feasible terms.  Fodor aims to establish that i) because we have no 
notion of how to even go about modeling doxastic processes in computationally feasible 
terms, and ii) since model-ability appears to be the only means by which we could ever 
come understand the workings of mind, and iii) since cognitive science has taken as its 
principle aim the task of explaining these processes in computational terms, we should 
be wholly pessimistic with respect to the future of cognitive science. 
 In support of the pessimistic conclusion that “(it appears) that Classical 
computations have no way to model [cognition]” (Fodor, 2000 p. 77) Fodor offers two 
distinct, though inter-related argument strains.  These are what I will call the argument 
from psychological isotropy and the argument from psychological (Quinean) holism. 
 In order to situate the discussion, it will be helpful if we have a brief overview of 
Fodor‟s argument.  At base, the argument proceeds from the following claims. 
 Arriving at conclusions rationally is the only means by which one may reliably arrive at 
correct conclusion (e.g., generate successful plans, fix correct beliefs). 
 
 Arriving at conclusions rationally requires that all of the evidence that is both available (to 
the system) and relevant (to the problem) be considered. 
 
Fodor‟s aim is to establish that the second of these leads to the pessimistic 
conclusion.  Once his arguments are unpacked and two principal strains distinguished, I 
will suggest that the argument from psychological isotropy is aimed at establishing that all 
beliefs in an agent‟s belief-set are available to him or her during the course of 
deliberation over what else he or she will come to believe.  The argument from 
psychological (Quinean) holism, I suggest, aims to secure that claim that relevance can be 
determined neither locally nor a priori but only globally and a posteriori.  Put another 
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way, this argument aims at establishing that any system capable of making 
determinations of relevance (at all) must be one that is capable of considering the totality 
of its belief-set.   
Broadly, then, if Fodor can establish that:    
1. Our doxastic processes are isotropic - that all of the beliefs in an agent‟s (or 
system‟s) belief-set are available to it in the course of its deliberations and, 
 
2. Our doxastic processes are Quinean – that all of these available beliefs are 
relevant (i.e., since relevance can only be determined a posteriori, each belief is a 
priori as relevant as any other) and, 
 
3. We at least sometimes arrive at conclusions rationally.  
 
Then we would have reason for thinking Fodor‟s pessimism with respect to the 
future of cognitive science to be warranted.  It is to the task of unpacking these two 
argument strains that I will now turn.   
THE ARGUMENT FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL ISOTROPY 
 Fodor‟s argument from psychological isotropy aims to establish that any 
particular belief and thus all beliefs in a system‟s (or agent‟s) belief-set are in principle 
available to it during the course of arriving at conclusions about what else it will come to 
believe.  By way of a general overview, the argument proceeds initially from the claim 
that our doxastic processes (i.e., the operations of belief-fixation) are computationally 
realized.  Next Fodor claims that psychological isotropy is a property of our doxastic 
processes.  This descriptive claim about our psychological processes serves as a premise 
in Fodor‟s argument that our cognitive processes must be architecturally informationally 
unencapsulated.  Taken in conjunction, these claims lead Fodor to conclude, via a reductio 
style argument, that the workings of our doxastic processes cannot be computationally 
modeled.  Since these operations are not apparently amenable to algorithmic description 
there can be, Fodor concludes, no meaningful science of mind. 
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 The argument from isotropy proceeds in two stages.  The first aims at 
establishing that our mechanisms of belief-fixation possess the property of psychological 
isotropy and as such must be informationally unencapsulated.  The second stage of the 
arguments aims to establish that if our doxastic processes are mediated by 
informationally unencapsulated mechanisms then there exists no viable strategy by 
which to model these processes in computationally feasible terms.  And so, if 
psychological isotropy is a property of our doxastic processes and if such processes, 
while computationally realized, are not model-able, since cognitive science has taken as 
it aim explaining cognition in computational terms, then, Fodor concludes, the workings 
of our doxastic processes and cognition quite generally will remain a mystery for the 
foreseeable future. 
FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL ISOTROPY TO INFORMATIONAL UNENCAPSULATION 
 Before proceeding, a few concepts and some terminology must be presented.  
Epistemologically, isotropy, Fodor explains, “is the principle that any fact may turn out to 
be (ir)relevant to the confirmation of any other.” (Fodor, 1983 p. 105)  Fodor continues, 
noting, 
By saying that confirmation is isotropic, I mean that the facts relevant to the 
confirmation of a scientific hypothesis may be drawn from anywhere in the field 
of previously established empirical (or, of course, demonstrative) truths.  
Crudely: everything that the scientist knows is, in principle, relevant to 
determining what else he ought to believe.  In principle, our botany constrains 
our astronomy, if only we could think of ways to make them connect. (Fodor, 
1983 p. 105) 
 
As presented, isotropy may be construed either as a descriptive claim about the 
manner in which confirmation actually occurs, or as a normative claim about the 
manner in which hypotheses ought to be confirmed.  I will suggest that Fodor offers two 
arguments aimed at establishing the descriptive claim that our doxastic processes are 
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what I will term psychologically isotropic.  Broadly, this amounts to the descriptive 
assertion that, in the course of arriving at conclusions, there are no beliefs possessed by 
agents (or systems) that are not available to them in the course of their deliberations. 
As there is little in the way of direct and explicit argument in support of this 
claim, I will attempt to reconstruct two lines of argument (both of which find support in 
Fodor‟s work) for the claim that isotropy is a property of our doxastic processes.  I will 
consider a third argument in support of this claim in a later section once the argument 
from psychological (Quinean) holism has been presented. 
THE INTUITIVE ARGUMENT 
 Psychological isotropy, understood as a descriptive claim, suggests that any 
piece of information (any belief in the belief-set) possessed by the agent may at least in 
principle be brought to bear in the course of deliberation.  Underlying this claim is the 
intuition that it really does seem as if we are capable at least in principle of accessing any 
belief that we happen to hold, at any time, given any proposition (hypothesis or belief) 
under consideration.  Furthermore, it really does seem that we are capable of 
entertaining simultaneously any set of thoughts – even those drawn from apparently 
radically disparate content domains – at any time, and given any proposition under 
consideration.  Prima facie it really does appear, for example, that we are quite capable 
of entertaining thoughts about AAA and thoughts about zymurgy (and, of course any 
random assortment of beliefs from A to Z) at any time no matter what else we might be 
thinking about.  We can, further, seemingly entertain thoughts about AAA and zymurgy 
simultaneously thus enabling us to in the course of our deliberations consider what (if 
any) bearing our beliefs about these matters may have on each other and on the issue 
under consideration.  We can, so it seems, at least in principle consider, in the course of 
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deciding what else to believe, anything else that we believe.  Or, the other way round, it 
really does seem that there are no beliefs that we possess that are in principle unavailable 
to us in the course of our deliberations.  While such a claim seems intuitively plausible, 
given that we have reason for thinking our introspective intuitions about the working of 
our own mental processes to be at least somewhat suspect and given the radical 
implications of the conclusion suggested by Fodor, perhaps more in the way of 
argument is needed.  
THE ARGUMENT FROM THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 
 Perhaps the intuitive argument is not quite what Fodor is offering.  Perhaps he is 
making the following empirical claim.  Suppose that we assume that psychological 
isotropy is not a property of our doxastic processes (i.e., that information is somehow 
partitioned).  If so, then it would follow that in the course of arriving at conclusions 
there must be some particular pieces of information that we possess that, as partitioned, 
absolutely cannot be brought to bear on some hypothesis or problem.  Fodor appears to 
be suggesting that for any manner in which information could be partitioned there can 
be found an actual instance in the history of science in which an agent, in arriving at a 
conclusion, brought to bear information that he or she (architecturally) should not have 
been able to access. 
 For example, suppose that my doxastic processes are not isotropic, that I have 
beliefs about AAA and zymurgy and that the non-isotropic (i.e., encapsulated) model 
proposed for describing my doxastic processes asserts that I should not even in principle 
be able to entertain thoughts about AAA and zymurgy simultaneously.  Fodor‟s 
argument appears to amount to the claim that, were we to examine the history of 
science, someone, in arriving at some conclusion, actually did simultaneously bring to 
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bear thoughts about AAA and zymurgy.  Seemingly, making the case is, in fact, even 
easier for Fodor, for even if no one has yet simultaneously brought to bear his or her 
beliefs about AAA and zymurgy, at least one person has now. 
 And so, Fodor appears to suggest, since no model of mind in which sets of 
information are partitioned from others exists without empirical counterexample, there 
can be no model of the workings of our doxastic processes that denies the property of 
psychological isotropy. 
FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL ISOTROPY TO NON-MODEL-ABILITY 
 Let us assume that Fodor has established that our doxastic processes are 
psychologically isotropic.  Fodor aims next to secure the claim needed to support the 
pessimistic conclusion, that “isotropic systems are ipso facto unencapsulated.” (Fodor, 
1983 p. 106)   While psychological isotropy is a property of minds and informational 
encapsulation is a property of processes, once some terminology has been explained, the 
move from psychological isotropy to informational unencapsulation becomes a trivial 
one.  To be a “module,” Fodor explains, is to be an 
Informationally encapsulated computational system – an inference-making 
mechanism whose access to background information is constrained by general 
features of cognitive architecture.  One can conceptualize a module as a special 
purpose computer with a proprietary database, under the conditions that: (a) the 
operations it performs have access only to the information in its database … and 
(b) at least some information that is available to at least some cognitive processes 
is not available to the module. (Fodor, 1985 p.3) 
 
Modular mechanisms then are computational systems that arrive at conclusions 
by considering definitionally only a subset of the total information available to the 
system at large, for this subset is all that is available to them.  Granting that Fodor has 
established that psychological isotropy is a property of our doxastic processes the 
argument for the informational unencapsulation of these processes follows rather 
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quickly.  The reductio argument proceeds along the following lines.  Suppose that the 
mechanisms realizing our doxastic processes are informationally encapsulated.  By 
definition, such mechanisms would have at their disposal only the information present 
in their proprietary databases.  Furthermore, there must, by definition, be information 
present elsewhere in the system (i.e., available to some other module) that is not 
available to the module under consideration.  As such, there must be at least one piece of 
information (i.e., belief) that, while available to at least one other module, cannot be 
available to the module under consideration.  In more psychological terms, there must 
be at least one belief that, while held by the agent (or system), is unavailable to him or 
her during deliberation.  If psychological isotropy is a property of our doxastic processes 
then the mechanisms mediating these processes cannot be informationally encapsulated.  
This follows for psychology isotropy holds that that any belief the system/agent holds 
can at least in principle be brought to bear during deliberation and information 
encapsulation demands that at least one belief (held elsewhere) is unavailable during 
deliberation.  Therefore, if psychological isotropy is a property of our doxastic processes 
and assuming these processes are computationally realized, then the mechanisms 
mediating these operations must be informationally unencapsulated – for encapsulation 
violates isotropy. 
The argument from psychological isotropy, then, attempts to secure that claim 
that our cognitive system must be organized so as to allow us access to any belief that 
we possess in the course of arriving at a conclusion about what else to believe.  Since any 
particular belief is available, it follows that the totality of the belief-set is available 
during deliberation.  Let the following then be the conclusion of the argument from 
psychological isotropy and a statement of what I will term Fodor‟s availability assertion. 
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 Any particular belief possessed by an agent (i.e., any member of a system‟s belief-set) is 
available to him/her during the course of deliberation about what else he/she  will come 
to believe. 
When taken in conjunction with Fodor‟s discussion of modularity, the following 
architectural conclusion may be drawn. 
 The mechanisms mediating our doxastic processes must be informationally 
unencapsulated. 
 
 These provide Fodor with a basis for presenting a set of arguments aimed at 
establishing the pessimistic conclusion.  In keeping with the strategy of attempting to 
disentangle the two argument strains, I will present Fodor‟s argument for how this 
strain leads to the pessimistic conclusion. 
FROM UNENCAPSULATION TO THE PESSIMISTIC CONCLUSION 
 The first stage of this argument aimed at establishing that the mechanisms 
mediating our doxastic processes must be informationally unencapsulated.  The second 
stage aims to establish that because our doxastic processes are not informationally 
encapsulated, these activities cannot be modeled in computationally feasible terms.  
Since the aim of cognitive science is to explain the workings of mind in computational 
terms and our doxastic processes are in principle un-model-able, it follows that we 
should be pessimistic with regard to the future of a full-fledged cognitive science.9 
 Before proceeding, it might be helpful to revisit the global structure of Fodor‟s 
argument in order to better situate the following discussion.  The argument begins with 
the assumption that (1) our doxastic processes are computationally realized.  Next, let us 
grant for purposes of discussion Fodor‟s conclusion that (2) the mechanisms mediating 
these processes must be informationally unencapsulated.  Third, let us further grant 
                                                     
9 As opposed to undertaking the “cognitive” science of perceptual systems, which as modularly 
realized and computationally model-able, we have every reason for being optimistic. 
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Fodor‟s claim that (3) we normal human reasoners at least sometimes arriving at 
conclusions (about what to do and what to believe) in a normatively rational manner.  
To this set, I suggest that Fodor includes the following to serve ultimately as the 
principle assumption of a reductio style argument (4) that our doxastic processes are 
model-able. 
 Fodor offers a battery of arguments at establishing that if (1), (2), and (3) are 
maintained then there is no means by which (4) can hold.  The argument against the 
possibility of modeling these processes proceeds by cases.  When disentangled, Fodor 
offers rejoinders to three strategies aimed at establishing the model-ability of our 
doxastic processes. 
STRATEGY ONE: EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH 
 Granting psychological isotropy holds of us and assuming that we at least 
sometimes actually do arrive at warranted conclusions about what to do and what to 
believe, it would appear that we must possess some means by which to locate the 
relevant information in our belief-sets.  Perhaps, one might suggest, there is a simple 
solution to this apparent puzzle and no reason to be pessimistic whatsoever.  Perhaps 
we merely consider exhaustively the totality of our beliefs.  So doing might very well 
provide us with the relevant information that is needed to contend with some problem.  
Furthermore, there appears to be no reason in principle why such a process could not be 
computationally modeled – for the exhaustive search of a set is clearly a model-able 
operation. 
 Fodor does not entirely disagree for, prima facie, there is no reason for thinking 
that the strategy of exhaustive search (as amenable to algorithmic description) is in 
principle un-model-able.  The following is a synthesis of a number of similar arguments 
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given by Fodor.  I suggest that what follows presents both a fair distillation of these 
arguments and a suitable reconstruction.  In chapter 1, I presented some of the findings 
with respect to the computational complexity of the planning and frame problems.  
While we need not revisit this in any detail, it is quite clear that these problems are 
incredibly computationally burdensome.  They are in effect beyond intractable.  And so, 
while these problems are in principle solvable by the exhaustive search strategy they 
are, given the amount of time needed to arrive at a conclusion – even by the most highly 
idealized computational systems - in practice unsolvable.  As of yet, however, since 
exhaustive search is amenable in principle to algorithmic solution (and thus modeling), 
Fodor has not secured the pessimistic conclusion.  The addition, however, of the 
following provides Fodor what is needed. 
 We normal human reasoners arrive at conclusions expeditiously. 
 Since any system that engages in the exhaustive search of a non-trivially sized set 
is committed to an incredibly computationally burdensome task requiring a vast amount 
of time (and/or space) to complete, and it appears that we are rather expeditious 
decision-makers and belief-fixers, either: 
1. The mechanism mediating our doxastic processes does not engage in the process of 
exhaustive search and evaluation for if it did, given the intractability of the task, we 
would (likely) never arrive at any conclusion whatsoever since our lives are, in the grand 
scheme of intractable problems, quite short. 
 
2. The mechanism mediating these processes does, in fact, engage in a process of exhaustive 
search, in which case, since no one has any idea whatsoever about how to model a 
computational system that can tract the intractable we are compelled to accept the 
pessimistic conclusion. 
 
And so, from this we are left with a choice between either denying that the 
mechanisms mediating doxastic processes engage in the exhaustive search and 
evaluation of the totality of the belief-set – in which case an alternative strategy is 
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needed if one wishes to maintain that doxastic processes are model-able - or granting 
Fodor his pessimistic conclusion. 
STRATEGY TWO:  MASSIVE MODULARITY (OF MIND) 
 As the issue of computational complexity (and not reliability) ultimately is 
responsible for the failure of the first strategy, and modular mechanisms are by 
definition systems that perform tractable computations, perhaps one might suggest that 
the mind is composed of a number of mental modules.  This claim, the massive 
modularity of mind thesis, holds that our minds are composed either largely or entirely of 
special-purpose modules.  As modules, by definition, have access in the course of their 
processing to only the information present in their proprietary databases, if the set of 
information in these databases is sufficiently limited, there appears prima facie reason 
for thinking that such a massively modular architecture might provide a means by 
which to model the workings of mind. 
 And so, let us suppose that our cognitive processes are mediated by a set of such 
mental modules each with its own proprietary database and each engineered to contend 
with certain kinds of problems.  Furthermore, let us assume that the contents of the 
databases of these modules are sufficiently limited to guarantee the tractability of their 
operations.  Fodor offers a number of arguments aimed at establishing the un-tenability 
(i.e., “incoherence”) of the massive modularity (of mind) hypothesis.  All of these, I 
suggest, are ultimately reducible to three fairly straightforward (counter) arguments.  
Two will be presented now while the third, since it relies upon the success of the 





MASSIVE MODULAR SYSTEMS NECESSARILY VIOLATE PSYCHOLOGICAL ISOTROPY 
 In terms of the viability of the massive modularity thesis, Fodor‟s argument 
proceeds rather quickly.  If our doxastic processes are psychologically isotropic then 
there are no beliefs that are in principle unavailable during deliberation.  Modules are 
informationally encapsulated systems.  Therefore, any putative mental module that 
engages in belief-fixation must be informationally encapsulated.  As such, there must be 
at least one belief that, while available to the system (i.e., some other module), is 
unavailable to the particular module under consideration.  More simply put, minds 
cannot be massively modularly realized because, if they were, psychological isotropy 
would fail to be a property of doxastic processes – which it is.    
MODULAR REGRESS AND THE NEED FOR AN UNENCAPSULATED “EXECUTIVE” 
 Suppose that one denies the claim that psychological isotropy is a property of 
cognitive processes, opting instead for the claim that minds are massively modularly 
realized.  That is, perhaps it is the case that for every problem domain that we might face 
we possess a dedicated mental module engineered for arriving at a conclusion in that 
domain.  Granting that complexity concerns will constrain any model proposed, let us 
further assume that any putative module will perform only tractable computations.  At 
least prima facie, such a model appears capable of providing an account of our doxastic 
processes in computationally feasible terms.  The principle criticism offered by Fodor 
against this strategy is that the massive modularity of mind thesis either courts a regress 
or is viciously circular. 
 Specifically, Fodor concludes that the massive modularity thesis is problematic 
for less informationally encapsulated “executive” mechanisms need to be posited for the 
account to be coherent.  He explains, 
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I think that, assuming that modular mechanisms are ipso facto domain-specific, 
the idea of a really massively – for example, an entirely – modular cognitive 
architecture is pretty close to incoherent.  Mechanisms that operate as modules 
presuppose mechanisms that don‟t. (Fodor 2001, p.71) 
 
 And so, suppose, Fodor continues, that our minds are composed of a set of 
special-purpose modules.  As informationally encapsulated, each module performs 
tractable computations.  Such a system would not be prone to the paralysis associated 
with the exhaustive search strategy.  As a trade for tractability, however, such modules 
are only allowed access to a limited amount of information available to the system as a 
whole – i.e., their own proprietary databases.  Suppose, Fodor continues, that there are 
two modules M1 and M2 and that M1 and M2 respond to the formal properties P1 and 
P2 of input representations.  The module M1 “turns on” when it encounters the property 
P1 and M2 “turns on” when it encounters the property P2.  It follows, Fodor suggests, 
that prior to the activation of these modules the properties P1 and P2 must be assigned 
to the appropriate representations.(Fodor 2001, p.72)  It is this requirement that forms 
the basis of Fodor‟s objection since it appears that some additional mechanism must be 
posited the task of which is to assign properties to representations.  Specifically, Fodor 
asks whether “the procedure that effects this assignment [is] itself domain 
specific.”(Fodor 2001, p.72)  Putting this another way, Fodor appears to be driving at the 
following point:  if we suppose that the mind is composed of mental modules, some 
additional mechanism must be posited that makes reliably correct determinations about 
which of the available modules is to be activated (i.e., relayed an input and “turned on”) 
and when.  I will call this the input-routing/module-activation problem.  
 There are, Fodor suggests, two options for contending with the input-
routing/module-activation problem.  Either we need to posit a single mechanism that 
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makes such determinations, or a set of mechanisms (i.e., modules) that conjunctively 
perform this task.  The first option, Fodor suggests, must be rejected as the mechanism 
proposed must be substantially less modular than either M1 or M2.  Put another way, 
the adoption of this option requires the positing of a mechanism that is capable of 
making reliably correct domain-general inferences which, Fodor concludes, undermines 
“the thesis that the mind is massively modular, that is, that it consists of nothing but 
systems that are, more or less, all equally domain-specific.”(Fodor, 2001 pp. 72-3)  The 
second option raises concerns of a regress.  If the determination of which modules are to 
be activated (i.e., “turned on”) is made by a set of modules then there must be a third 
mechanism posited that arrives at conclusions about which of these (meta)-modules is to 
be activated.  And so, Fodor concludes we are returned to the original puzzle for a third 
mechanism must once again for posited.  Either a single mechanism must be posited that 
makes such determinations or a set of modules must be posited that performs the (meta-
)module activation task.  The first horn commits the massive modularist to cede that at 
least some of the minds activities (and the most “interesting” parts in Fodor‟s 
estimation) cannot be modularly realized (and thus not modeled) while the second 
compels them to explain how the module-activation problem could be adequately 
contended with by a modularly realized mechanism.  Since the massive modularity 
hypothesis is offered in support of the second option (by denying the first), Fodor 
concludes that we are returned to the pessimistic conclusion. 
STRATEGY THREE: THE HEURISTIC APPROACH 
 Perhaps, we are possessed of a set of heuristic processes designed to engage in a 
selective and limited process of search and evaluation.  Prima facie, such a strategy for 
modeling the working of mind seems promising for it would 1) make purchase on 
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tractability by relying upon computationally economical search, stopping and decision 
rules, 2) arrive at reliability correct (or at least reliably approximately correct) 
conclusions by heuristically bringing to bear approximately relevant material, while 3) 
allowing for psychological isotropy to be maintained as a property of doxastic processes.  
That is, let us suppose that psychological isotropy is a property of doxastic processes 
and, as such, the interesting activities of mind are unencapsulated.  However, let us also 
assume that we are possessed of a battery of heuristic strategies that expedite the 
processes of search and decision-making.  As heuristics are both computationally 
economical and, when properly exploited, can be relied upon to produce reliably correct 
determinations, a massively heuristic model of mind seems quite promising. 
For example, barring for now concerns raised by the argument from Quinean 
holism (to be discussed shortly) such heuristics could be employed to, in effect, locate 
and bring to bear the relevant material without having to consider each and every belief 
in the set and without having to posit the existence of partitioned sets of material (i.e., 
that information is encapsulated as in modular systems).  Such a proposal, Fodor notes, 
“is entirely compatible with the idea that cognition is computational, so long as the 
course of presumed heuristic calculations is itself locally syntactically 
determined.”(Fodor 2001, p. 42)  It is, of course, this caveat that lays the groundwork for 
Fodor‟s objection to the heuristic strategy. 
 Fodor offers a regress argument (reminiscent of that raised against the massive 
modularity account) against the heuristic strategy.  While particular heuristics, he 
suggests, might very well provide a means by which to explain how particular 
inferences could be both reliably correct and expeditious, the heuristics strategy as a 
model of mind can be successful only if an account can be provided of how and when 
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particular heuristics are to be applied.  Fodor explains, “if there are to be heuristic 
solutions to problems about what to do or believe, there must be something that decides 
which heuristics to use in solving them.”(Fodor 2001 p. 41)  Clearly, Fodor is here raising 
a variant of the circularity/regress argument leveled against the massive modularity 
approach. 
 And so, along these same lines, for the heuristics approach to be viable, Fodor 
contends, requires that some mechanism be posited that is capable of contending with 
what I will term the heuristic selection problem – the problem of determining which 
heuristic from the set of all those available should be employed given the problem 
posed.  The problem here, Fodor contends, is that “the inferences that are required to 
figure out which local heuristic to employ are themselves often abductive.”(Fodor 2001 p. 
42)  This raises a number of concerns. 
 First, given some belief to be fixed (hypothesis to be confirmed) there are, under 
the heuristics approach, a battery of potential heuristics that might be employed.  In 
order to determine which heuristic ought to be employed requires that two problems be 
solved.  First, we must have some idea of what would serve as a solution (or 
approximate solution) to the problem posed.  Second, some mechanism must select, 
from the set of those available, those heuristics that are likely to result in the correct 
conclusion.  Since this requires that a reliably correct and expeditious belief be fixed (an 
hypothesis confirmed that, for example, heuristic h should be employed), we are, Fodor 
concludes, returned to the initial puzzle.  Specifically, relying upon the criticism of the 
massive modularity hypothesis (as viciously circular or courting a regress), it follows, 
Fodor concludes, that there can be no (meta)-heuristic solution to the heuristic selection 
problem.   And so, echoing the concerns raised with respect to the coherence of the 
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massive modularity approach as requiring the positing of an unencapsulated 
“executive,” there appears to be, he suggests, no viable means – other than the positing 
of an unencapsulated and computationally mysterious central processor – to anchor the 
regress raised by the heuristic selection problem. 
 And so, Fodor concludes, unless (1) the heuristics approach can adequately 
heuristically contend with the heuristic selection problem, or (2) the massive modularists 
can modularly anchor the module-selection problem, or (3) it can be demonstrated that 
P=NP (and thus that exhaustive search is in practice tractable), there appears to be no 
viable means by which to model the activities of mind in computationally feasible terms.  
Since these options, Fodor suggests, exhaust the field and none are capable in principle 
of providing a framework by which to make comprehensible the operations of belief-
fixation, we should, he concludes, be highly pessimistic with respect to the future of 
cognitive science.  While evaluation of this conclusion will be undertaken in the next 
chapter, before we proceed, a second argument strain in support of the pessimistic 
conclusion must be presented. 
THE ARGUMENT FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL (QUINEAN) HOLISM 
 The argument from psychological isotropy aimed at establishing that all beliefs in 
the belief set are available, thus raising the question of how a process of reliably correct 
belief-fixation could be made tractable.  The argument from psychological holism, I 
suggest, aims at establishing that all beliefs are simultaneously epistemically relevant to 
determining what else the agent believes.  The argument from psychological/Quinean 
holism, if successful, would establish that since relevance cannot be known a priori, it can 
only be determined by a process of rational consideration and evaluation that is 
necessarily global in character.  Put somewhat differently, the relevance of any given 
58 
 
belief to the confirmation of any given hypothesis can only be determined a posteriori.  If 
successful, the argument from psychological holism would effectively render any 
strategy that did not rely upon exhaustive search and rational consideration 
inconsequential, non-responsive and irrelevant.  Specifically, Fodor concludes, since we 
have no idea how to model something that engages in expeditious exhaustive search 
and since exhaustive search and rational consideration appears to be the only means by 
which relevance could possibly be determined, the pessimistic conclusions follows 
straightaway. 
 There appear to be two versions of the argument from psychological (Quinean) 
holism.  The first suggests that some of the conclusions that we reach require the 
exhaustive consideration of the belief-set, while the second appears to make the 
significantly stronger claim that the fixation of all warranted beliefs requires exhaustive 
consideration.  I will consider each in turn. 
 Before considering either, however, I must present some background material.  
Specifically, we need some idea of what Fodor means by the (normative/descriptive) 
claim that confirmation is Quinean.  By Quinean, Fodor means “the degree of 
confirmation assigned to any given hypothesis is sensitive to properties of the entire 
belief system; as it were, the shape of our whole science bears on the epistemic status of 
each scientific hypothesis.” (Fodor 1983 p.107)  He continues, 
The point about being Quinean is that we might have two astrophysical theories, 
both of which make the same predictions about algae and about everything else 
that we can think of to test, but such that one of the theories is better confirmed 
than the other – e.g., on the grounds of such considerations as simplicity, 
plausibility, and conservatism.  The point is that simplicity, plausibility, and 
conservatism are properties that theories have in virtue of their relation to the 





ARGUMENT ONE: SIMPLICITY, PLAUSIBILITY AND CONSERVATISM  
It‟s part of rationality to prefer the simpler of two competing beliefs, ceteris 
paribus; and likewise, it‟s part of practical intelligence to prefer the simpler of 
two competing plans for achieving a goal.  That appeals to simplicity are 
ineliminable in scientific reasoning is practically axiomatic.  But it would seem 
equally clear that comparing the relative simplicity of candidate beliefs, or of 
candidate plans of action, is routinely a part of reasoning in quotidian decisions 
about what one ought to think or do. (Fodor, 2001 p. 25) 
 
 Quite broadly, this argument is aimed at establishing that the various regress 
concerns discussed above can never in principle be suitably anchored.  This (weaker) 
version of the argument from Quinean psychological holism proceeds in the following 
manner. 
1. Arriving at conclusions in a normatively rational manner often depends upon our 
identifying properties of simplicity, plausibility and conservatism. 
 
2. Determinations of simplicity, plausibility and conservatism cannot be made locally and 
depend upon the totality of one‟s beliefs. 
 
3. We, at least sometimes, arrive at warranted conclusions about what else we should come 
to believe or do.  
 
4. Therefore, we at least sometimes make rational determinations of simplicity, plausibility 
and conservatism. 
 
5. We must then possess doxastic mechanisms whose operations do, at least sometimes, 
depend upon (i.e., access or consider) the totality of our beliefs. 
 
6. Thus, we do, at least sometimes, in the course of determining what we should believe, 
consider the totality of our beliefs. 
 
And so, if the mechanisms mediating doxastic processes do at least sometimes 
arrive at conclusions that require the consideration of the totality of the belief-set, then, 
Fodor concludes, we are led straightaway to the pessimistic conclusion for neither the 
massive modularity approach nor heuristics approach will be of any assistance.  
Modules, by definition, preclude the consideration of all of an agent‟s beliefs, while 
heuristics preferentially access particular beliefs by not accessing them all.  The only 
remaining strategy is that of exhaustive search.  Since this is a decidedly 
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computationally burdensome task and no one has any idea how to model a system that 
can “tract” an intractable task (as expeditious exhaustive search would require), we are 
led to the pessimistic conclusion. 
ARGUMENT TWO: THE HOLISTIC NATURE OF RELEVANCE DETERMINATION 
While the above, if successful, would establish that at least sometimes we must 
be considering the totality of our belief-sets in arriving at a conclusion, I suggest that 
Fodor‟s argument in fact aims to show that we must be considering the totality of our 
belief-sets whenever we arrive at a warranted conclusion.  Earlier I noted that Fodor relies 
upon the following rationality claim: 
 (It appears that) arriving at conclusions rationally requires that all of the evidence that is 
both relevant and available be considered. 
 
The argument from psychological isotropy aimed at establishing that the entire 
contents of our belief sets are available to us in the course of deliberation.  This stronger 
version of the argument from Quinean holism aims at securing the claim that all beliefs 
in this set are epistemically relevant.  If Fodor can establish this, the pessimistic 
conclusion would follow immediately for, once again, no one has any idea how to model 
the working of a formal system that expeditiously undertakes exhaustive search. 
 Before setting out the argument from psychological Quinean holism, I will 
present a quotation from Quine‟s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.”  So doing will provide 
some needed background about just what it is that Quinean holism entails.  Quite 
writes, 
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters 
of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of 
pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience 
only along the edges.  Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force 
whose boundary conditions are experience.  A conflict with experience at the 
periphery occasions readjustment in the interior of the field.  Truth values have 
to be redistributed over some of our statements.  Reevaluation of some 
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statements entails reevaluation of others, because of their logical 
interconnections – the logical laws being in turn simply certain further 
statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. … But the total 
field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is 
much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any 
single contrary experience.  No particular experiences are linked with any 
particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through 
considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole. (Quine, 1980 pp. 42-
3) 
 
 And so, the “web of belief” model proposed by Quine suggests that the relevance 
of a belief to some proposition under consideration can be neither determined in 
isolation nor a priori.  Since there is no means by which to determine relevance in 
isolation that is, removed from the epistemic fabric of which it is part (i.e., locally), and 
since relevance cannot be known beforehand, the entire belief-set must be evaluated for 
the relevance of even one belief (to some hypothesis under consideration) to be 
determined.  Fodor notes, 
The Duhem/Quine point about globality of relevance has to do with [this]:  You 
can‟t decide a priori which of your beliefs bear on the assessment of which of the 
others because what‟s relevant to what depends on how things are contingently 
in the world which in turn depends on how God put the world together. (Fodor, 
2001 p. 32) 
 
 Given this global or holistic structure and the commitments that this places upon 
confirmation and relevance determination, Fodor continues, “there is typically no way 
to delimit a priori the considerations that may be relevant.”(Fodor, 2001 p. 37)  If so, 
Fodor concludes, the pessimistic conclusion follows straightaway for neither the massive 
modularity nor heuristics approaches will be of any assistance.  Specifically, neither of 
these approaches will be of aid because both rely upon determinations of relevance 
being able to be made locally and prior to exhaustive consideration.  Put somewhat 
differently, both approaches rely for their successes upon the assumption that what is 
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relevant (to some hypothesis/task/problem) can be determined a priori and/or locally – 
that is without the need to consider exhaustively the contents of the belief-set. 
 As these strategies are in principle unfeasible, Fodor concludes, we are returned 
immediately to the original puzzle since it would appear that only the exhaustive search 
strategy could possibly satisfy the conditions sets by the Fodor/Duhem/Quine model of 
relevance determination.  That is, if relevance cannot be determined a priori and nor can 
it be determined locally, then only a mechanism that actually engages in global 
exhaustive search and evaluation of the belief-set would suffice. 
There‟s a familiar dilemma: Reliable abduction may require, in the limit, that the 
whole background of epistemic commitments be somehow brought to bear in 
planning and belief-fixation.  But feasible abduction requires, in practice, that not 
more than a small subset of even the relevant background beliefs is actually 
considered.  How to make abductive inferences that are both reliable and feasible 
is what they call in AI the frame problem. [Furthermore] classical architectures 
know of no reliable way to recognize [relevance] short of exhaustive searches of 
the background of epistemic commitments. (Fodor, 2001 pp. 37-8) 
 
 This (stronger) variant of the argument from psychological/Quinean holism 
concludes the following:  Since neither the massive modularity of mind thesis nor the 
heuristics approach are responsive, given the holistic nature of relevance determination 
only a mechanism of belief-fixation that actually engages in exhaustive search could 
possibly arrive at reliably correct determinations of relevance.  Any system that engages 
in exhaustive consideration, however, faces a computationally troublesome task.  
Specifically, any system that expeditiously makes reliably correct determinations of 
relevance must be possessed of some way to make tractable an intractable problem.  
Since we have no idea how to model such a system and we are just such a system, we 





REINTEGRATING THE TWO STRAINS 
 The argument from psychological isotropy aimed at establishing that, even if 
relevance could be readily determined, the massive modularity and heuristics 
approaches are problematic, for both must anchor a regress in order to be tenable.  The 
argument from psychological Quinean holism aims at establishing that relevance can be 
determined neither locally nor a priori and as such, it follows that the regress problems 
faced by the massive modularity and heuristics approaches can never be anchored by 
anything other than a domain-general and global/holistic central system type 
mechanism.  Since this kind of mechanism is in principle un-model-able, we should, 
Fodor concludes, be pessimistic about the future of cognitive science.   
 The aim of this chapter has been primarily exegetical.  I will use this exegesis as 
the basis of my discussion, in Chapter Three, of some arguments and positions that 
might occur to readers of Fodor who understand his pessimistic conclusion in the same 













CHAPTER 3:  RATIONAL SYSTEMS AND FODOR’S PESSIMISM 
 Fodor (1983, 1987, 2000) argues for a rather pessimistic conclusion with respect to 
the future of cognitive science.  This pessimism ultimately reduces to the claim that, 
though our doxastic processes are computationally realized, the interesting activities of 
mind (i.e., belief-fixation, decision-making, problem-solving and higher-level cognition 
in general) are not amenable to classical computational modeling.  And so, because 
modeling appears to be the only means by which we may come to understand the 
workings of our doxastic processes, we should be entirely pessimistic regarding the 
future of cognitive science.  Fodor‟s argument for this conclusion is fairly 
straightforward and may be reduced to the following: 
1. We, at least sometimes, arrive at conclusions rationally. 
 
2. Arriving at conclusions rationally requires that all of the evidence that is both relevant (to 
some hypothesis) and available (to the system) be considered. 
 
3. Any complex system capable of considering all the evidence that is both relevant and 
available to it cannot be modeled in computational terms. 
 
4. Therefore, our cognitive processes cannot be modeled in computational terms. 
 
 I will present an analysis of this argument and conclude that Fodor‟s pessimism 
is unwarranted.  This follows because, although it is true that any system capable of 
arriving at conclusions rationally cannot be modeled in computational terms, this is so 
for the rather interesting reason that it is impossible to model the operations of a 
physical impossibility.  To this end, I will aim to establish two conclusions.   
 First, I will argue that underlying Fodor‟s arguments in support of Premise 2, is 
an impossibly demanding normative rationality principle.  I next argue that this 
normative rationality condition cannot be satisfied by anything that is finite and 
physically realized.  Since it is reasonable to think that our cognitive processes are finite 
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and physically realized, it follows, by application of ought implies can reasoning, that this 
normative rationality principle is in need of weakening. (Cherniak, 1984 pp. 20, 106, 110, 
113)  This is significant for Fodor‟s principal objection to both the massive modularity of 
mind and heuristics approaches reduces to the claim that such processes are “irrational” 
and thus cannot be relied upon to model the workings of (a rational) mind.  And so, by 
weakening the demands of the rationality principle, these objections – and thus the 
argument in support of the pessimistic conclusion - are undermined.   
 Second, I‟ll argue that while finite and physically realized rational systems 
cannot be modeled in computational terms, because they cannot physically exist, we 
have no reason for thinking our cognitive processes to be rational in that sense.  That is, I 
will argue that the descriptive claim made by Fodor in Premise 1 above, as to the nature 
of our cognitive processes, is false.  Given Fodor‟s construal of the demands of 
rationality, it follows that we never arrive at conclusions rationally.  As such, whatever 
problems there are with modeling the operations of rational, finite and physically 
realized systems, these problems need not be and are not ours.  If not, then, there are no 
compelling reasons of principle for thinking our cognitive processes to be unmodelable. 
AN OUTLINE OF FODOR‟S (NORMATIVE) ARGUMENT 
 Reliably arriving at correct conclusions requires that determinations of relevance 
be made.  Drawing upon the Quinean model of confirmation, the relevance of a piece of 
evidence, Fodor contends, cannot rationally be determined a priori, nor can it rationally 
be determined locally; that is, in isolation from the theoretical web or fabric of the 
system‟s prior epistemic commitments.  As confirmation is Quinean, the relevance of 
any piece of evidence (given some hypothesis under consideration) can only be 
rationally determined both intra-theoretically (i.e., globally) and a posteriori. 
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 As relevance can only be determined globally and a posteriori, any system that 
arrives at conclusions by considering less than all of the available evidence necessarily 
considers an “arbitrary” sample – that is, less than all – of the available evidence and, as 
such, is “ipso facto irrational.” (Fodor, 1987 p.139) As rational systems should consider 
all of the evidence and as any subset of the evidence considered will necessarily be 
arbitrary, only a process that considers all of the available evidence could be a rational 
one.  Underlying Fodor‟s argument, then, is the following normative rationality 
principle: 
 A conclusion is reached rationally if and only if all of the evidence that is both relevant 
(to the hypothesis under consideration) and available (to the system) is considered. 
Having set out the rationality condition underlying Fodor‟s account, let us next 
consider a psychologically isotropic cognitive system.  Such systems are those in which 
the totality of the contents of the system‟s belief-set is available to it in the course of its 
deliberations.  In psychological isotropic models there are no beliefs/evidence that are 
architecturally encapsulated or otherwise partitioned from and thus unavailable to the 
system in the course of deliberation.10  As i) all of the material available to the system 
(i.e., its entire belief-set) could be relevant, and ii) relevance, Fodor contends, can neither 
be determined a priori nor locally (i.e., non-globally), any psychologically isotropic 
system must consider the totality of its belief-set for a determination of relevance to be 
made rationally.  We may now restate Fodor‟s normative rationality condition as: 
 A conclusion is reached rationally if and only if all of the evidence available to the system 
is considered. 
 
                                                     
10 Isotropy, Fodor holds, is a property of “rational” confirmation and thus of any rational system 
capable of engaging in such activities.  By “psychological isotropy” I mean only that this property 
holds descriptively of some individual cognitive process (i.e., with respect to access to the 
contents of some system‟s belief-set). 
67 
 
From this, it follows that: 
 A system is rational if and only if it is capable of, in the course of arriving at conclusions, 
considering all of the evidence available to it.11 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Fodor‟s argument for the pessimistic 
conclusion proceeds by cases.  While we need not revisit these arguments in detail, 
Fodor rejects the heuristics and massive modularity of mind proposals tout court because 
both are “irrational” strategies.  Modules, by definition, consider only a sub-set of the 
evidence available to the system and thus necessarily arrive at conclusions by 
considering an “arbitrary” sample of the evidence.  Since modules, as encapsulated, can 
only ever consider an arbitrary sample of the evidence available, they are ipso facto 
“irrational.”(Fodor 1983, 1987, 2000).  And so, because modules cannot satisfy the 
normative rationality condition they cannot, Fodor suggests, be relied upon to model the 
operations of mind.  Likewise, heuristics (as reliant upon search, stopping and decision 
rules) bring only a subset of the available evidence to bear without considering the 
totality of the evidence.  Since any sub-set brought to bear is “arbitrary,” (with respect to 
the totality of the available evidence) heuristics too are “irrational” processes.  And so, 
because heuristics cannot satisfy the normative rationality condition they cannot, Fodor 
suggests, be relied upon to model the operations of mind. 
                                                     
11 There is an external/wide and internal/narrow reading of “availability.”  The external 
construal suggests that as the system is capable of seeking out evidence (e.g., looking in the 
library) -- evidence that is, while not directly held by the system, broadly “available” to it.  The 
internal construal suggests that the system need only consider the current contents of its belief-
set.  As the external construal would make Fodor‟s rationality principle impossibly demanding – 
as there is little that is not “available” to us in this manner – and as such the argument for the 
pessimistic conclusion would thereby become a strawman, I‟ll assume that rationality as 
construed by Fodor requires “only” that the contents of the system‟s belief-set be considered.  So 
doing, however, does raise the concern, as Cherniak (1986) rightly notes, that such rationality 
conditions are in some respect too weak to really qualify, as such principles do not require the 
system to seek out evidence that, by external standards, it “should have known.”   
68 
 
 Underlying Fodor‟s arguments, then, is a particular normative rationality 
condition. Specifically, these proposed strategies for modeling the operations of mind 
are rejected precisely because they cannot arrive at conclusions rationally - in Fodor‟s 
sense.  More precisely, these approaches are dismissed because Fodor holds that since 
we at least sometimes do, in fact, satisfy the normative rationality condition (i.e., we at 
least sometimes do arrive at conclusions “rationally” – in Fodor‟s sense) and these 
approaches are “irrational” (in Fodor‟s sense), they cannot be relied upon to model the 
workings of our minds. 
 Given the role of the normative rationality condition in Fodor‟s account, it is 
necessary to first explore what must hold of any system capable of satisfying its 
demands.  To this end, I will offer a set of arguments aimed at establishing two points.  
First, I will argue that a truly rational (in Fodor‟s sense) system cannot arrive at 
conclusions of any kind.  Second, I will argue that if there are systems that can, in fact, 
arrive at conclusions rationally (in Fodor‟s sense), then these cannot be finite and 
physically instantiated.   
CONTENDING WITH THE IN PRINCIPLE CHALLENGE 
 In this section I will aim at establishing the following:  
 If a system is a rational one, that is, if it goes about attempting to arrive at conclusions 
rationally (in Fodor‟s sense), then either it will not be able to arrive at conclusions at all, 
or, if it can, then such a system must not be finite and physically realized. 
 
 Since we normal humans do arrive at conclusions, it would follow that either our 
cognitive and doxastic processes are not rational (i.e., they are “irrational” in Fodor‟s 
sense) or that they are not finite and physically realized.  In either case, I suggest, we 
have reason for rejecting Fodor‟s descriptive claim - that we, at least sometimes, arrive at 
conclusions rationally and thus instantiate (at least sometimes) rational systems.  Since 
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Fodor‟s argument relies upon this descriptive claim, if we have reason for thinking it 
false, it follows that his pessimism with respect to the model-ability of our cognitive 
processes is unwarranted. 
THE DEMANDS ON RATIONAL SYSTEMS 
“Rationality is a normative property; that is, it‟s one that a mental process ought 
to have.” (Fodor, 2000 p. 19) 
 
 I will present two related arguments aimed at establishing that while the third 
premise of Fodor‟s argument (i.e, that any complex system capable of considering all the 
evidence that is both relevant and available to it cannot be modeled in computational 
terms) is true, it is so for a reason other than that offered by Fodor.  Fodor claims that the 
un-model-ability of rational systems is due to concerns of computational complexity and 
thus to the practical (as opposed to in principle) impossibility of modeling the activities 
of such systems.12  I will argue that, given what must hold of anything capable of 
satisfying Fodor‟s normative principle, rational systems cannot be modeled because 
either they cannot arrive at conclusions at all, or, if they can, then they cannot be finite 
and physically instantiated.   Put another way, I will suggest that the activities of 
rational systems are in principle (as opposed to “merely” practically) un-model-able.  That 
Fodor‟s rationality principle is either unsatisfiable or satisfiable only by something that 
                                                     
12 Fodor suggests that the problem of rational exhaustive search is in principle computable, but in 
practice intractable (i.e., at least in the complexity class NP.)  Intractable tasks are those that are 
amenable to algorithmic solution and as such, they are amenable to modeling in computational 
terms.  Relying upon an exhaustive search algorithm, however, to arrive at a conclusion when 
faced with particular kinds of problems  (and thus particular problem-spaces) will require an 
inordinate amount of time.  And so, such algorithms can in principle be relied upon to arrive at 
correct conclusions but only if they are allowed an indefinitely large amount of time to do so.  As 
the amount of time necessary for a conclusion to be reached rationally may be excessive (i.e., 
exponential-time or worse and may require more than the amount of time remaining until the 
heat-death of the universe) while an exhaustive search algorithm can in principle be relied upon 
to arrive at correct conclusions, it cannot in practice be relied upon to do so. 
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is infinite and physically unrealizable, presents a dilemma, the implications of which I 
will explore. 
CONFIRMATIONAL REGRESS AND THE PARALYSIS OF RATIONAL SYSTEMS: 
 Fodor claims that for a system to arrive at conclusions rationally, all of the 
evidence that is both relevant (to the confirmation of some hypothesis) and available (to 
the system) must be considered. (Fodor, 1983, 1987, 2000) Any system capable of 
arriving at conclusions rationally must be capable of making determinations of 
relevance.  As with any determination, conclusions with respect to the relevance of a 
piece of evidence can be reached in one of two ways – “rationally” or “irrationally.”  
Relevance, Fodor claims, cannot be determined a priori nor (since confirmation is 
Quinean) can it be determined locally – that is, in isolation from the system‟s 
background set of epistemic commitments (i.e., its belief-set).  As confirmation is 
Quinean there is no non-arbitrary means by which to arrive at reliably correct 
conclusions about relevance.  And so, Fodor concludes, only a rational process could 
arrive at reliably correct determinations of relevance.13   
Arriving at conclusions or determinations of relevance rationally, however, 
requires the consideration of all of the relevant and available evidence.  Since all the 
available material is relevant material, the system must consider the totality of its belief-
set before rationally making a determination of relevance.14   
Given the Quinean model of confirmation relied upon by Fodor and Fodor‟s 
normative rationality principle, it follows that any system that has actually arrived at a 
conclusion rationally (in Fodor‟s sense) must have already succeeded in rationally 
                                                     
13 This follows, for no relevance confirmation metric can rationally be fixed a priori or locally. 
14 I take Fodor‟s (Quinean) point here to be the following: since relevance can only be determined  
a posteriori, everything is a priori relevant.  
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arriving at an indefinitely large number of conclusions with respect to the relevance of 
each of its beliefs to the hypothesis under consideration.  However, each of these 
individual conclusions, if reached rationally, requires that the system has already 
succeeded in rationally arriving at an indefinitely large number of conclusions with 
respect to the relevance of each of its beliefs to this hypothesis.  However, arriving at a 
conclusion rationally with respect to the relevance of each belief to each of these 
hypotheses requires that an indefinitely large number of relevance hypotheses be 
considered.  And so on. 
    Specifically, then, I am suggesting that Fodor‟s rationality principle is untenable 
for it requires that a rational system contend (rationally) with a regressive and non-
terminating series of rational relevance determinations.  By way of example, consider 
some hypothesis H1 under consideration by a rational system.  For the system to arrive 
at a conclusion rationally it must consider all of the evidence that is both i) relevant to 
the confirmation of H1 and ii) available to it.   
 To determine what such “consideration” might entail, given the nature of 
rational systems, take any piece of evidence B1 available to the system.  One of two 
things is true of B1: Either i) B1 is relevant to the confirmation of H1 or ii) it is not.  Since 
Fodor claims that relevance cannot be determined a priori nor locally (that is, beforehand 
and in isolation from the system‟s entire web, fabric, or set of background epistemic 
commitments) it follows that “consideration” of B1 can be given either rationally or 
“irrationally.”  For consideration to be given rationally (i.e., for a determination of 
relevance to be made) it must not be given arbitrarily or “on the cheap.”  Therefore, a 
relevance hypothesis RH1 – with regard to the relevance of B1 to H1 – must itself be 
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considered and intra-theoretically confirmed.15  Before a conclusion can be reached 
rationally with respect to H1, the relevance of B1 must be determined, which requires 
that a relevance hypothesis be confirmed intra-theoretically with respect to the system‟s 
entire set of prior background epistemic commitments (i.e., its belief-set.)  And so, to 
arrive at a conclusion rationally with respect to H1, the system must first arrive at a 
conclusion rationally with respect to RH1. 
 Now take any piece of evidence B2 that is available to the system.  Either B2 is 
relevant to the confirmation of RH1 or it is not.  Without restating the above, it follows 
that for the relevance of B2 (to RH1) to be determined rationally the system must 
“consider” B2 with respect to RH1 and do so intra-theoretically, that is, from within and 
with respect to the system‟s set of background epistemic commitments.  If this 
conclusion (i.e., the first relevance hypothesis) is to be reached rationally, a second 
relevance hypothesis RH2 – with respect to the relevance of B2 to RH1 – must be 
“considered” and intra-theoretically confirmed.  And so on.…16 
 Given that the system under consideration is a rational one, it is faced with a 
paradoxical and impossible task.  Specifically, it must contend with (i.e., rationally 
anchor) a regressive chain of rational hypothesis confirmations that cannot, in principle, 
be rationally anchored.  And so, any system that attempts to arrive at conclusions 
rationally will be caught in this ensuing regress and unable to arrive at conclusions at 
                                                     
15 The point here is that “consideration” in a rational system cannot simply be given to a piece of 
evidence “on the cheap” by the system by merely “accessing” the piece of evidence nor can 
“consideration” entail that the piece of evidence be placed near the hypothesis for its relevance to 
become apparent.  Rather, the system must arrive at a conclusion rationally (in Fodor‟s sense) 
with respect to the relevance of some piece of evidence.  It is because a conclusion must be 
reached – and reached rationally - if the system is to be a rational one – that the regress is able to 
take hold. 
16 The argument offered here can be run in either direction, for by assuming a conclusion to have 
in fact been reached rationally, it follows that an infinite number of relevance hypotheses must 
have been rationally confirmed. 
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all.  As I shall show in more detail later, any system that attempts to arrive at 
conclusions rationally (i.e., by satisfying Fodor‟s normative rationality condition) will be 
hopelessly cognitively paralyzed – unable to anchor/halt the endless regress of 
relevance hypothesis confirmations. 
 Since we do, in fact, arrive at conclusions, it follows that we cannot – even 
sometimes - be arriving at these conclusions rationally (i.e., we cannot satisfying Fodor‟s 
normative rationality principle).  Since we cannot - even sometimes - arrive at 
conclusions rationally, we cannot therefore be instantiations of a Fodor-style rational 
system. 
One may object that I have overstated Fodor‟s position in claiming that he is 
committed to the view that all material is relevant material. Rather, the objection 
continues, Fodor‟s claim is only that any particular belief could be relevant.  I will 
consider two responses here. 
If Fodor is making the claim that all material could be relevant and that, for 
example, the possibility is real that one‟s botanical beliefs are not, in fact, 
confirmationally relevant to a particular astronomical one, a number of points bear 
mentioning.  First, there would be no way of knowing a priori which beliefs are relevant 
and which are not.  Therefore, since any particular belief could be confirmationally 
relevant, for one to be rational (in Fodor‟s sense) there would be no option but to 
actually determine whether or not it, in fact, is relevant.  This, of course, requires that the 
system “consider” and consider rationally this bit of information.  Second, since this 
would hold for each belief in the set, one must, in order to be rational, consider them all.  
And so, even if Fodor is claiming only that some material is, in fact, never 
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confirmationally relevant to any hypothesis under consideration, any rational system 
must still consider and consider rationally the totality of its belief set. 
Understood in this manner, all available material is relevant material because the 
irrelevance of a piece of information to some particular hypothesis under consideration 
would be, given both the system‟s aim of determining what else it should believe and its 
inability to know a priori which things confirmationally bear on other things, quite 
relevant.  For example, that one should come to determine that one‟s botanical beliefs 
are, in fact, irrelevant to one‟s astronomical ones, would be, as knowable only a 
posteriori, quite relevant to the task of determining what else one should believe for one 
now knows that what one believes about matters botanical is in this instance 
confirmationally irrelevant.  
However, there is reason for thinking that Fodor‟s reliance upon the Quinean 
model may commit him to the stronger claim that, in fact, all available material is 
relevant.  The very structure of the Quinean web of belief model, whereby belief-fixation 
is confirmationally dependent upon the holistic equilibration of the entirety of the web – 
and thus upon the totality of the beliefs in the set – suggests that all of a system‟s beliefs 
are relevant to determining what else it should come to believe.  That is, given that belief 
sets are both isotropic and exhibit the web structure proposed by Quine, it would follow 
that each belief in the set is either directly or indirectly confirmationally linked to all other 
beliefs in the set.  Put another way, any particular belief in the set bears confirmationally 
on every other belief in the set.17   
Discussion has been so far somewhat abstract and perhaps an example will 
better serve the point.  Drawing upon this model then, let us consider some botanical 
                                                     
17 See Chapter 2, pp. 60-61 for direct quotation from Quine regarding this point.   
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belief (B) that is both located somewhere at the periphery of the field/web of the 
system‟s belief set.  This suggests that this particular belief serves to confirm those 
beliefs “below” it or those beliefs that are more “central” than it, as well.  (e.g., if B 
violated these central beliefs than either it would not have been accepted or the very 
structure of the web itself would have been readjusted to accommodate it).  Assuming 
the system to be an isotropic one, that is assuming that there are no beliefs or sets of 
beliefs that are partitioned from other sets, given the Quinean model, then, this 
particular botanical belief B would serve to, at least in part, directly confirm a number of 
the system‟s others beliefs.  In so doing it would serve also to confirm directly or 
indirectly those beliefs most “centrally” located. Indirectly, then, or transitively via the 
more central beliefs, B would lend confirmational support to all other beliefs in the set 
(since the belief set is both Quinean and isotropic).   
As isotropic and Quinean, the same would hold for every belief in the set, 
including any of those at the periphery.  And so, on the Quinean model, since one‟s 
botanical beliefs at least indirectly confirm one‟s astronomical beliefs and one‟s 
astronomical beliefs at least indirectly confirm botanical ones, each is, in fact, relevant to 
the other.  Since this would hold of any two beliefs in the set, that is since any two 
beliefs, as part of the same confirmational “fabric” or web, are mutually, though perhaps 
indirectly, confirmationally dependent, it would appear that all available material (i.e., 
the entirety of the belief-set) is relevant material.   
Furthermore, it would be rather puzzling on the Quinean model if everything the 
system believed was not relevant, since this would suggest that portions of a system‟s 
belief set would be isolated, partitioned or otherwise fractioned off from the web itself.  
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This in turn would suggest that confirmation/belief-fixation is, at least in some cases, 
not a global activity.  It also suggests a model that is non-isotropic.  
For example, suppose that botany really is entirely irrelevant to astronomy.  For 
one‟s botanical beliefs to be entirely irrelevant to one‟s astronomical ones, it would need 
to be the case that no matter what we came to believe about botany and no matter what 
reevaluation and readjustment of the web these might occasion, this would have no 
bearing whatsoever on what one should believe about matters astronomical.  That some 
finding in botany might result in the reevaluation and readjustment of the web, 
including perhaps some radical revision of the “central” beliefs, suggests that 
confirmation cannot be partitioned in this way under the Quinean account, since what 
we should believe about astronomy is certainly confirmationally dependent upon these 
central beliefs. 
And so, in any particular instance, since all beliefs in the set are confirmationally 
inter-dependent, as the Quinean model suggests, one‟s botanical beliefs would in fact be 
relevant to the credence that one should give an astronomical one.  From this it follows 
that, in order to be rational, one must “consider” the totality of the contents of the belief 
set (i.e., all that is available).  Put another way, since everything we believe is 
confirmationally relevant to everything else we believe and all that we should come to 
believe, rational confirmation would require that everything be considered and 
considered rationally.  Interestingly, the task for the rational system under this 
interpretation is no longer one limited to determining whether or not some particular 
belief is relevant, but rather, given that everything the system believes is relevant, the 
task becomes one of determining how or in what way, each belief in the set bears on the 
particular hypothesis under consideration. 
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THE PHYSICAL UN-REALIZABILITY OF RATIONAL SYSTEMS 
 The above discussion suggests that any rational system is compelled to consider 
a series of relevance hypotheses intra-theoretically.  Since, Fodor claims, there is no non-
arbitrary means by which to fix relevance18 other than by doing so rationally, any 
rational system en route to arriving at any conclusion must first arrive at an indefinitely 
large and non-terminating number of intermediate conclusions.  In this respect, Fodor‟s 
normative rationality standard is highly idealized for it requires the rational 
“consideration” of (i.e., that conclusions be reached rationally with respect to) an 
indefinitely large and non-terminating set. 
 Cherniak (1986) offers a number of arguments aimed at establishing that no finite 
system could satisfy such idealized rationality conditions.  While the particular 
idealization underlying Fodor‟s account is slightly weaker than that directly considered 
by Cherniak – for Fodor‟s account is idealized “only” insofar as the system must 
consider a regressive and non-terminating (i.e., infinite) set – Cherniak‟s arguments and 
conclusions remain applicable.  Since any system that is able to arrive at conclusions 
rationally must be capable of rationally considering a non-terminating (i.e., infinite) set, 
it follows that such a system must be capable of undertaking an infinite number of 
relevance determinations in a finite amount of time.  This follows for one of two reasons.  
Either (i) if a rational system could succeed in eventually ending the regress of rational 
consideration (i.e., confirming a relevance hypothesis) then there must have been at least 
                                                     
18 Given Fodor‟s (1983, 1987, 2000 pp. 63-4) discussion of Hamlet’s Problem – the problem of non-
arbitrarily (i.e., rationally) determining when the evidence considered is enough or the problem 
of non-arbitrarily (i.e., rationally) determining when to stop thinking about something – he 
appears to, in some way, acknowledge the potential for such a regress.  Though, as noted earlier, 




one additional belief (e.g., that a is relevant to b) added to the belief set.  This would hold 
for each relevance hypothesis confirmed.  And so, returning to the regress set out above, 
things look even worse for the rational system, since the set of beliefs that would need to 
be considered would be ever-increasing.  That is to say, each relevance hypothesis 
confirmed “along the way” would yield another belief that would need to be considered 
and considered rationally. Or (ii) if each newly confirmed relevance hypothesis is not 
added to the belief set, then the system would be compelled to endlessly reconfirm each 
relevance hypothesis.  And so, in the first case, the number of relevance hypotheses that 
would need to be confirmed would be ever-increasing (i.e., as new beliefs are added to 
the set).  In the second case, the number of relevance hypotheses that would need to be 
confirmed would also be ever increasing (i.e., because the system must endlessly 
reconfirm each relevance hypotheses). 
 By way of example, considering even a very small set of only 2 beliefs (a,b) and 
an hypothesis under consideration (c) provides a suitable toy example.  First, relevance 
hypotheses would have to be initially considered and confirmed for the product of a,b 
and c.  Assuming that the conformational regress set out could be anchored, each of 
these “considerations” would result in the creation of a new belief (e.g., that a is relevant 
to c, and so on).  Running through the entire set once would at least double the number 
of beliefs in the set.  In order to arrive at any conclusion rationally, the system would 
now need to consider the relevance of each of these and so on.  Alternatively, if these are 
not appended to the systems belief set, then, to arrive at any conclusion rationally it 
would need to endlessly (re)consider and (re)confirm each relevance hypothesis.  Either 
way, the rational system is faced with considering a non-terminating (i.e., infinite) set. 
And so, in keeping with Cherniak‟s conclusion, it would appear that any system that is 
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actually capable of arriving at conclusions rationally (in Fodor‟s sense) cannot be a finite 
one. 
 That rational systems cannot be finite, while of interest and potentially 
troublesome, is not yet problematic.  But, when taken in conjunction with the claim that 
anything that is physically realized (instantiated) must necessarily be limited and finite, 
the conclusion poses a problem.  Specifically, it would seem to follow that any system 
capable of arriving at conclusions rationally (in Fodor‟s sense) cannot be physically 
realized.  To put this point another way, nothing physically realized could instantiate a 
(Fodor-style) rational system.  To the extent that the operations of a rational system 
cannot be physically instantiated (i.e., they are physically unrealizable) it follows 
straightaway that they cannot be computationally modeled either.19  
A DILEMMA 
 The above discussion suggests one of two conclusions: i) given the apparent 
regress with which it must be contend, no rational system could arrive at conclusions at 
all, or, ii) if we suppose there to be rational systems that arrive at conclusions, then such 
systems can be neither finite nor physically realized/realizable.  The normative 
rationality principle, when taken in conjunction with Fodor‟s descriptive claim (that we 
at least sometimes arrive at conclusions rationally) presents the following dilemma or 
paradox. 
 Fodor‟s normative rationality condition is maintained and the descriptive claim – that we 
do at least sometimes arrive at conclusions rationally – is also maintained, in which case 
it would follow that we at least sometimes satisfy Fodor‟s normative rationality 
condition.  Given that the normative condition cannot be satisfied by anything that is 
finite and physically realized, it follows that at least sometimes our cognitive processes 
are neither finite nor physically realized. 
                                                     
19 That such operations are unmodelable follows by way of the Church-Turing thesis since there 
are no conclusions that could be reached by a rational system in a finite number of steps or 




 Fodor‟s normative rationality condition is maintained and physicalism is assumed true, 
in which case it would follow that Fodor‟s descriptive claim is false as neither we nor any 
other finite and physically realized system could ever arrive at conclusions rationally. 
Adopting the first horn of the dilemma appears to come at the price of a 
commitment to mystery interactive dualism for it follows from this that if we (at least 
sometimes) arrive at conclusions rationally, then our minds must (at least sometimes) be 
infinite and physically unrealizable.20  Assuming that some brand of physicalism is more 
plausible than mystery interactive dualism, there appears little reason to maintain an 
unrealizable and unsatisfiable normative rationality condition. 
 Adopting the second horn suggests that, whatever may be true normatively 
about the way we should go about arriving at conclusions, if our cognitive processes are 
physically realized then our cognitive systems are not and cannot be rational (in Fodor‟s 
sense).  Because we have good reason to think that our cognitive processes are 
physically realized, we have reason for rejecting the normative rationality principle as 
unsatisfiable. 
 There is a third option here that I have purposefully left unconsidered.  
Connectionism, quite interestingly, seems best to model Fodor‟s beliefs about the holistic 
character of cognition.  However, while radical connectionist networks, Fodor 
convincingly argues, provide a means by which to accommodate the properties of 
Quineanism and isotropy, it is “simply hopeless” (Fodor, 2000 p. 47) as a model of the 
workings of mind and should be rejected on the grounds that it cannot account for 
                                                     
20 As interactive dualists generally maintain that human (as opposed to divine) minds are finite, 
Carruthers raises the interesting point that adopting this horn means accepting that we are (in 
this one respect) divine.  C.f. Cherniak (1994) p. 94 for initial discussion of the claim that “we do 
not have God‟s brain.” 
81 
 
“patent truths about the productivity, systematicity, and compositionality of typical 
cognitive systems.” (Fodor, 2000 p. 50)  He continues, 
Here, as so often elsewhere, networks contrive to make the worst of both worlds.  They 
notoriously can‟t do what Turing architectures can, namely, provide a plausible 
account of the causal consequences of logical form.  But they also can‟t do what Turing 
architectures can‟t, namely, provide a plausible account of abductive inference.  It must 
be the sheer magnitude of their incompetence that makes them so popular. (Fodor, 2000 
p. 47) 
 
  Since Fodor clearly finds connectionism anathema on a number of other grounds, 
and we do appear to have good reason for thinking such proposals problematic for a 
number of the reasons he has set out, I have not included this as a viable third option.   
ON FODOR‟S DESCRIPTIVE CLAIM 
 The previous discussion suggested that either we do not arrive at conclusions 
rationally (and thus are not instantiations of rational systems) or that we are such 
systems (in which case our cognitive processes must be infinite and physically 
unrealizable).  I will suggest that we have little reason for accepting Fodor‟s descriptive 
claim - that we ever arrive at conclusions rationally - and thus little reason for believing 
our cognitive processes to be infinite and physically unrealizable. 
 In support of this, I will present an argument similar in form to Fodor‟s 
empirically based argument from the history of science outlined in the previous 
chapter.21  Specifically, I will suggest that a similar empirical claim may be made with 
respect to the un-tenability of Fodor‟s rationality condition - read descriptively. 
                                                     
21 Very briefly, Fodor‟s argument suggests that any massively modular model of mind proposed 
must posit the encapsulation/partitioning of discrete sets of information.  A commitment of this, 
he continues, is that there must be beliefs broadly available to the system as a whole that cannot, 
in principle, be simultaneously entertained – because they are partitioned from each other.  Any 
such model is implausible, he concludes, because a counterexample (from the history of science) 
can be found in which someone, somewhere at some time actually (in fact) did succeed in 
simultaneously entertaining the two bits of information that it should not – under some 
particular modular model proposed – be able to simultaneously consider.     
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 Consider any belief that you hold.  I suggest that for any such belief, there is at 
least one ancillary belief, piece of evidence or bit of information that, while broadly 
available to you, was not considered in the deliberative process that led to the fixing of 
that particular belief.  For example, I believe that “Manhattan is an island.”  I have just 
found at random in my dictionary the word “grommet.”  Until this moment, while I 
have had thoughts about Manhattan, about islands and about grommets, I have never 
brought to bear my beliefs about grommets on the hypothesis that Manhattan is an 
island.  And so, while psychological isotropy demands that any belief is available to be 
brought to bear, it does not follow from this that all of my beliefs are in fact ever brought 
to bear.  
I take my belief that Manhattan is an island to be warranted.  However, in 
arriving at my conclusions about Manhattan‟s island status, I failed to bring to bear my 
beliefs about grommets. I thus failed ipso facto to arrive at that conclusion rationally (in 
Fodor‟s sense).  As an empirical matter, I suggest that for any belief that I hold and for 
any conclusion that I have reached or may reach, there are/will be at least one belief i) 
that is available to me and 2) that I failed to bring to bear/consider.   
 To put the point slightly differently, I am suggesting that, as an empirical matter, 
for any conclusion reached, there is at least one piece of evidence that is both available to 
me and that would, because I failed to consider it, “surprise” me were it brought to my 
attention by some external source (e.g., by means of random dictionary searches or other 
person).  The fact that I can be surprised by one of my very own beliefs in the course of 
arriving at some conclusion/fixing some belief suggests that I could not have considered 
it in the course of my deliberation.  If so, then I could not have arrived at that conclusion 
rationally (in Fodor‟s sense). 
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 Because I can be surprised by one of my very own beliefs given any hypothesis 
under consideration (i.e., any conclusion reached or belief fixed), I cannot have arrived at 
any of my conclusions rationally (in Fodor‟s sense).  And so, it would appear that 
Fodor‟s descriptive claim – that we at least sometimes arrive at conclusions rationally - is 
false.22  As such, it is also false that we ever we even sometimes satisfy Fodor‟s normative 
rationality condition. 
With respect to Fodor‟s challenge, then, whatever the problems inherent in 
modeling the operations of rational (in Fodor‟s sense) systems - and there appear to be 
many - to the extent that we are not and (if our cognitive processes are finite and 
physically realized) cannot be instantiations of rational systems, these problems need 
not be ours. 
NORMATIVE RATIONALITY COME WHAT MAY 
 It is the adherence to both the normative rationality principle and the descriptive 
claim (i.e., that we, in fact, at least sometimes satisfy the normative principle) that under-
gird both the pessimistic conclusion and Fodor‟s prescription that cognitive science23 
must wait on the development of a suitably mysterious Quinean theory of computation. 
(Fodor, 1983, 2000)  And so, it appears that Fodor is advocating the adoption of the third 
horn in the following trilemma. 
 We maintain our commitment to computationalism and our commitment to the 
normative rationality principle, in which case we are compelled to revise our 
commitment to physicalism. 
                                                     
22 At the very least, we have reason for thinking the descriptive claim false and absolutely no 
reason for thinking it true. 
23 Fodor suggests that while we should continue to work on attempting to understand and model 
perceptual/input processes, as these are amenable to modular description and thus 
computational modeling, we shouldn‟t waste any more time trying to understand the working of 
our doxastic processes.  So doing, he claims, would require that we have a suitably Quinean 
theory of computation and we neither have one of these nor do we have any idea how we might 




 We maintain our commitment to computationalism and our commitment to physicalism, 
in which case we are compelled to revise our commitment to the normative rationality 
condition. 
 
 As “rationality is a normative property; that is, it‟s one that mental processes ought to 
have,” we maintain the commitment to the normative rationality condition come what 
may.  And so, if we maintain commitments to both physicalism and to the descriptive 
claim (that we do at least sometimes satisfy the normative rationality principle), then we 
are compelled, given the unsatisfiability of this normative rationality principle by any 
finite, physically realized and computationally modelable system, to revise our 
commitment to computationalism. 
 
I have argued that we have reason to think both that no finite and physically 
realized system could in principle satisfy Fodor‟s rationality condition and that Fodor‟s 
descriptive claim is false.  These conclusions, when taken in conjunction with Rey‟s 
(1997) arguments that computationalism is the most plausible (and perhaps only) hope 
for our understanding the workings of mind, provide us with good reason for rejecting 
the third horn of the trilemma.  In light of this, and assuming that physicalism is more 
plausible than mystery dualism, it would appear that we have far more compelling 
reasons for thinking the second horn the most plausible option. 
 The aim of this section has been narrow: to suggest that underlying and 
motivating Fodor‟s pessimism is an adherence to an unsatisfiable normative principle of 
rationality.  I have suggested that adherence to this principle compels Fodor, in light of 
its unsatisfiability and paradoxical implications, to ignore other options and call for the 
rejection24 of computationalism so that this normative principle can be made satisfiable.  
                                                     
24 Fodor, at times, (1983, p. 126; p. 129 and 2000 pp. 44-5, p. 71, pp. 77-8, p. 105, p. 108, pp. 111-2, 
p. 114) does appear to be suggesting that, in light of the paradox caused by the unsatisfiability of 
the rationality condition given the nature of our current theory of computation, a new theory of 
computation is needed.  Such a theory would be quite unlike anything currently available and 
would at least prima facie appear to require radical revision of some of our central logical 
notions.  That is, such a new Quinean theory of computation would seemingly be able to explain 
not only such practical concerns as how intractable operations could be “tracted” but also rather 
troubling ones like how finite systems could complete an infinite number of operations in a finite 
amount of time.   
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Given the options of either i) weakening the demands of the normative rationality 
principle or ii) come what may revising our commitments to computationalism or 
physicalism - or both - in order to make satisfiable the normative condition, we have 
little reason for thinking Fodor to have made a compelling case for pessimism. 
 The fact that a normative principle cannot be satisfied by any finite and 
physically realized system militates against our thinking it tenable.  The fact that 
computationalism fails to provide a model of the activities of an infinite and physically 
unrealizable system should not be a strike against it.  Since there is much to recommend 
in computationalism, and because we have reason for thinking the normative rationality 
principle undergirding Fodor‟s argument to be unsatisfiable and thus in need of 
weakening, we should reject the conclusion that the workings of the “interesting” 
activities of mind are in principle un-model-able.  This follows for once the rationality 
principle is weakened to one that is actually satisfiable, the a priori arguments for 
rejecting tout court the heuristics and massive modularity approaches are no longer 
supported.  Rather, since it would appear that our minds are instantiations of an 
“irrational” (in Fodor‟s sense) system – for we both arrive at conclusions and fail to do 
so rationally (in Fodor‟s sense) – and since the heuristics and massive modularity of 
mind programs proceed quite generally under the assumption that cognitive process are 
“irrational” (in Fodor‟s sense), these approaches appear promising. 
ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
 I argued in the previous section that Fodor‟s pessimism relies upon both an 
untenably demanding principle of normative rationality and an unwarranted 
descriptive claim that we ever arrive at conclusions rationally (in Fodor‟s sense).  From 
these I concluded that we have no reason for thinking the workings of mind to be on 
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principle un-model-able.  Arguing for this point of principle, however, goes only so far 
in contending with the challenge raised by Fodor.  What remains, of course, is for a 
positive account to be provided of how these processes might be modeled in 
computationally feasible terms.  In response to this rather practical “engineering” 
challenge of showing how a computational system could undertake the kinds of 
operations that we know the human mind to be capable (e.g., bringing disparate material 
to bear, exhibit flexibility and creativity but also systematicity of thought), I will outline 
some alternative approaches.  My aim here is not to provide a complete model of the 
workings of mind, but rather to show that there is a plausible and computationally 
feasible alternative overlooked by Fodor.  
 Before proceeding, however, it will be beneficial to very briefly review Fodor‟s 
two principle objections to the massive modularity of mind (and the heuristics 
approach) hypothesis outlined in the previous chapter.   
Fodor‟s first objection reduces to the claim that minds cannot be massively 
modularly realized because, if they were, psychological isotropy would fail to be a 
property of mind – which it is.  That is, since our doxastic processes are isotropic, and 
modules, as informationally encapsulated devices, necessarily violate isotropy, the mind 
cannot be massively modularly realized.   
Fodor‟s second objection reduces to the claim that no massively modular system 
could possibly contend with the input-routing or module activation problem (i.e., the 
problem of how a modular system could possibly make determinations about which 
other modules are to be routed which information and thus activated or “turned on.”)  
Contending with this puzzle (i.e., making a reliably correct determination about how 
and where information is to be routed and which modules are to activated), Fodor 
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argues, requires a system that is capable of undertaking holistic/global processes.  Since 
modules are, by definition, informationally encapsulated devices, they are in principle 
incapable of undertaking operations that consider the totality of the system‟s belief-set. 
This is the principal result of what I termed the argument from Quinean holism outlined 
in the previous chapter.   Since, Fodor maintains, only a mechanism capable of 
global/holistic processing could adequately contend with the input-routing or module 
activation problem, and modules are incapable of undertaking global operations, the 
mind cannot, he concludes, be massively modularly realized. 
Here‟s the moral:  Really massively modularity is a coherent account of cognitive 
architecture only if the input problem for each module (the problem of 
identifying representations in its proprietary domain) can be solved by 
inferences that aren‟t abductive (or otherwise holistic); that is, by domain-specific 
mechanisms.  There isn‟t, however, any reason to think that it can. (Fodor, 2001 
p. 78) 
 
Given this, the challenge for the massive modularity theorist (and, as the 
objections are conceptually identical, the heuristics-approach theorist) is to provide a 
model of a computational system that is capable of modularly (or heuristically) 
contending with the input-routing or module activation puzzle.  It is to the task of 
outlining such a model that I will now turn. 
 Carruthers (2006) argues for a reinterpretation of the term “encapsulation” – the 
principal feature of modular systems – that will provide a helpful and accessible starting 
point for the discussion.  Generally, an informationally encapsulated system is one 
“whose internal operations can‟t be affected by most or all of the information held 
elsewhere in the mind.”(Carruthers, 2006 p. 58)25  There is, Carruthers notes, a scope 
ambiguity resulting in an equivocation with respect to the demands placed on 
                                                     
25 As Fodor notes, “A module sans phrase is an informationally encapsulated cognitive 
mechanism.”(Fodor, 2001 p.58) 
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encapsulated systems.  The modal operator, he explains, can take either a “wide” or a 
“narrow” scope with respect to the quantifier.  Taken “narrowly,” informational 
encapsulation demands that, “concerning most of the information held in the mind, the 
system in question can‟t be affected by that information in the course of its 
processing.”(Carruthers, 2006 p.58) This conception of encapsulation – that adopted by 
Fodor – suggests that there are discrete sets of information that are permanently (i.e., 
physically) partitioned from each other.  Each module, then, has its own proprietary 
database that is physically partitioned from information held elsewhere in the system.  
Or, the other way around, there is information elsewhere in the system that is in 
principle inaccessible and thus unavailable to the module in the course of its processing. 
 Taken “widely,” encapsulation demands that a system be “such that it can‟t be 
affected by most of the information held in the mind in the course of its 
processing.”(Carruthers, 2006 p.58)  Or, put somewhat differently, taken “widely” 
encapsulation demands that the module will actually consider only a small sub-set of 
the information that is globally available to it.  Carruthers explains,  
It can be true that the operations of a module can‟t be affected by most of the 
information in the mind, without there being some determinate sub-division 
between the information that can affect the system and the information that 
can‟t.  For, it can be the case that the system‟s algorithms are set up such that 
only a limited amount of information is ever consulted before the task is 
completed or aborted.  Put in this way: a module can be a system that must 
consider only a sub-set of the information available.  Whether it does this via 
encapsulation as traditionally understood (the narrow scope variety) or via 
heuristics and stopping rules (wide-scope encapsulation) is inessential.  
(Carruthers, 2006 pp. 58-9) 
 
 Carruthers‟ point then is that “narrow” scope (i.e., traditional Fodor-style) 
encapsulation is only one manner in which an operation might be modularly realized.  
While encapsulation may be undertaken by physically partitioning classes of 
information (i.e., by physically fixing a module with a limited and proprietary database) 
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it may also be undertaken by processes that heuristically limit the material that a 
module will actually operate upon.  Such “process encapsulation” then serves to limit 
the set of information considered by the module, not by physically partitioning the set, 
but rather by limiting the information actually brought to bear for processing.  Since it is 
processes that limit the material actually operated upon by a wide-scope encapsulated 
device, conceptually, such modules could have a proprietary database that is (with 
respect to the narrow scope interpretation) identical to the set of information that is 
globally available to the system as a whole. 
 Narrow scope encapsulated systems then will definitionally violate the isotropy 
condition for there is, by stipulation, information that such devices cannot in principle 
access.  For precisely this reason, narrow-scope encapsulated systems cannot undertake 
global computations.  As such, narrow scope encapsulated systems also necessarily 
violate the Quinean holism condition, for the reasons outlined by Fodor.  In contrast, 
wide-scope encapsulated devices need not violate the isotropy condition for there are no 
bits of information that are in principle unavailable to them in the course of their 
operations.  By design heuristics (by means of the exploitation of search and stopping 
rules) bring to bear only some sub-set of the available information. Different heuristics, 
when applied to the same set of available information, bring different sub-sets of 
material to bear.  And so, depending on the nature of the heuristic processes employed, 
a wide-scope encapsulated device (unlike a Fodor-style module) could, in principle, be 
provided with and thus consider during the course of its processing, any particular bit 
of information held by the system at large – though it will actually consider only some 
sub-set of this totality (i.e., whatever the particular heuristic exploited actually brings to 
bear).  Put another way, in wide-scope encapsulated systems, while only some sub-set of 
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the available information will actually be considered, there are no bits of information 
that are, in principle, unavailable.  And so, with respect to Fodor‟s first objection, it need 
not follow that just because an operation is modularly realized that it must also violate 
the condition of isotropy.   
While narrow-scope encapsulated systems are, for the reasons outlined by Fodor, 
incapable of arriving at reliably correct conclusions about which of the available material 
is to be brought to bear, wide-scope encapsulated systems need not be.  With respect to 
the issue of reliability, we have no reason for thinking that we arrive at conclusions 
rationally (in Fodor‟s sense) and thus no reason for thinking that we are, in this respect, 
cognitive optimizers.  Rather, in light of the unsatisfiability of Fodor‟s normative 
rationality condition, I argued that we have reason to weaken this rationality condition 
to one that is satisfiable by the likes of us.  Since we cannot be cognitive “optimizers” in 
this sense (i.e., we cannot arrive at conclusions rationally in Fodor‟s sense), it follows 
that we must be “satisficers” (i.e., we must consider only some of the available evidence).   
That we do in fact deploy processes that are satisficing (i.e., that are “good enough” 
without being optimal) is well accepted among cognitive scientists.  With respect then to 
the heuristic search, stopping and decision-making rules relied upon by wide-scope 
encapsulated systems, it is reasonable to suggest that evolutionary pressures would 
have favored those search heuristics (i.e., those heuristics that bring to bear sub-sets of 
the available information without consider the set exhaustively) which, though irrational 
(in Fodor‟s sense), are “good enough.”26  While such evolutionary claims are at least 
                                                     
26 That such heuristic processes are not optimal – that they exhibit characteristic breakdowns -  is 
also well known.  C.f. Kahnman 1982. 
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prima facie plausible, the issue of the accuracy of such heuristics is, at base, an empirical 
matter.    
With respect to this, Gigerenzer et al., (1999) investigated the reliability, 
tractability and robustness of a number of search, stopping and decision-making 
heuristics comparing them to more “rational” (i.e., informationally and computationally 
intensive) strategies.  Both very simple one-cue heuristic stopping/decision rules and 
complex and computationally intensive rational “benchmark” strategies were 
considered.  Specifically, Gigerenzer investigated how accurate very simple heuristics, 
that both fail to incorporate all of the available evidence and which rely upon only one 
cue, could be.  Quite surprisingly they found that, with respect to accuracy, the three 
simple “fast and frugal” heuristics tested outperformed or tied those computationally 
intensive “rational” strategies that considered all (or most of) the available evidence. 
(e.g., Dawes‟ rule, Franklin‟s rule and multiple linear regression). (Gigerenzer et.al., 1999 
p.87) Furthermore, by dramatically reducing the impact of data over-fitting (i.e., over-
generalization) which reduces the accuracy of rational strategies, these simple heuristics 
were found to be quite robust, as well. (Gigerenzer et. al., 1999, pp. 109-110, pp. 127-136)  
And so, contrary to the common lay assumption that reliability is proportional to the 
amount of information considered (i.e., that “more is better”) we have reason to think 
that very simple heuristics can be surprising effective. 
Underlying Fodor‟s conclusion is the assumption that only a system capable of 
arriving at conclusions rationally (in Fodor‟s sense) could arrive at reliably correct 
conclusions.  But, Gigerenzer et al., findings suggest that heuristics are reliable processes 
for arriving at correct (i.e., satisficing) conclusions.  While irrational processes (in Fodor‟s 
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sense) they are “good enough” and “good enough” is good enough given that we have 
every reason for weakening Fodor‟s impossibly demanding rationality principle.   
That heuristic processes are expeditious and robust (i.e., they generalize without 
over-fitting) and are nearly, as, or more reliable than “rational” strategies, is of interest.  
However, in order for the heuristics approach to be a viable alternative, it must contend 
with the heuristic variant of the input-routing problem – what I have termed the 
heuristic-selection problem (i.e., the problem of when to employ which heuristic).  
With respect to the proposed meta-heuristic regress that Fodor claims any 
massively heuristic system must contend (i.e., the heuristic-selection problem discussed 
in Chapter 2), there is no reason to think that heuristics and thus meta-heuristics could 
not be organized such that particular search, stopping, and decision meta-heuristics are 
exploited to determine which (1st order) heuristics are to be employed.  It is likely, 
however, given the very nature of heuristics, that as one goes “up” the meta-heuristic 
chain that there will be progressively fewer and fewer meta-heuristics per order.  In 
other words, one would expect there to be far fewer meta-heuristics (2nd order) than 
heuristics (1st order) and far fewer still meta-meta-heuristics (3rd order) than meta-
heuristics, and so on.  If so, then there would be no reason, in principle, why such a 
regress must be viciously circular or un-anchorable as Fodor suggests.27 
While the heuristics approach has available to it an internal means by which to 
contend with the heuristic-selection problem, there are other alternatives by which 
heuristics might be selected - without the need to posit a central executive.  I will return 
to this following the presentation of Barrett‟s enzymatic model. 
                                                     
27 Carruthers (2006) p. 358 offers a similar rejoinder. 
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With Carruthers‟ distinction marked and the conception of a wide-scope 
encapsulated device outlined, I will next consider an alternative model of how a 
modular system may contend with the input-routing or module selection problem 
overlooked by Fodor.  I will begin by setting out Baars (1988) and Shanahan & Baars‟ 
(2005) global workspace model which provides a general account of how a massively 
modular system might be relied upon to contend with the input-routing problem.  Next, 
I consider how the global workspace architecture (and similar “bulletin board” models 
of mind) might be realized by examining Barrett‟s model in which modules are 
metaphorically likened to enzymatic systems.   
BAARS & SHANAHAN‟S GLOBAL WORKSPACE ARCHITECTURE 
 Shanahan & Baars (2005) argue that Fodor‟s version of the frame problem relies 
upon a commitment to a particular architectural model that “betrays the assumption 
that it is the responsibility of the cognitive process itself to make the selection of relevant 
information.”(Shanahan & Baars, 2005 p.12)  Specifically, they note that while Fodor 
offers little detail as to the particular computational model he has in mind when making 
the claim that unencapsulated processes cannot be modeled, there are, they suggest, 
Strong hints of a commitment to a centralized, serial process that somehow has 
all of the requisite information at its disposal, and that has the responsibility of 
choosing what information to access and when to access it.  Although parallel 
peripheral processes are part of the picture, they are passive sources of 
information that wait to be called upon before delivering their goods. (Shanahan 
& Baars, 2005 p.16) 
 
In particular, they suggest that Fodor is led astray by Dennett‟s discussion of the 
frame problem (discussed in chapter 1) in which robots engage in a serial process of 
exhaustive consideration – generating and assessing each alternative (ramification) one-
at-a-time.  They note, however, that “the design of Dennett‟s robot is absurd,” for each 
robot is required to carry out a “serial computation that exhaustively works through a 
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long list of alternatives one-by-one before it terminates.”(Shanahan & Baars, 2005 p.11)  
And so, under this serial and exhaustive model, Fodor takes the question to be one of 
how possibly a computational system could expeditiously bring relevant material to 
bear.  Shanahan & Baars, however, suggest that Fodor‟s version of the puzzle should be 
recast as one of how relevant information might actively be made salient and available 
by modular processes themselves.  In response to this recast puzzle, they provide a 
different architectural model, the global workspace model (GWM), in which no central 
executive is posited and in which the “responsibility for selecting relevant information 
[is distributed] among multiple parallel processes.”(Shanahan & Baars, 2005 p.12)  They 
explain, 
The essence of the global workspace architecture is a model of combined serial 
and parallel information flow.  Multiple parallel specialist processes compete and 
co-operate for access to a global workspace.  A specialist process can be 
responsible for some aspect of perception, long-term planning, problem solving, 
language understanding, language production, action selection, or indeed any 
posited cognitive process.  If granted access to the global workspace, the 
information a process has to offer is “broadcast” back to the entire set of 
specialists.  The means by which access is granted to the global workspace can be 
likened to an attention mechanism.  
The contents of the global workspace unfolds in a serial manner.  But it is 
the product of massively parallel processing.  A sequence of moment-to-moment 
snapshots of the global workspace would reveal a meaningful progression, and 
each state would typically be related to its predecessor in a coherent way.  Yet 
the state-to-state relation itself is highly complex, and could not be obtained by a 
single computational step on a conventional serial machine.  Rather, it is the 
outcome of a selection procedure that has at its disposal the results of numerous 
separate computations, each of which might have something of value to 
contribute to the ongoing procession of thoughts. … Unconscious information 
processing is carried out by the parallel specialist processes.  Only information 
that is broadcast via the global workspace is consciously processed. (Shanahan & 
Baars, 2005 pp.12-13) 
 
 And so, Shanahan & Baars are offering the global workspace model as a direct 
counter to Fodor‟s claim that a central “executive” must be posited in order to contend 
with the various selection problems outlined in the previous chapter (i.e., input-routing, 
module-activation, heuristic-selection problems).   
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 Instead of positing an “executive” that serially and exhaustively queries each 
available module and makes a determination about which of these is to be activated (i.e., 
routed representations) and when, the global workspace model suggests that this 
responsibility is undertaken actively by the specialist inferential processes (i.e., modules) 
themselves working both in parallel and competitively. (Shanahan & Baars, 2005 p.16) 
 By way of example, Shanahan & Baars consider the processes underlying 
perception and object recognition – specifically those involved in recognizing a 
Rorschach inkblot image as an elephant.  Fodor‟s account, they suggest, is committed to 
a model of the central processor that “poses a series of questions one-at-a-time – is it a 
face? Is it a butterfly? Is it a vulva? And so on – until it finally arrives at the idea of an 
elephant.” (Shanahan & Baars, 2005 p.16)  The global workspace model, in contrast, 
posits a set of specialist processes working cooperatively and competitively in parallel – 
one of which is “always on the lookout for elephantine shapes.” (Shanahan & Baars, 
2005 p.16)  Once this particular device is activated (i.e., when an elephant(ish) image is 
perceived) “the information that it has to offer makes its way to the global workspace, 
and is thereby broadcast back to all the other specialist processes.” (Shanahan & Baars, 
2005 p.17) 
 While global workspace theory provides a plausible account of perceptual 
processing, there is no reason to suppose that a host of other cognitive processes could 
not be undertaken by means of the same processes, Shanahan & Baars suggest.  And so, 
once the elephant shape detector is activated and its output is relayed to the global 
workspace, this information is broadcast to all of the system‟s other specialists to 
process.  Following further parallel and competitive processing by modular specialist 
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processes, further elephant-related information would be brought to bear in the global 
workspace.  
 With respect to Fodor‟s challenge – specifically his claim that only an un-model-
able central executive could possibly contend with the input-routing (module/heuristic 
activation) problem - Shanahan and Baars conclude that the global workspace model 
provides an account of how the operations of an unencapsulated system could be 
massively modularly realized.  Specifically, they suggest that global workspace theory 
provides a computationally feasible model that “explains how an informationally 
unencapsulated process can draw on just the information that is relevant to the ongoing 
situation without being swamped by irrelevant rubbish” (Shanahan & Baars, 2005 p. 25) 
by relegating the task of relevance determination to the specialist processes themselves.  
Such parallelism, cooperation and competition for access to the global workspace, they 
continue, “confers great computational advantage without compromising the serial flow 
of conscious thought, which corresponds to the sequential contents of the limited 
capacity global workspace.” (Shanahan & Baars, 2005 p. 25)   
With respect to the relevance of global workspace theory to the (philosopher‟s) 
frame problem in particular, Shanahan notes,  
The particular blend of serial and parallel computation favoured by global 
workspace theory suggests a way to address the frame problem in the 
philosopher‟s sense of that term … In particular, in the context of so-called 
informationally encapsulated cognitive processes, it allows relevant information 
to be sifted from the irrelevant without incurring an impossible computational 
burden.  More generally, broadcast interleaved with competition facilitates the 
integration of the activities of a large number of specialist processes working 







Furthermore, Shanahan & Baars note,  
If the frame problem is a genuine puzzle, the human brain incorporates a 
solution to it.  In global workspace theory, we find clues to how this solution 
might work.  Global workspace theory posits a functional role for consciousness, 
which is to facilitate information exchange among multiple, special-purpose, 
unconscious brain processes.  These compete for access to a global workspace, 
which allows selected information to be broadcast back to the whole system.  
Such an architecture accommodates high-speed, domain-specific processes (or 
“modules”) while facilitating just the sort of crossing domain boundaries 
required to address the philosopher‟s frame problem. (Shanahan & Baars, 2005 p. 
2) 
 
While global workspace theory is quite promising it is also, as presented, 
somewhat suggestive.  What remains is for an account to be provided of how such a 
computational system might be instantiated.  Particularly, some account of how 
modular devices themselves could contend with the input-routing/module-activation 
problem is needed.  To this end, I will turn to Barrett‟s enzymatic account of modularity 
to help flesh-out Baars‟ proposal.  
BARRETT‟S (METAPHORICAL) ENZYMATIC ACCOUNT 
 Like Carruthers and Shanahan & Baars, Barrett (2005) argues that Fodor‟s 
pessimism relies upon a commitment to both a very specific account of modularity and 
the particular systems-level model that derives from this.  In response, Barrett proposes 
a way of thinking about the operations of modular processes drawing upon the 
operations of enzymatic systems that provides a metaphor for how a “bulletin board” 
architecture (e.g., global workspace model) might be realized. 
Enzymes catalyze reactions, systematically combining and transforming 
substrates to generate new molecular products in a manner that “can be regarded as a 
kind of computation.”(Barrett, 2005 p.268)  Glossing over the biochemical details, 
enzymes function quite generally in the following manner.  Cells contain a number of 
different enzymes each of which has its own characteristic “shape.”  The particular 
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shape of an enzyme determines both the kinds of substrates with which it may interact 
and the kinds of operations or transformations that it serves to catalyze.  Put more 
directly, enzymes are specified both by the kinds of substrates that can adhere to them 
and by the types of reactions that they undertake (catalyze) on these substrates.  Cells 
also contain many proteins, each of which with its own particular characteristic “shape.”  
Enzymes adhere to any substrate molecule (protein) of the proper geometry (i.e., if a 
substrate‟s “key” fits an enzyme‟s geometric “lock,” a reaction is catalyzed.)  In keeping 
with the analogy, enzymes may have multiple “locks,” pockets, active sites, or input 
nodes, each of which accepts a specifically shaped “key.”  And so, enzymes may be 
adhered to by a number of substrates simultaneously.  As such, the particular “shape” of 
the output molecule of any enzymatic reaction will depend on both the substrates 
operated upon and the particular kind of transform that is undertaken by the enzyme.  
Once transformed, these newly minted molecules are outputted and released back into 
the cellular central pool where they can be “picked up” by any enzyme capable of 
adhering to it (i.e., by any enzyme with the right shaped “lock”) thus potentially 
catalyzing a subsequent reaction with another substrate or substrates.  In this manner, 
cells can come to contain many proteins of varying geometries, some of these will be, 
somewhat conceptually, raw molecular “primitives” (i.e., untransformed or minimally 
processed substrates), while others, as the result of cascades of enzymatic transforms, 
are highly processed and complex.  
Enzymes are of interest, Barrett suggests, for they exhibit the three principal 
properties of modular computation systems.  The specificity with which enzymes and 
substrates interact suggests that enzymes accept as input only particular kinds of 
substrates (i.e., those that are specifically “shaped”).  Second, enzymes perform specific 
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operations, systematically combining or otherwise transforming substrates and 
generating new molecules in a rule-governed manner.  Finally, the output of these 
enzyme-catalyzed transformations (i.e., a newly minted molecule) are of a form that is 
acceptable as input to other processes (i.e., other enzymes can accept and operate upon 
these outputs).  These properties are significant, Barrett explains, for “enzymes are 
computational devices that solve problems that cognitive computational systems also 
face: they achieve functional specificity in an “open” system.”(Barrett, 2005 p.269)   
With respect to this, there are a number of features of enzymatic computational 
systems that are applicable to the challenges set out by Fodor.  First, enzymatic systems 
provide a means by which to explain how a massively modularly realized cognitive 
system might contend with the input-routing (module activation) problem in a way that 
does not require the positing of a central “executive” mechanism.  Echoing Carruthers‟ 
discussion of wide-scope encapsulation, Barrett marks a distinction between the “access 
specificity” and “processing specificity” of devices.  Access specificity is “the breadth of 
information that a device has access,” while processing specificity is the “breadth of 
information that a device actually processes.”(Barrett, 2005 p.274)  Enzymatic devices, 
Barrett argues, are “access-general,” for all of the substrates contained in a cell‟s central 
pool are non-partitioned and thus available to any enzyme, and “processing-specific,” 
for each enzyme undertakes a particular rule-governed transformation on only those 
substrates that are properly templated.  And so, he continues,  
One can have an enzymatic system in which all of the enzymes in the system 
have access to all of the substrates, and in which only the „correct‟ reactions are 
catalyzed.  This is because of the lock-and-key nature of molecular recognition 
processes, which depend on the diffusion of information for their proper 




 And so, in enzymatic systems there is no need for a central “executive” that 
decides how information is (representations are) to be routed.  Rather, input specificity 
is achieved by template matching – (i.e., a module becomes active only when a 
representation maps to its particular recognitional front-end).  Substrates (in biological 
systems) and, by analogy, representations (in cognitive systems) that are present in the 
system‟s central informational pool (e.g., the cellular pool in biological systems and the 
“bulletin board” or global workspace in cognitive systems) are diffused or “globally 
broadcast” to each enzymatic specialist device in the system.  Those 
molecules/representations that are properly templated (i.e., a match to a module‟s 
particular recognitional front-end) are “picked up,” operated upon and the resultant 
transform returned to the central pool.28  Since these specialist devices (like enzymes) 
operate in parallel, and only those that are capable of accepting as input the 
representation broadcast will become active, no “executive” decision needs to be made 
about which modules are to be activated and when they are to be activated. 
 The enzymatic model can also account for how both complex and novel 
representations might be modularly generated. Since enzymes are capable of accepting a 
number of substrates they are thus “multi-dimensional” with respect to the kinds of 
substrate-representations that they may operate upon and the kinds of operations that 
they can perform. (Barrett, 2005 p.270)  And so, while some enzymes will have 
(conceptually) rather simple recognitional front ends, others may be structured such that 
they can interact only with highly processed substrates (i.e., substrates/representations 
                                                     
28 Conceptually, one may envision this as a process whereby either representations in the central 
pool are actively globally broadcast (i.e., relayed) to all specialists processes simultaneously or 
one in which representations stay put and each specialist is constantly and actively scanning the 
contents of the central pool “looking” for any representations that are the proper shape. 
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that are the result of cascade of prior transforms) thus allowing for a high degree of 
input specificity.  At the same time, as enzymes accept as input any substrate with the 
properly shaped key or keys, and molecules may have many keys, there is the potential 
for complex molecules to form a partial or incomplete “fit” with an enzyme (i.e., some 
but not all of the enzyme‟s active sites are filled by the substrate).   And so, Barrett 
explains, while each recognitional event is Boolean (i.e., logic-gated), “the binding 
procedures of enzymes have analog properties [because] many individual chemical 
bonding events contribute to the recognition process.  The sum of these determine 
recognition; there can be better or worse degrees of fit.”(Barrett, 2005 p.270) 
 Along similar lines, enzymes can also engage in “byproduct processing” 
whereby they accept as input substrates that mimic portions of the protein that the 
enzyme was “designed” to recognize.  Many synthesized drugs, Barrett explains, 
function by mimicking the shape of proteins that are in the “proper domain” of an 
enzyme, thus forging an “artificial” fit by exploiting the active sites of enzymes.  It is this 
capacity, Barrett continues, “of low level byproduct processing by enzyme-like cognitive 
devices [that] may be what permits novel combinations and processing of 
representations beyond, in some sense, what the mechanism was designed to 
do.”(Barrett, 2005 p.270) 
 Furthermore, enzymes need not only be such that they adhere to just one 
particular substrate.  Rather, they can be capable of recognizing and thus operating 
upon substrates of particular classes or kinds.  That is, since substrates may possess 
multiple sub-unit “keys” and since some of these “keys” might be shared by multiple 
substrates, those molecules with the same sub-unit “key” in common form a class or 
kind, although their geometries might otherwise vary.  In this manner, properly 
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templated enzymes might come to pick up and transform substrates that, while 
otherwise geometrically/representationally quite different, share a sub-unit in common.  
With respect to this, Barrett explains that in some instances those sub-units not 
recognized might be unmodified, preserved or “carried through” in the output 
molecule.  In other reactions these sub-units could be transformed by the operations of 
the enzyme and thus not be preserved in the output molecule/representation.  This 
property of “carry through” (i.e., the non-modification of portions of the substrate) is 
computationally significant for two reasons.  First, it provides a means by which to 
explain how particular properties (and likewise truths) can be preserved through a 
cascade of enzymatic transformations.  Second, Barrett explains, the capacity of 
enzymatic systems to undertake operations on only a portion of a representation is 
significant for parallel distributed systems notoriously have great difficulty in 
undertaking truth-preserving operations on minimally altered representations.   
In the enzyme model, class-level processing is achieved by means of the 
transformational application of a “tag” to a molecule.  Once appended, such “tags” may 
then be picked up by another enzyme, thereby influencing both the kinds of other 
substrates/representations the enzyme may adhere to (accept as input) and how the 
recipient enzyme processes or transforms these substrates/representations.  In this 
manner then the application of a “tag” to a substrate/representation can influence a 
cascade of enzymatic transformations.  At the same time, carried-through tags also 
provide a means by which to mark a substrate‟s/representation‟s membership in a class 
– irrespective of how many other transformations are undertaken on it.  So doing 
provides an account of how information about some particular property of an object 
(and thus some predicate or “truth” in the cognitive domain) might be both preserved 
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from one operation to the next and also be brought to bear on subsequent enzymatic 
computations/transformations. 
 Not only does enzymatic “tagging” allow for class-level processing and 
informational carry-through, but it also, Barrett explains, “allows for horizontal and 
„top-down‟ control in which the output of devices can influence other devices at the 
same horizontal level, a kind of feedback which is not typical of Fodorean modular 
systems.”(Barrett, 2005 p.271)  In addition to the tagging of substrate molecules, 
enzymes can output unattached tags.  These free-floating tag-substrates, when 
recognized by the front-ends of particular enzymes can have the effect of turning these 
“off” or “on” (by altering the geometry of an enzyme‟s front-end and thus affecting the 
kinds of substrates to which they may bind) and/or of modulating the transformations 
that these will undertake on recognized molecules in the manner outlined previously.29  
 With respect to Fodor‟s objection to the massive modularity of mind approach to 
modeling doxastic processes, the enzyme model, Barrett explains, “is important because 
it points to potential computational solutions to problems that standard versions of 
modular architectures are said to face.”(Barrett, 2005 p.272) 
 Given that enzymes have access to any and all substrates present in the cellular 
pool and since they undertake specific transformations on only those substrates that are 
“recognized” it is clear that they are, in Barrett‟s terms, access-general and processing-
specific devices.  With respect to the challenge posed by Fodor, the enzyme account 
                                                     
29 Given the model outlined, such a process does not turn a module “on” or “off” in the manner 
suggested by Fodor.  Rather substrate modulation functions to alter the recognitional front-ends 
of particular enzymes making it such that they can either accept or not accept the substrates 
currently floating about in the cellular central pool.  Over time, as the contents of the central pool 




provides a model of a modularly realizable system that achieves processing specificity 
even under a condition of access generality. (Barrett, 2005 p.275) Or, put another way, 
the enzymatic account provides a model of a modular system that is both process-
encapsulated and isotropic. 
 Furthermore, as enzymatic devices are subject to feed-forward, horizontal and 
top-down30 influence by means of the tagging operation outlined above, the 
computations undertaken by an enzyme can be modified in light of and are thus 
sensitive to any number of factors.  That is, unlike Fodor-style modules, enzymatic 
devices are capable of performing operations that are both content and context sensitive.  
This is of course significant for each enzymatic device itself undertakes only a 
(syntactically) local computation.  And so, the enzyme model provides an account of 
how a local computational device (a module) can process and generate content and 
context sensitive outputs - something that on Fodor‟s model isn‟t possible.   
Enzymatic tagging allows for information, once obtained, to be retained between 
operations/transformations.  Rather, when “carried through” in the manner outlined, 
such tags allow for particular information to be preserved and, given the input 
specificity of enzymatic devices, to be processed by only the “right” kinds of devices 
(i.e., those with the right kinds of recognitional front-ends).  In this way, particular tags 
once added may be carried through and influence all subsequent operations undertaken 
on the representation.  The tagging of substrates/representations, Barrett explains,  
                                                     
30 There should be no confusion here about the nature of such top-down influence.  The idea here 
is that if particular representations are maintained in the global workspace then they will be 
globally broadcast to all specialist systems.  In this way then a representation might be relayed to 
enzymatic devices that were part of the transformational cascade that resulted in itself.  By 
modulating the front-ends of these devices, and relaying the representation back to them, the 
same device may transform further (though differently) the representation. 
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Can provide a kind of functional input restriction, even in the absence of hard-
wired piping.  Like a child safety lock, a single tag can render a representation 
„out of bounds‟ for a host of computational processes without establishing a wall 
or physical partition between the representation and those processes. …Tag-
mediated input restriction suggests that the input pool of a device could in 
principle be changed on the fly, granting or denying access to a database simply 
by changing the set of representations to which a particular tag is attached, 
without altering the design of the device in any way. (Barrett, 2005 p.278) 
 
 Turning now to cognitive processes more explicitly, Barrett suggests that higher-
level semantic categories can be enzymatically computed by means of the operations of 
a set of processes, each of which appends a semantic tag to a representation.  Returning 
to the bulletin board or global workspace model, each tag-appending device will output 
a transformed substrate to the shared pool, board or workspace.  Via carry-through, the 
representation will come to be multiply semantically tagged.  In this manner, quite 
complex and higher-order semantic categories could be computable.  The following 
example may help to clarify, 
Consider, for example, how the semantic property PREDATOR might be 
computed from a perceptual input, using an imaginary example.  We could 
envision a three-step process.  First, information from a lion passes through the 
object parsing system, and is deposited in the central pool.  Next, this 
representation is matched with a perceptual template that adds a LION tag and 
returns it to the public representation pool.  Finally, a third mechanism takes as 
input the representation with the LION tag – perhaps using something akin to a 
lookup table of animal tags that satisfy its input criteria - and adds a PREDATOR 
tag. … Once the PREDATOR tag is added to the representation, this tag can then 
be used to admit this information to various predator-specific computational 
procedures.  A „higher-order‟ or „abstract‟ semantic category has been computed 
from raw sensory inputs.  In principle there is no reason a particular 
representation could not carry many, many tags. (Barrett, 2005 p.279) 
 This example is relevant in light of Fodor‟s argument that such things as “cheater 
detection” cannot be modularly realized.  This follows, he suggests, because 
determining what constitutes a cheating situation or a social exchange cannot be based 
upon the perception of “Very Subtle Clues” alone. (Fodor, 2001 p.76)  Rather, Fodor 
concludes, determining if a situation is a social exchange requires “thinking” – 
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something that modules just cannot do, for the reasons discussed in the previous 
chapter.(Fodor, 2001 pp.76-77)  Barrett‟s example, however, suggests that enzymatic 
processes need not accept only perceptual cues.  Rather, via the tagging operation, both 
perceptual, contextual and content specific information may be brought to bear in the 
local computational processes.  With respect to cheater detection, then, via 
transformational cascade, many tags may be appended to some (initial) representation.  
Some of these tags may be the result of an enzymatic transform that accepts a “raw” 
perceptual input (e.g., the addition of the LION tag in the above example).  Others 
would be the result of an enzymatic transform that accepts only particular highly 
processed and multiply tagged representations (e.g., the addition of the PREDATOR tag 
in the above example).  If a putative cheater detection module has a particular template 
front-end, then only those representations that are properly multiply-tagged (semantic 
and otherwise) would be “picked up,” operated upon and its output returned to the 
central pool.  In this manner, the highly complex determination that “X is a cheat” or 
“this is a social exchange” becomes amenable to modular description. 
 And so, the enzymatic model provides a means by which to explain how 
modularly realized processes can contend with the input-routing (module-activation) 
puzzle without having to posit a central executive.  Furthermore, by means of a process 
of template matching, the enzymatic model attains functional specificity without 
violating the isotropy condition – as traditional Fodor-style modules must.  So doing 
alleviates the need for a central executive to be posited while also explaining how the 
“right” representation/information ends up being processed by the “right” operation at 
the “right” time.   
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The enzymatic model also provides a response to Fodor‟s argument from 
(Quinean) holism.  Specifically, as an “access general” system, the enzymatic model 
allows for any piece of information to “propagate through all relevant inference devices.  
[By means of this,] all inferences that the system is capable of generating, given its 
current set of rules and its complete knowledge database, will be generated.”(Barrett, 
2005 p.284)  With respect to the argument from (Quinean) holism, enzymatic modular 
systems possess many features that are applicable to contending with the problems 
raised by abduction and belief-revision.  Unlike Fodor‟s model, the enzymatic metaphor 
account allows for representations to be cognitively “percolated.”  Specifically, the 
model allows for the same representation to be operated upon by many processes (in 
parallel), thus allowing for the representation to be simultaneously compared to many 
beliefs (other representations) held by the system. (Barrett, 2005 p.283)  Furthermore, 
unlike Fodor‟s feed-forward model, the enzymatic metaphor account allows for 
horizontal control and feedback (both positive and negative) in the manner outlined.  So 
doing, Barrett explains, provides a means by which to explain how hypotheses 
consistent with the available evidence might be reinforced. (Barrett, 2005 p.283)  Since 
the tagging of a representation by one device can affect how it is processed by other 
devices, the reprocessing or rehearsal of a representation accounts for how, “the same 
piece of information can lead to different inferences depending on how it has been 
previously tagged (which in turn can depend on the context in which it is presented.)” 
(Barrett, 2005 pp. 283-4)  Finally, with respect to the argument from (Quinean) holism, 
Barrett notes,  
In enzymatic computational systems every device in the system has access, in 
principle, to every representation in the system, and therefore, can in principle 
leverage the inferential power of every other device in the system. … One might 
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think of this kind of global process – representations seeping through the system 
by diffusion and generating all possible inferences as they go – as the system 
going to catalytic equilibrium. (Barrett, 2005 p.284) 
 
 Abduction, he continues, is the reverse of this process.  By starting with a diverse 
set of facts, the system can, by application of a carried-through suppositional or pretense 
tag, “back-generate the single fact which, when passed through many inference systems, 
would produce these diverse inferences.”(Barrett, 2005 p.284) At catalytic equilibrium, 
he proposes, that representational substrate that is capable of accounting for the 
available evidence will be discerned.  As suppositionally tagged, the system may do so 
without also tainting the system‟s belief-set along the way. 
 Returning to earlier discussion, we have from Barrett‟s metaphor a plausible 
means by which to contend with the heuristic selection problem.  Specifically, there is no 
reason to think that enzymatic processes must be limited to the transformation of 
substrates.  Rather, just as Barrett suggests that tags (e.g., LION) are retrieved and 
appended to substrates, it is reasonable to think that the activation of an enzyme might 
result in the employment of some particular heuristic.  This is even more plausible given 
that the particular front ends of enzymatic devices themselves are rather heuristic in 
design – for they only select (i.e., adhere to) particular substrates while they have access 
to them all.  And so, once activated, an enzymatic device might output or invoke a 
directed search of memory (preferentially exploiting some particular tag or tags to 
expedite search) thus preferentially retrieving particular (kinds) of material for other 
specialists to accept (or not) depending on the current “shape” of their front-ends.  
Likewise, the employment of particular heuristic stopping and decision rules could be 
controlled enzymatically in much the same manner.  This is relevant for the global 
workspace model suggests that the competition (for access to the global workspace) 
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between or among specialist devices is resolved heuristically.  While the details are in 
need of fleshing out, the point is that the enzymatic model provides a viable control 
structure for contending with what I have termed the heuristics selection problem and one 
that does not require the positing of a domain-general central executive mechanism.31   
Before proceeding, a potential objection to Barrett‟s account needs to be 
considered.  Were Barrett offering his account as a complete computational model of the 
operations of mind, we would have reason for thinking the proposal problematic.  That 
is, were we to think that Barrett is suggesting that cognition is, in fact, undertaken 
enzymatically, there is reason to think this implausible.  And so, one might object, for 
example, noting that any fully enzymatic system must rely on passive diffusion to move 
substrates around and thus to move processes and cascades along.  That is, the modular 
sub-systems/operations of an enzymatic system must passively “wait” for a substrate of 
the proper shape to “float by.”   The smaller the size of the “pool,” the faster substrates 
can be diffused, picked up, transformed and released back.  Therefore, given the 
physical facts about diffusion gradients, as the size of the pool increases, so too does 
processing time.  And so, the concern continues, any large-scale enzymatic system 
would necessarily be very slow.  Since the pool size of any enzymatic system that 
attempted to contend with the kinds of problems currently under consideration would 
have to be quite large, it is, the concern continues, an implausible suggestion.32 
                                                     
31 While I argued previously that the heuristics approach has an internal means by which to 
contend in principle with the heuristic selection problem (i.e., that there are likely to be fewer and 
fewer heuristics as one progresses “up” the meta-heuristic chain) it seems (at least prima facie) 
unlikely that heuristics are selected ultimately by one nth order meta-heuristic. 
32 There is, as Cherniak rightly notes (personal communication, 2008), given the very real physical 
constraints on systems relying on diffusion, a reason why cells are so very small.  C.f., Adelman 
(1994), Benenson et. al., (2001) and MacDonald, Stefanovic, & Stojanovic (2008) for discussion of 
the promise and limits of biomolecular/DNA computing. 
110 
 
There are, I think, two responses to this worry.  First, if we suppose Barrett to be 
in fact offering his account as a model of mind, (i.e,. that minds are enzymatic systems) 
the structure of the global workspace framework should go some distance in responding 
to the concern.  Specifically, global workspace theory, unlike a truly enzymatic system, 
need not rely on diffusion gradients to move representations about.  Rather, Baars‟ 
model suggests that either (a) consumer subsystems are actively scanning the workspace 
for representations of the right “shape” or (b) each representational substrate is globally 
broadcast (i.e., actively relayed) to every consumer sub-system directly – whereby only 
those of the right “shape” are processed.  And so, under the global workspace 
framework (unlike that of truly enzymatic systems) the very real processing-time 
concern raised about any computational system that relies upon diffusion to move 
representations/substrates, need not apply.  
However, given Barrett‟s discussion, it does not appear that he is offering this 
account as a model of mind.  Rather, he is offering a metaphor, an heuristic for thinking 
about modular processes on analogy with enzymatic ones.  And so, while modules are 
not enzymes and thinking is not enzyme catalyzed substrate transformation, we can, by 
thinking in these terms, gain some insight into the puzzle of how the input routing 
problem might be contended with locally.  This is turn helps us to better understand 
how the modular specialist systems posited by global workspace theory could be, 
without the need for a generalist input routing device, selective with respect to both the 
kinds of representations that they will operate upon and the kinds of transformations 
that they will effect. 
The aim, then, of this section is not to provide a complete model of the workings 
of mind but rather to show that there are viable and computationally feasible 
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alternatives that meet the practical computational engineering challenges posed by 
Fodor.  
Very briefly, however, Carruthers (2006) provides a detailed account of how 
doxastic processes (including abduction and the creativity and flexibility of thought) can 
be accommodated by a variant of this model.33  Expanding on the general framework of 
the global workspace model, Carruthers suggests a role for natural language in 
integrating the outputs of the various specialist inferential mechanisms. 
The quasi-perceptual imagistic representation is globally broadcast and made 
available inter alia to the language comprehension sub-system, which attaches a 
content to it and makes that content (as expressed in some sort of Mentalese 
representation, perhaps in the form of a mental model) available to a suite of 
central/conceptual modules.  … When „P‟ [a sentence in English, say] is mentally 
rehearsed the comprehension sub-system extracts form it the mentalese 
representation |Q|, which can then (especially if it takes the form of a mental 
model) be globally broadcast for the different central modules to get to work 
upon, providing that any aspect of it meets their input conditions. (Carruthers, 
2006 pp. 264-5) 
 
                                                     
33 As an additional example, borrowing from Franklin & Graesser‟s (1999) implementation of the 
global workspace model, Shanahan & Baars consider the activity of analogical reasoning since 
this is precisely the kind of unencapsulated process that Fodor claims is un-model-able.  (Fodor, 
1983 p. 105)  Following a review of the current computational models of analogical reasoning 
(e.g., ARCS, MAC/FAC, SME, IAM, and LISA), Shanahan & Baars concludes that Hummel & 
Holyoaks‟s (1997) LISA model (learning and inference with schemas and analogies) is “the most 
accurate and psychological plausible of the current computational models of analogical 
reasoning.” (Shanahan & Baars, 2005 p. 20)  The LISA model is of interest for it relies upon a 
serial mapping operation while undertaking retrieval (of representations in memory) by means of 
parallel processes.  This combination of serial and parallel processes is in direct alignment with 
the architecture proposed by the global workspace model.  Specifically, Shanahan & Baars 
explain,   
The currently active propositions in LISA‟s working memory correspond to the current contents of 
the global workspace model.  That parallel activation of propositions in LISA‟s long-term memory 
corresponds to the broadcast of the contents of the global workspace.  And the distributed 
propositions in LISA‟s long-term memory correspond to the parallel, unconscious processes in global 
workspace theory.  But most importantly, the necessary serial presentation of propositions in LISA‟s 
limited capacity working memory matches the necessarily serial presentation of coherent material in 
the limited capacity of the global workspace. (Shanahan & Baars, 2005 p. 23)  
 
Put another way, the most plausible model of analogical reasoning on offer is “also the 
one that maps most cleanly and elegantly onto a global workspace architecture.”(Shanahan & 




And so, building upon Baars‟ general framework, Carruthers suggests that 
quasi-perceptual image-models are constructed of rehearsed sentences in mentalese 
which are then globally broadcast to all specialist devices for further processing by those 
consumer specialists the “front-ends” of which are properly templated.  The language 
production sub-system, Carruthers continues, engages, in effect, in a process of 
linguistic (re)description of the various (transformed) images returned by these 
specialist devices.  Carruthers‟ proposal, then, is that the inner rehearsal of sentences, 
results via operations of image re-construction (undertaken by means of back-
projections to and processing by various perceptual sub-systems), in the generation of 
image-models of the contents of these sentences which are then globally broadcast to the 
set of specialists for further processing.  Through cycles of rehearsal in inner speech and 
global broadcast of the integrated image-models generated to the set of manifold 
specialists, the language faculty functions to both integrate and consolidate the 
information relayed from potentially quite disparate specialists into a coherent 
statement in mentalese.  In performing this function, the language faculty facilitates 
creativity and flexibility of thought by enabling information from disparate content 
domains to be brought to bear and integrated into an image-model. 
CONCLUSION     
 I have argued in this chapter that the normative rationality principle underlying 
and motivating Fodor‟s pessimistic conclusion is, as unsatisfiable by any finite and 
physically realized system, impossibly demanding.  We have then, good reason for 
rejecting Fodor‟s normative rationality condition.  I next argued that it is false that we ever 
arrive at conclusions rationally (in Fodor‟s sense).  We also, then, have reason for 
rejecting Fodor‟s descriptive claim.  In light of some ought implies can reasoning, this 
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normative principle must be weakened to one that that can be satisfied by the likes of us 
(or, at the very least, to one that can be satisfied by a finite and physically realized 
system). (Cherniak, 1984 pp. 20, 106, 110, 113)   While I have made no attempt at setting 
out a suitably weakened rationality condition, as this was not my aim, any such revised 
principle must, so it would appear, take the very general form:  
 Arriving at a conclusion in a rationally warranted manner requires that some of the 
available and relevant information be considered.   
Weakening the rationality condition, even in this very general way, however, has 
significant implications for Fodor‟s pessimistic conclusion.  Specifically, since Fodor‟s 
rejection of both the massive modularity of mind and heuristics approaches reduce, at 
base, to the claim that these are “irrational” strategies, and we have reason to reject 
Fodor‟s rationality condition, then it follows that we have then no (a priori) reason to 
dismiss these strategies tout court in the manner suggested by Fodor.  Specifically, since 
heuristics and modular systems can, in principle, satisfy a weakened version of the 
rationality condition, we have no reason for rejecting these strategies on principle.  Since 
we have no reason to think that we ever arrive at conclusions rationally (in Fodor‟s 
sense), then we have no reason for thinking our cognitive processes un-model-able as a 
matter of principle.   
Establishing this point of principle, however, responds only to Fodor‟s a priori 
arguments, for it still might be the case that, as a practical matter (as opposed to one of 
principle), our doxastic processes are not computationally model-able.  Specifically, 
what remains is for a plausible and computationally feasible model to be provided that 
contends with the particular engineering challenges posed by Fodor (e.g., isotropy, 
holism, the input-routing, module-activation, and heuristic-selection problems).  In 
response to these rather practical (as opposed to in principle) engineering challenges, 
114 
 
drawing upon Gigerenzer, Carruthers, Baars & Shanahan and Barrett‟s discussions, I 
outlined an alternative model.  The aim of this section has not been to provide a 
complete model of the workings of mind, for this is far too involved a task, but rather to 
show that there is a plausible and computationally feasible alternative overlooked by 






















CHAPTER 4: ON (THE VERY IDEA OF) BRINGING EMOTIONAL AFFECT TO BEAR  
 In the remaining two chapters, I will argue for the following claim:  Given what 
(at least some of what) the “emotions” are and the role occupied by affect in attentional 
direction, motivation, meta-planning, and decision-making, bringing emotion to bear 
might provide a promising approach for explaining how we might contend with some 
of the frame problems that arise in practical reasoning and decision-making.  In what 
follows, I will not be providing a complete account of what the emotions are, nor will I 
be providing a comprehensive solution to the frame problem.  I will also not be 
undertaking an exhaustive discussion of all of the roles that emotion might occupy in 
practical reason, nor will I consider all of the roles that it might play in helping us 
contend with various instances of the frame problem.  Rather, I will be arguing that the 
consideration of emotion might provide a promising way of approaching some of these 
problems.  Suggesting this requires that two principal challenges be addressed.   
First, it must be shown that emotion or affect occupies the right kind of 
relationship with/to the operations of reason generally and practical reason and 
decision-making in particular.  Clearly, in order even to suggest that bringing emotional 
affect to bear on instances of the frame problem holds any promise whatsoever, some 
account both of what the emotions are and of their relationship to/with reason must be 
set out.  As a first step, I will begin by presenting a review of some representative 
theories of what emotions are and a discussion of the relationship between reason and 
emotion proposed by these accounts.  Following this discussion, I will argue that we 
have no reason – in advance of our considering specific proposals - to think that 
bringing emotional affect to bear on these puzzles should be irrelevant nor have we any 
reason for thinking such a proposal to be an in principle “non-starter.”  Having argued 
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that the suggestion is not worthy of rejection tout court, I will suggest that, given what 
the emotions are and their relationship to/with cognition generally, we have reason for 
thinking that the emotions, at least on principle, may provide a promising approach for 
contending with some of the frame problems that arise in practical reason and decision-
making. 
Second, given the dual aspects (i.e., the two horns of the dilemma of speed and 
accuracy) of the frame problem, if consideration of emotion is to help us in 
understanding how we might contend with some of the instances of the problem that 
arise in practical reason and decision-making, then it must be shown both to expedite 
(i.e, help in “tracting”) and to increase the accuracy of these operations.  Clearly, were 
emotion to either (a) invariably slow, hinder or otherwise make more computationally 
burdensome or (b) decrease the accuracy of the operations of practical reason and 
decision-making, then we would have no reason for thinking that bringing emotion to 
bear on this puzzle should hold any promise. Similarly, if the influences of emotion on 
practical reason are, with respect to either the tractability/complexity or the accuracy 
conditions, arbitrary (i.e., if emotion is as likely to expedite and increase the accuracy of 
these processes as it is to hinder them), then emotion would be entirely “orthogonal” to 
the puzzle.  If emotion is orthogonal with respect to issues of tractability and accuracy of 
the operations of practical reason and decision-making, then bringing them to bear 
should hold no promise either.     
 Taken together, if emotion assists in both expediting and increasing the 
correctness of practical reason and decision-making and if it occupies the right kind of 
relationship to/with those of cognition, then consideration of emotion might provide a 
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promising approach for helping to understand how we might contend with some of the 
frame problems that arise in practical reason and decision-making. 
 The first challenge will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter.  The 
remaining challenges will be considered in the next.  Before even beginning to set out a 
case in support of the claim that consideration of emotion might provide a promising 
approach for understanding how we might contend with a number of the frame 
problems that arise in practical reason and decision-making, I need first to consider the 
following prima facie irrelevance objection:  Given what the emotions appear to be (and 
what is involved in having them), the emotions are entirely irrelevant to the frame 
problem.  As irrelevant, bringing emotion to bear on the frame problem – in any way – 
holds no promise for helping us to understand (and much less to model) the operations 
of practical reason and decision-making. 
The irrelevance objection, I suggest, stems from a particular and pervasive 
philosophical view about both what the emotions are and of what their relationship 
to/with reason must be.  Specifically, this challenge reduces to the claim that if emotions 
are always dependent upon belief, then they too will be infected with or by all of the 
frame problems that arise in belief-fixation.  If so, the concern continues, bringing 
emotion to bear on those frame problems that arise in practical reason would serve only 
to import those belief-fixation frame problems into this other domain.  If emotions are 
always belief-dependent, then bringing them to bear on those frame problems that arise 
in practical reason and decision-making would be an obvious non-starter.  That is, if 
emotions are always belief-dependent and if the fixation of belief is itself infected with 
frame problems, then bringing emotion to bear on the question of how we might 
contend with some of the frame problems that arise in practical reason would succeed 
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only in bringing a frame problem tainted operation to bear on the question of how we 
might contend with some of the frame problems that arise in another domain.  So doing, 
the concern continues, might very well make the situation worse but it certainly would 
not make it any better.  At best, emotion would be irrelevant.   
In order to meet this challenge – establishing the very modest point that the 
emotions are not irrelevant to the frame problem – I will begin by setting out some 
representative and rather traditional philosophical propositional attitude accounts of the 
emotions and their cognitive appraisal theory counterparts in psychology.  Next, I will 
discuss how these approaches result in the claim that bringing emotion to bear on the 
frame problem (in any form) would be entirely nonresponsive - a “non-starter” 
proposal.  Following this, I will present and consider the evidence most often relied 
upon in support of the cognitive appraisal approach to emotion.  This evidence, I 
suggest, is both methodologically problematic and fails to adequately establish the claim 
that emotions are “cognitive.”  Since the irrelevance objection relies upon this particular 
conception of what the emotions are, I suggest that - in advance of our examining 
particular proposals – there is little reason for thinking emotion to be irrelevant to the 
question of how it is that we contend with some instances of the frame problem.  Next, I 
turn attention to an alternative account of emotion provided by automated appraisal 
theory.  Following this, I will argue that the automated appraisal/basic emotion 
approach, while likely deficient as a complete account of what the emotions are, does 
provide a plausible partial response to this question.  Putting this somewhat differently, 
while we know little about what the emotions really are, we do know that at least some of 
what they are can be explained in terms of the activities of automated, autonomous and 
modularly realized appraisal mechanisms and innate emotion programs. 
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At the outset, let me state once again that my aim in this chapter is a modest one.  
I will not be providing a complete answer to the vexed and confused question of “what 
the emotions are.”  Since the evidence bearing on this question is so grossly insufficient, 
it is unlikely that a complete account could, at this time, be provided.  For the present 
aim (i.e., of suggesting that bringing emotion to bear might help us to understand how 
we contend with some instances of the frame problem) I need not, however, provide a 
complete answer this question.  Rather, I need only provide reason for thinking that at 
least some of what the emotions are are activities undertaken by automated, autonomous 
and plausibly modularly realized processes that influence practical reason and decision-
making in ways relevant to contending with the dual horns of the frame problem.  
 By way of alleviating a potential source of confusion, I will note at the outset that 
the debate between “cognitivist” (e.g., Lazarus) and “automated appraisal” (e.g., Zajonc) 
accounts of emotion, to be discussed subsequently, focuses on the question of just how 
“cognitive” emotions are.   While terminologically unhelpful, that a process is 
“cognitive” in the cognitivists sense (i.e., Lazarus‟ sense), requires that “higher-level 
thinking” - specifically the systematic manipulation of propositionally formulated 
sentences resulting in the fixation of belief - be undertaken before any emotion is 
experienced or emotional response induced.  Automated appraisal theorists (e.g., Zajonc) 
deny this claim and hold instead that “cognition” (understood in this sense) is not a 
precondition of emotion or of the induction of an emotional response.  To make this 
explicit, what is at stake in this debate is not the issue of whether the induction of a 
particular emotion requires prior information processing, but rather whether it requires 
prior processing by those systems involved in the fixation of belief.  
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Put somewhat differently, both camps agree that some form of information 
processing is requisite for the induction of an emotion.  What is at issue is the extent to 
which the emotions are belief-dependent.  Lazarus and the cognitivists maintain that the 
kind of information processing undertaken prior to the induction of any emotion is 
“cognitive” insofar as all emotions are belief-dependent, while Zajonc and the 
automated appraisal theorists hold that these prior processes are “non-cognitive,” i.e., 
are undertaken by processes that are automated, autonomous and rather perceptual in 
nature.  Under this latter account, emotions (at least some of them) are not belief-
dependent.  Any theory, then, holding that the emotions are belief-dependent (i.e., not 
merely cognition-dependent) is a cognitive appraisal/cognitivist account.  Those 
holding emotion (at least some of them) to be “cognition”- dependent but not belief-
dependent are non-cognitivist accounts.  Put another way, any account denying that (at 
least some) emotions are belief-dependent (regardless of whether or not such accounts 
claim emotions to be the result of “some sort of prior cognitive” operation) is not a 
cognitive appraisal account.  If this distinction is not properly marked and maintained, 
that is if what is to count as “cognition” is allowed to be broadened to include any prior 
informational processing, then there would be absolutely nothing about which 
Lazarus/Zajonc and the cognitivist/non-cognistivists accounts disagree – since both 
agree that some sort of informational processing is required.  It is only by marking the 
distinction that the debate even exists. 
It is perhaps worth noting that only very strong interpretations of the cognitivist 
and automated appraisal accounts would necessitate the rejection of the other.  That is, 
unless one holds that all emotions are belief-dependent or that they are all “non-
cognitive,” then there is no reason to think that some of the what the emotions are might 
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be the result of “cognitive” process while some might be the result of “non-cognitive” 
automated appraisal processes.  While I will discuss this subsequently in greater detail, 
it is only under the strong interpretation of the cognitivist approach that emotion should 
be entirely irrelevant to the frame problem.  And so, if emotion is to be of help, reason 
needs to be provided for our thinking it both likely false that all emotions are belief-
dependent (i.e., are “cognitive”) and likely true that at least some of what the emotions 
are are undertaken by “non-cognitive” operations.  If at least some of what the emotions 
are are “non-cognitive” (i.e., undertaken by automated and autonomous appraisal 
processes) and these operations influence and inform practical reason and decision-
making in the proper manner, then bringing emotion to bear on some of the frame 
problems that arise in these domains might hold some promise. 
PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE THEORIES OF EMOTION 
 While there are a number of propositional attitude accounts of emotion and since 
a complete review would be both lengthy and likely unhelpful, I will focus here on 
providing a brief introduction to and overview of the principal tenets of both “pure” 
and “hybrid” propositional attitude accounts.   
Solomon (1976) provides, perhaps, the most accessible discussion of the principal 
tenets of the pure propositional attitude account of emotion. He explains that “an 
emotion is a judgment (or set of judgments) … an evaluative (or “normative”) judgment, 
a judgment about my situation and about myself and/or about other people.”(Solomon, 
1976 pp. 185-6)  Solomon‟s account is a “pure” propositional one insofar as he claims 
that, “My shame is my judgment to the effect that I am responsible for an untoward 
situation or incident.”(Solomon, 1976 p. 186).  The pure propositional attitude approach 
to the emotions then takes as fundamental the idea that emotion types are indentified 
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with and distinguished from each other (i.e., other emotion types) by the particular 
propositional attitude involved.  As Solomon‟s example suggests, a token of some 
emotion is the kind of emotion that it is because of the type of belief entertained.  Shame, 
for example, requires the belief that “I am responsible for an untoward situation” while 
the tokening of an instance of fear would require, on a similar analysis, that the agent 
hold the belief that the current situation is dangerous.   
The second feature of all “pure” propositional attitude theories is the claim that 
the physiological alterations associated with emotional responses are entirely (or 
largely) irrelevant to what an emotion is.  Solomon explains, “That anger has a biological 
backing and includes sensations is inessential to understanding the emotion, though no 
doubt significant in certain measurements, which only contingently correlate with the 
intensity of the emotion or its significance.”(Solomon, 1984 p. 249) That is, according to 
the propositional attitude approach there is a necessary conceptual connection between 
particular emotional states and particular beliefs while the connection between 
emotional states and particular physiological states is merely contingent.  And so, 
according to the propositional attitude account, in order for one to be afraid for example, 
one must hold the belief that some aspect of their current situation is dangerous.  One 
need not in order to be in some particular emotional state (fear, for example) exhibit any 
of the “contingent” physiological manifestations commonly associated with that 
particular emotional response. Put another way, since for an agent to be in an emotional 
state just is to say that the agent holds some particular belief, there is no contradiction in 
one being in a particular emotional state and exhibiting none of the physiological 
responses typically associated with such states.  Since emotional states are 
propositionally defined, (i.e., belief-identical) were one to exhibit the physiological 
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responses commonly associated with an emotional response while not holding the right 
type of belief, one would be merely in an “aroused” but not an emotional state.34 
Modifying Solomon‟s approach, Lyons (1980) outlines a “hybrid” account of 
what the emotions are that incorporates physiological states into a propositional attitude 
theory.   Specifically, Lyons contends that both propositional attitudes and physiological 
manifestations (i.e., states or alterations) are necessary for emotion.  While both are 
required, Lyons posits a uni-directional causal relationship between the two aspects.  
Specifically, he takes an emotion to be the holding of a belief that in turn induces a 
particular physiological state.  Setting out his account of the emotions, Lyons explains, 
“X is deemed an emotional state if and only if it is a physiologically abnormal state 
caused by the subject of that state‟s evaluation of his or her situation.”(Lyons, 1980 
pp.57-58).  It is clear from this that Lyons‟ account is still fundamentally very much in 
line with Solomon‟s propositional attitude approach for it is belief that is ultimately 
fundamental to the induction and determination of an emotional state.  This is so 
because the physiological aspect of any emotion is, according to Lyons‟ account, belief-
dependent that is, caused by (i.e., induced by and thus a byproduct of) belief.  This 
implies that the fixation of a belief must occur prior to emotion.   
Lyons clarifies his position further noting, “In general a cognitivist theory of 
emotion is one that makes some aspect of thought, usually a belief, central to the concept 
of an emotion and, at least in some cognitive theories, essential to distinguishing 
different emotions from one another.”(Lyons, 1980 p. 33)  He further maintains, in 
keeping with the general propositional attitude approach that, “the emotions 
presuppose certain judgments … as to what properties a thing possesses.”(Lyons, 1980 
                                                     
34 Kenny (1963) provides an analogous reductive account of emotion to propositional attitudes. 
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p.7)  As such, “emotion is based on knowledge or belief about properties.”( Lyons, 1980 
p.138)  By way of example, Lyons continues, “Saying I am angry at X or I love X implies 
that at some time I have apprehended certain qualities in X.”(Lyons, 1980 p.71) And so, 
while Lyons‟ account does allow for physiological response to play a part in what 
emotions are, since these responses are caused by prior “cognitive” appraisals, it is belief 
that does the work (i.e., is determinative of the kind of emotion entokened).   
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT: COGNITIVE APPRAISAL THEORY 
 At base, then, Lyons account suggests that while emotion requires both that a 
particular belief be held and that a particular (“abnormal”) physiological state be 
enacted, the latter is a byproduct of the former.  Under this and all propositional attitude 
accounts, beliefs are either identical to or a component cause of emotion.   
 Parallel to the propositional attitude approach to the emotions in philosophy, 
and often relied upon to support these claims, is cognitive appraisal theory in cognitive 
psychology.  Cognitive appraisal theory emphasizes the role of “higher cognitive” 
processes in the formation and induction of an emotional response. Like the 
propositional attitude approach, cognitive appraisal theories maintain that emotional 
responses are induced by (i.e., caused by) those cognitive processes involved in belief-
fixation.  Specifically, according to cognitive appraisal theory, emotional responses 
require that the subject fix a propositionally formulated belief about the meaning of an 
event and the relationship between this event and the subject‟s ongoing projects and 
goals. (Lazarus, 1982, 1984) 
As discussed previously, cognitive appraisal theory holds not just the 
uncontroversial view that emotions are preceded by information processing operations, 
but rather, that the information processing undertaken is decidedly “cognitive” in 
125 
 
character - that the same information processing operations involved in belief-fixation 
are also employed in emotion. (Lazarus, 1982, 1984) Simply put, cognitive appraisal 
theory maintains that emotions are the result of “cognitive” processes, are always belief-
dependent and thus are always the result of (i.e., are caused by) some prior activity of 
“thinking.” 
 Perhaps the most often referenced study in support of the cognitivist/ 
propositional attitude approach is that of Schachter & Singer (1962).  The aim of this 
experiment was to show that while physiological arousal might be a component of 
emotion (as Lyons suggests), it is not determinative of the kind of emotion experienced.  
Put the other way around, Schachter and Singer aim to show that the kind of emotion 
experienced is determined by the type of cognitive evaluations/judgments reached – i.e., 
by what the subjects believe and think and not by the mere fact that they are 
biochemically aroused.  And so, the very same level of physiological arousal, they 
conjecture, will be experienced as a different emotion depending upon what the subject 
believes. 
 Subjects were divided into four groups.  Group one was given a placebo, while 
groups two through four were given injections of adrenaline to increase their levels of 
physiological arousal.  Of the three groups injected with adrenaline, the first was told 
truthfully what the physiological effects of the adrenaline injections would be, the 
second was given no information and the third was deliberately misinformed about the 
nature of the injection and its physiological effect. Half of the members of each group 
were then subjected to conditions designed to anger the subjects while those remaining 
were subjected to a condition designed to make the subjects happy.  Specifically, each 
test condition employed a number of confederates/sham subjects working with the 
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researchers and/or purposefully irksome and highly personal questionnaires in order to 
make the subjects “happy” or “angry.”  Results were obtained from both Schachter and 
Singer‟s observations of the subjects during the trials and by means of subjects‟ 
responses to questionnaires following the experiment. 
 Schachter & Singer found that all subjects in the anger and happy conditions 
reported being angry and happy respectively.  Those subjects given a placebo exhibited 
and reported minimal emotional arousal (relative to the other conditions).  With respect 
to the three groups who received the adrenaline injection, the following was found.  
Those who were told about the effects of the injection both exhibited and reported the 
lowest levels of emotional arousal.  Those who were told nothing about the nature of the 
injection or its effects exhibited and reported an elevated level of emotional arousal.  
Finally, those purposefully misinformed about the effects of the injection exhibited and 
reported the highest level of emotional arousal.  These findings 
cognitivist/propositional attitude theorists maintain establish that a subject‟s level of 
emotional arousal is entirely dependent upon their appraisal of their environmental 
context.  That is, these findings are taken to establish that emotions are differentiated 
and labeled by subjects based on their appraisals of (i.e., beliefs about) their situations.  
Propositional attitude theorists maintain that these results support their claim that 
emotions are identified (and differentiated) not by physiological states but rather solely 
upon the basis of the cognitive appraisals undertaken by the agent – i.e., the beliefs 
(and/or desires) they currently hold. 
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While there a number of cognitive appraisal accounts on offer35 all share the 
commitment to the dual claims that an emotional response requires prior “cognitive” 
appraisal of the situation/stimuli (i.e., that a belief be fixed) and that these prior 
cognitive appraisals are the cause of any physiological responses associated with an 
emotional response of a particular kind.36  Analogous then to Lyons‟ claim, cognitivist 
theories hold both (a) that all emotional responses are the result of higher level 
“cognitive” processes of appraisal (i.e., “thinking”) and (b) for a subject, for example, to 
be afraid of X requires that one fix a belief about X – namely that X is dangerous (or at 
least “fear-worthy”).  Whatever physiological alterations come to manifest are secondary 
to and dependent upon the processes of belief-fixation. 
ON COGNITIVIST/PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE ACCOUNTS OF EMOTION AND FRAME 
PROBLEMS 
 Cognitive appraisal/propositional attitude theories of emotion, as outlined 
above, maintain that emotions are either identical to or are caused by processes of 
“cognition” – of the operations of belief-fixation.  Since, as Fodor‟s arguments aim to 
establish that any system engaging in “thinking” is computationally inexplicable and 
un-model-able (since it must be able to solve the frame problem), quite trivially it 
follows that if the emotions are identical to or caused by beliefs then the emotions too 
would be prone to the frame problem and would also be computationally inscrutable.  
Clearly, under any account in which it is maintained that all emotions are belief-
dependent, the proposal that by bringing the emotions to bear some light might be shed 
on the question of how it is that we contend with some of the frame problems that arise 
                                                     
35 Fridja, Kuipers & TerSchure (1989), Fridja (1986), Oatley & Johnson-Laird (1987) Gehm & 
Scherer (1988), Roseman, Spindel & Jose (1990), Smith & Ellsworth (1985), Reisenzein & Hofman 
(1990), Smith & Lazarus (1993), Lazarus (1982), (1984) & (1991). 
36 That is, in those accounts that allow for physiological responses to play a role in emotion at all. 
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in practical reason, would be ill-received – viewed as a quite pointless proposal that, as 
decidedly circular, would be a “non-starter.”  Put somewhat differently, if the 
operations of belief-fixation are, as Fodor suggests, computationally un-model-able and 
if emotions are invariably belief-dependent, then there would be no reason whatsoever 
for thinking that by bringing emotion to bear we should have any more hope of 
understanding the workings of mind than we do by ignoring it.  This is so because 
under the cognitivist/propositional attitude account the emotions are just another 
cognitive event in need of explanation and modeling.  And so, bringing emotion to bear 
in the hopes of explaining how it might be that we contend with some of the frame 
problems that arise in practical reason and decision-making would fail to offer any 
explanation at all.  Rather, so doing would serve only to chase the problem about.   
SOME STANDARD PUZZLES FOR PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE/COGNITIVIST ACCOUNTS OF 
EMOTION 
 There are a number of rather standard objections to or puzzles raised about the 
propositional attitude/cognitivist account that should be briefly set out and discussed.37 
While I will discuss Griffiths‟ rather global critique of the propositional 
attitude/cognitivist approach shortly, since his assessment of the limited powers of 
conceptual analysis as a tool for understanding what the emotions are is compelling, I 
will focus on examining the empirical support for and the objections to this approach.  
Propositional attitude/cognitivist accounts are often charged with being unable 
to account for what have come to be called in the literature “objectless emotions” - those 
emotional states such as generalized anxiety or depression that lack specific intentional 
objects.  Since, at least in some cases, there is no particular thing about which one is 
                                                     
37 This rather standard set of puzzles for propositional attitude/cognitivist theories outlined here 
is a distillation of a number of versions of these objections made by a number of different 
theorists.  Most of these, in some form or other, can be attributed to Zajonc (1980, 1984). 
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anxious, there can be no explicit proposition entertained and thus no specific belief that 
is identical to or the cause of the emotion.38   
Second, it is claimed that some propositional attitude approaches, particularly 
those like Solomon‟s in which physiological alterations (i.e., affective responses) are 
taken to be entirely irrelevant to the question of what emotions are, are either (a) 
committed to positing far too many emotions or (b) unable to provide an account of why 
certain appraisal/evaluations are emotional while others are not.    
With respect to the first option, the objection continues, under those accounts in 
which emotions are belief-identical, what reason do we have for thinking that all 
cognitions (i.e., all instance of belief-fixation) are not emotions?  If all cognitive 
appraisals (i.e., all instances of belief-fixation) are emotions, then there would be a vast 
number of emotions – one for each belief fixed in the limit. 
Alternatively, if such accounts wish to maintain vernacular emotion types (i.e., 
disallowing that every belief-fixing episode is an emotional episode) then some 
explanation is needed for why/how it is that some appraisal/belief-fixing episodes are 
emotions and others are not.  Seemingly, the objection continues, something in addition 
to belief would be needed to determine and differentiate the emotion types.  Taken 
together then, those approaches that maintain that emotions are belief-identical face the 
problem of having to explain how/why it is that some beliefs are emotional and others 
are not. 
This concern, while raising doubt about the tenability of a “pure” propositional 
attitude/cognitivist approach to emotion, is not directly applicable to those accounts 
                                                     
38 A similar concern is often raised with respect to the inability of propositional 
attitude/cognitivist approaches to offer an account of “mood” which appear to be both 
“emotional” in character yet objectless (i.e., non-intentional). 
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that allow for physiological states to play some role in determining and differentiating 
emotions.  For example, Lyons‟ account in which emotions are taken to be reducible to 
both a particular belief and the physiological change (i.e., affective response) induced by 
this belief, is largely immune to this particular charge. Specifically, under this variant of 
the propositional attitude/cognitivist approach, it would follow that not all belief-fixing 
episodes are emotion-episodes precisely because not all beliefs result in the induction of 
an alteration in the subject‟s physiological state of the relevant sort.   
Those variants (like Lyons‟) in which physiological states are incorporated, 
however, face the question of how to explain those situations in which some particular 
affective response (i.e., physiological alteration) is induced by the “wrong” kind of belief.  
Consider for example a situation in which the physiological state associated with “joy” 
is induced in response to the belief that some situation is a highly dangerous one (e.g., 
base-jumpers, street drag-racers, waterfall barrel-riders, and other “extreme sport” 
enthusiasts).  If each emotion requires both that a particular type of belief be entertained 
and that a particular kind of (“abnormal”) physiological state be induced, then cases 
such as these in which the “wrong” kind of state is induced, are at the least somewhat 
puzzling.  Specifically, the concern continues, one wonders what emotion such folks are 
really in.   
If belief is doing the work in determining the type of emotion entokened, then it 
would seem that one should say that these folks are really afraid (because they genuinely 
believe the situation a dangerous one).  However, at least prima facie, this does not 
appear to be the case at all.  If belief is taken to be in fact determinative of the emotion 
entokened (i.e., if such folks really are afraid because of what they believe irrespective of 
the particular physiological state induced) then one wonders what role physiological 
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states are actually playing in determining and differentiating emotion.  If physiological 
states play no role, then the original criticism outlined above would remain applicable, 
for some account would still be needed as to why certain beliefs are emotions and others 
are not.  If physiological states do play at least some role, then an explanation is needed 
of what precisely this role might be. 
Alternatively, if the subject‟s physiological state is doing the work in determining 
the type of emotion entokened, then it would seem that one should say that these folks 
really are “happy/joyful” irrespective of their beliefs about the dangerousness of the 
situation.  However, if this second option is adopted, it becomes unclear what role belief 
is actually playing in determining and differentiating emotion. That is, endorsing this 
option would appear to come at the price of the rejection of the principal claims of the 
cognitivist/propositional attitude approach (i.e., that all emotions are belief-dependent).  
Propositional attitude/cognitivists theories are sometimes criticized for their 
inability to contend with cases in which agents experience genuine emotions in response 
to imagined (imaged) content (Greenspan, 1988).  If so, since the propositional 
attitude/cognitivist approach holds that all emotions are belief-dependent (i.e., they are 
all reducible to or caused by belief) and the subjects in such imaginative cases explicitly 
do not believe the content of these imaginings, then it would follow that either the agent 
is not experiencing a genuine emotion (as some propositional attitude/cognitivist 
theorists maintain and Greenspan denies) or the propositional attitude/cognitivist 
approach to emotion is incomplete.  
Furthermore, the propositional attitude/cognitivist approach is charged with 
being unable to provide an adequate explanation for those cases of emotions that occur 
in the absence of belief.  There are, so it would appear, instances in which we respond 
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emotionally (long) before we have fixed a belief.  I freeze, then recoil, my gut constricts, 
heart rate increases and I attend immediately to the sound near me – I am afraid.  Only 
later do I come to believe that in fact I am standing near bags of trash teeming with rats.  
That one can respond emotionally prior to the fixation of a belief poses a puzzle, of 
course, for the propositional attitude/cognitivist approach which claims that all 
emotions are belief-dependent.  
Likewise, propositional attitude/cognitivist approaches are charged with being 
unable to account for those cases in which one becomes “emotional” in spite of one‟s 
beliefs.  For example, many believe that being in a graveyard at midnight is no more 
dangerous than being in one at noon (i.e., there are no ghouls, demons, zombies, beasties 
and the like), yet at least some of these folks will be genuinely afraid.  This, of course, 
presents a puzzle for the propositional attitude/cognitivist approach for it would appear 
that their only recourse is to claim either (a) that these folks really are not afraid, or (b) 
that they really do not believe that graveyards are zombie-free at midnight.39 
In addition to this rather standard set of objections to or puzzles about the 
propositional attitude/cognitivist approach briefly discussed above, Griffiths (1997) 
argues that the entire propositional attitude approach to emotion is methodologically 
suspect.  Before outlining Griffiths‟ critique, however, I will examine briefly the 
empirical evidence most often relied upon in support of the cognitivist (and, by 
association, the propositional attitude) approach. 
                                                     
39 Disgust also provides some nice examples.  Normal subjects, it has been found, will invariably 
refuse to drink water into which sanitized rubber dog feces, fake vomit and/or plastic roaches 
have been briefly dipped.  All subjects know full well – i.e., believe – that the water is in no way 
contaminated, yet all are disgusted by the prospect of drinking it. 
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Zajonc (1980), (1984) and Berkowitz (1994) heavily criticize the research 
methodology relied upon in many of the studies offered in support of 
cognitivist/propositional attitude approach to emotion.  Specifically, Zajonc and 
Berkowitz note that all of the experiments offered in support of the cognitive appraisal 
approach rely upon subjects reporting upon their own cognitive processes.  Taking 
Schachter and Singer‟s study as an example, subjects are required, upon completion of 
the trial, to reconstruct from memory the processes undertaken by them during the trial 
and verbalize these to the examiners.  While most now acknowledge the unreliability of 
evidence from introspection, with regard to the particular paradigms employed in the 
studies taken to support the cognitivist position, Phaf (1996) argues that the conclusions 
rely upon the assumption that subjects are capable of accurately reporting upon their 
cognitive processes when many of these are likely to be unavailable to consciousness.  
Similarly, Berry (1987) suggests that experts consistently report that they employ 
“rational” problem-solving strategies that bear little resemblance to the heuristic 
strategies that they actually employ when solving problems in their particular domains 
of expertise.  And so, if evidence from introspection is suspect and if subjects are prone 
to thinking that they are employing one kind of process when they are in fact employing 
one quite different, then we have reason for thinking the empirical evidence relied upon 
to support the cognitivist approach to be problematic.  
Furthermore, and pertinent in particular to the often cited conclusions of 
Schachter and Singer (1962) there are the findings of Parkinson & Manstead (1992, 1993), 
Nisbett and Wilson (1977), Gazzanaga & Smiley (1984).  These suggest that subjects 
often construct, invent or confabulate explanations and rationales for their 
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behavior/physiological states when the cause is uncertain.40  And so, under conditions 
of uncertainty, subjects tend to explain their behavior as the result of some inner mental 
process though the actual cause is attributable to some other factor (e.g., an 
environmental cue.)  And so, if subjects are known to confabulate (i.e., invent) 
explanations for their behavior/physiological states under conditions of uncertainty, 
and the injection of adrenaline causes physiological arousal, then these subject‟s self-
reports would be suspect.  The phenomenon of confabulation, then, provides an 
alternative and an at least equally plausible explanation for Schachter and Singer‟s 
(1962) results.  This, when taken in conjunction with the general unreliability of evidence 
from introspection, suggests that the empirical support for the cognitivist/propositional 
attitude approach is by no means decisive. 
GRIFFITH‟S CRITIQUE OF THE PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE APPROACH 
 The propositional attitude approach to emotion relies, Griffiths (1997) contends, 
upon the analysis of emotion terms to define and differentiate emotions.  This general 
approach, he continues, “assume[s] that a concept is entirely constituted by what is 
currently believed about its referent.” (Griffiths, 1997 p. 24)  It is then conceptual 
analysis, Griffiths suggests, that undergirds the philosophical support for the claim that 
all emotions are belief-dependent (i.e., “cognitive”).  Griffiths, however, argues that 
conceptual analysis is a deficient tool for understanding the emotions. (Griffiths, 1997 p. 
35)  He explains,  
Our best definition of water is the formula HOH, but this could not have been 
established by conceptual analysis!  Ordinary English speakers in the past did not 
know that water was HOH, but this is still an important part of what “water” means. 
(Griffiths, 1997 p. 35) … Conceptual analysis can tell us only what people currently 
                                                     
40 Thanks to that member of P. Greenspan‟s seminar (2002) on emotion - I unfortunately do not 
recall whom – who first pointed out the potential relevance of the phenomenon of confabulation 
as an alternative interpretation of Schachter & Singer‟s findings.  
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believe about emotion.  There are many puzzles about emotion that cannot be resolved 
by mere analysis of what people currently believe.  To answer these questions it is 
necessary to look at the referent of the concept as well as the concept itself.  It may even 
be necessary to revise the concept in order to better accommodate its referent.41 
(Griffiths, 1997 p. 39) 
 
 And so, given the standard set of puzzles faced by the propositional 
attitude/cognitivist approach outlined above and the inability, Griffiths contends, of 
conceptual analysis to offer insight into the nature of the referent of our emotion terms, 
we have reason for thinking the propositional attitude/cognivitist approach to emotion 
to be problematic and at the very least an incomplete account of what the emotions are.   
While my goal in this section is not to provide a complete response to the 
question of “what the emotions are,” we do have reason for thinking the account offered 
by the propositional attitude/cognitivist approach to be problematic.  I conjectured 
earlier that initial resistance to the suggestion that bringing emotions to bear on the 
frame problems that arise in practical reason and decision-making might hold promise 
for explaining how we might contend with such problems, is likely rooted in a particular 
view about the nature of the emotions themselves – specifically in a tacit assumption 
that something like the propositional attitude/cognitivist approach must be true.  Since, 
however, we have reason for thinking this initial objection (or charge of irrelevance) to 
be based upon theoretical foundations that are empirically unsupported and 
methodological problematic, we have reason for thinking the claim that all emotions are 
belief-dependent to be unsupported.  And so, if at least some of what the emotions are 
might be undertaken by “non-cognitive” processes, then we would have no reason for 
thinking that bringing emotion to bear on some of the frame problems that arise in 
                                                     
41 Griffiths continues, “But the proponents of the propositional attitude approach seem quite 
undaunted by its bleak history and are so firmly committed to the methodology of conceptual 
analysis that they may regard my cure as worse than the disease.” (Griffiths, 1997 p.39) 
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practical reason and decision-making should be irrelevant.  Likewise, in advance of our 
considering specific proposals, we also do not appear to have reason for thinking the 
proposal to be an obvious non-starter.  
The point here is a modest one.  While there are other considerations that must 
be addressed (i.e., it remains to be shown that emotion helps to expedite and increase the 
accuracy of practical reason and decision-making) there appears to be no reason - in 
advance of our considering specific proposals - for thinking emotion to be obviously 
irrelevant. 
AUTOMATED APPRAISAL THEORY 
 The second of two broad approaches to the question of what the emotions are, 
the automated appraisal/“basic” emotion approach, has received comparatively little 
philosophical attention and, as such, is somewhat (philosophically) undeveloped.  In 
what follows, I will briefly outline this approach and present a representative sample of 
the evidence in support of the automated appraisal account of emotion.  Following this, I 
will argue that while the automated appraisal approach is unlikely to provide a 
complete response to the question of what the emotions are, there is ample evidence for 
thinking the processes outlined by such accounts to be at least part of the picture (i.e., a 
partial response to the question of what the emotions are).  And so, I will suggest that 
whatever the emotions turn out to be, at least part of what they are will be explicable in 
terms of the operations of automated appraisal mechanisms/basic emotion programs. 
ZAJONC‟S AUTOMATED APPRAISAL ACCOUNT: THE EVIDENCE FROM “AFFECTIVE PRIMING” 
 Lazarus‟ claim that emotions are cognitive in the manner outlined above 
instigated a debate between him and Zajonc. The Lazarus (1982, 1984) and Zajonc (1980, 
1984) debate concerns the extent to which cognition (in Lazarus‟ and Fodor‟s terms) is 
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required for emotion.42  In contrast to the cognitivist approach, Zajonc argues for a dual-
systems model whereby affective/emotional responses are undertaken by autonomous 
and automated “non-cognitive” systems that are functionally distinct from those 
implicated directly in cognition (i.e., belief-fixation).   
That subjects generate preferences for stimuli that cannot be consciously 
perceived (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) is taken by Zajonc to 
support the hypothesis that affective/emotional appraisals are undertaken by 
information processing systems that are distinct from those implicated in belief-fixation.  
Specifically, Zajonc‟s “affective priming hypothesis” maintains that affective appraisals 
occur without cognitive appraisal.  While there is considerable evidence in support of 
various formulations of the affective priming hypothesis, I will, with the aim of keeping 
discussion short, focus on presenting only few representative results.43 
Zajonc & Murphy (1993), for example, studied the effects of cognitive and 
affective priming on a judgment task involving previously neutral stimuli (novel 
Chinese characters).  Happy or angry faces were employed as affective primes while 
circles and squares of different sizes and symmetrical or asymmetrical geometric shapes 
were employed as cognitive primes.  Subjects were exposed to the primes - images of 
faces or geometric shapes - either briefly for 4 msec or longer for 100msec prior to the 
                                                     
42 Again, while the terminology is decidedly unhelpful what is at stake in this debate is not the 
issue of whether or not emotion requires prior information processing but rather whether 
emotions require information processing by the same systems implicated in belief-fixation and 
planning.  Both agree that some form of information processing is prerequisite to the induction of 
an emotion.  Lazarus maintains that the kind of information processing undertaken is “higher-
level” (i.e., doxastic) while Zajonc holds the kind of information processing to be rather 
perceptual in nature.  
43 Izard, 1991, 1992, 1993; Etcoff & Magee, 1992; Bargh, Chaiken, Govender & Pratto, 1992; 
Greenwald, Klinger & Lui, 1989; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Niedenthal, 1990; Martin, Williams & 
Clark, 1991; Neidenthal & Kitayama, 1994; Dagleish & Watts, 1990; Hunt & Ellis, 1999; Kraiger & 
Isen, 1989; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Pratto & John, 1991; Ingram, 1984; Teasdale, 1983; 
Niedenthal & Showers, 1991; Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994. 
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presentation of the Chinese character.  It was found that the affective primes 
(happy/angry faces) when presented for the short 4 msec duration significantly 
influenced the subjects evaluations of the “goodness” or “badness” of the target 
characters.  The cognitive primes (square, circles and symmetrical/asymmetrical 
geometric shapes), however, were found to influence subjects‟ judgments concerning 
whether the character represented an object that was round, square, symmetrical or 
asymmetrical only when presented for the longer duration (100 msec) and not for the 
shorter.  Zajonc & Murphy explain these results noting, “when affect is elicited at levels 
outside of conscious awareness, it is diffuse and its origin and address are unspecified.  
Because of its diffuse quality, nonconscious affect can „spill over‟ onto unrelated 
stimuli.”(Zajonc & Murphy, 1993 p. 736)  That affective appraisals can influence 
cognitive processes in this manner, Zajonc concludes, suggests both that these processes 
(i.e., affective appraisal and cognitive appraisal) are distinct and that automated 
emotional appraisals occur independently of and in many cases prior to cognitive 
appraisals.  As autonomous and rapid, the output of these automated appraisal 
operations inform and influence cognitive processes in the manner described. 
Similarly, DeHouwer, Hermans, & Eelen (1998), in an affective variant of the 
Stroop (1935) task, found further support for an automated and distinct emotional 
processing (sub)system.  Subjects were presented with a discrimination task in which 
they were to determine as quickly as possible whether a target word was an adjective or 
a noun.  In response to a noun the subjects were to respond by saying aloud “positive” 
and “negative” to an adjective.  The target words themselves were either positively, 
negatively or neutrally affectively valenced.   Again, in keeping with the Stroop-like 
nature of the experiment, subjects were explicitly instructed to ignore the emotional 
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valence of the target words themselves.  Similar to the original Stroop test, subjects‟ 
response latencies (the time required to respond) were measured.  It was found that the 
response latencies were significantly longer in cases in which the valence of the target 
word was in contrast with their verbal response.  (e.g., in cases in which the word was a 
noun and thus the correct response should be “positive” subjects took considerably 
more time to respond when the target word was itself negatively valenced.)  This 
suggests that though subjects were given explicit instruction to ignore the emotional 
valence of the target words such appraisals were automatically generated and brought 
to bear, thus interfering with the discrimination task.  DeHouwer‟s finding appear to 
support a dual-system model whereby affective appraisal occurs automatically, 
independently of and prior to cognitive appraisals and in so doing informs (in this case 
interferes with or facilitates) cognitive processes. 
EKMAN‟S AUTOMATED APPRAISAL ACCOUNT: THE BASIC EMOTIONS  
 In addition to the evidence from affective priming, anthropological support for 
automated appraisal theory is available as well.  In response to the prevailing view at 
the time that emotions are “social constructions” (Harre, 1986; Averill, 1980; Oatley, 
1993) – the view that emotions are culturally inculcated learned behaviors that are 
acquired in much the same manner as one learns any other cultural mores.44  Underlying 
social constructivist accounts quite generally is the claim that one cannot experience joy, 
sadness, anger and so on without first having learned/been taught to do so (e.g., in 
much the same way that one learns which fork to use for which course).  Clearly, under 
                                                     
44 Occasionally social constructivists liken the acquisition of emotion to the learning of language.  
While I think few modern social constructivists would endorse this analogy, historically the claim 
is understandable given the view of language acquisition predominant at that time. 
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the social constructivist account having an emotion would be a decidedly cognitive 
activity. 
 In response to the social constructivist‟s claim, Ekman, Sorenson & Friesen (1969) 
and Ekman & Friesen (1971) conducted a set of studies (similar to those undertaken by 
Darwin) on remote populations in Borneo (1969) and New Guinea (1971).  Due to their 
isolation, members of neither group had had any interaction with Western culture (e.g., 
none had seen western photographs or films, knew English, or had lived in any Western 
settlement.)  As isolated from western influences, there would have been no way for 
members of either population to have learned any of the western emotions posited by 
social constructivism.  Since the studies are quite similar, I will focus on briefly outlining 
the findings of Ekman & Friesen‟s (1971) study involving members of the Fore 
population of New Guinea. 
 Fore language-speaking subjects (both adults and children) were presented with 
a set of three photographs (each depicting the face of an American expressing an 
emotion) and told a short story (in Fore and by a Fore member of the research team) 
involving a particular emotion.  Subjects were then asked to select which of the three 
pictures matched that described by the story.   Ekman & Friesen found that the pictures 
intended by them (i.e., Westerners) to match the story were also chosen by Fore speaking 
subjects.  That is, the Fore selected the same facial expressions in response to emotion-
involving stories as did the Western researchers. Next, Fore subjects were videotaped 
and photographed making the facial expression appropriate to each of the stories.  With 
these images, the experiment was repeated on American subjects.  American college 
students too chose those Fore facial expressions that tracked the emotion involved in 
each of the stories.  Simply put, both American college students and members of isolated 
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tribes in Borneo and New Guinea (neither of whom knew anything about the other‟s 
cultural or purported emotional mores) chose and expressed the same emotions in 
response to the same kinds of stories. 
 The (1971) study focused on six facial expressions – Joy/happiness, 
Distress/sadness, Fear, Anger, Disgust and Surprise – the so called “basic emotions” - 
which Ekman concludes are universal (pan-cultural), innate and undertaken by 
automated and autonomous (sub)systems.  Additional support for the claim that these 
basic emotions are automated and universal comes from Ekman et al., (1971) in which 
Japanese and American subjects were videotaped while watching both neutral/pleasant 
and stress-inducing film shorts.  While there are marked differences in the socially 
acceptable “display rules” for emotional expression between the two cultures (Japanese 
evidently find excessive emotional displays unpalatable, even rude in some instances, 
while Western cultures tend to be more permissive of such displays), the question 
Ekman & Friesen considered was the extent to which the social constructivist approach 
to emotion is correct.  If correct then Japanese subjects should really be emotionally 
unfathomable and entirely affectively outré to the Westerner for the simple reason that 
they are not actually experiencing the same emotions in response to stressful images as 
the Westerner.   That is, the question under consideration is whether Japanese and 
American subjects actually respond to the stressful images differently because of their 
particular cultural inculcations?   
 American and Japanese subjects were observed in two conditions.  First, the 
subjects were videotaped while watching neutral and stressful films alone.  In this 
condition the facial expressions of both the Japanese and American subjects matched to 
an extremely high degree (specifically, a .96 correlation was found).  In the second 
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condition, an interviewer was present in the room while each subject viewed the film.  
Interestingly, in this situation Japanese and American expressions differed markedly.  
Notably, Japanese subjects tended to “politely smile” during the trial - overall 
displaying more positive expressions and fewer expressions of disgust than did their 
American counterparts. Of greater interest however was the finding that when the 
videotapes of Japanese subjects were analyzed in slow-motion, even these subjects 
expressed – though only briefly – identical facial expressions in response to the stressful 
films as did the American students.  That is, both Japanese and Americans were found to 
automatically respond identically to the stressful film clips.  It was only after the 
subject‟s cognitive processes were able to catch up to these automated processes (a few 
hundred milliseconds later), Ekman argues, were the Japanese subjects emotional 
expressions curtailed or coerced into the more culturally acceptable display of a polite 
smile.   With respect then to Ekman‟s aim, it appears that Japanese subjects both 
experience and express the same emotions in response to the films as did westerners, 
though the ultimate manner in which emotion is displayed, communicated or conveyed 
to others (i.e., the particular “display rules” employed) do exhibit cultural variation. 
Support for the nativist claim underlying Ekman‟s account comes from Eibl-
Eibesfeldt (1973).  In this set of experiments, the emotional expressions of children and 
infants born blind and deaf were studied.45  Such infants, it was found, make identical 
facial expressions as those who are unaffected.  Since the blind and deaf infants could 
not have possibly learned to make such expressions - as the social constructivists claim - 
                                                     
45 Subsequently, thalidomide-affected infants were studied to determine whether emotion 
expression might be learned tactilely.  Here too, it was found that these infants generated 
identical expressions as unaffected infants. 
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these studies are offered as a poverty-of-the-stimulus type argument in support of the 
nativist claim.  
The species-universality of emotional recognition and display when taken in 
conjunction with the nativist claim, resulted in Ekman positing the existence of 6 (or 7) 
innate, automated and modularly realized affective appraisal mechanisms - the “basic” 
emotions or emotion programs as they are sometimes referred to in the literature.  
Underlying the account is the claim that (at least some) emotional responses are non-
cognitive, automated and complex coordinated sets of responses to both internally 
generated and externally perceived stimuli.  The activation of each program results in 
specific and measurable alterations in facial and vocal expression, musculoskeletal 
modifications such as changes in stance, visual and auditory orienting and particular 
muscular responses such as flinching, constriction of the gut, increased heart rate and 
respiration, alteration of hormonal/endocrine system homeostasis (i.e., increase or 
decrease in the production or release of hormones) and changes in autonomic nervous 
system activity.  Significantly, as autonomous neural programs, the appraisals and 
alterations induced are undertaken and transpire without cognitive mandate.  He 
explains, 
Since the interval between stimulus and emotional response is sometimes 
extraordinarily short, the appraisal mechanism must be capable of operating with great 
speed.  Often the appraisal is not only quick but it happens without awareness, so I 
must postulate that the appraisal mechanism is able to operate automatically.  It must be 
constructed so that it quickly attends to some stimuli, determining not only that they 
pertain to emotion, but to which emotion. (Ekman, 1977 pp. 58-59) 
 
And so, once activated emotion programs automatically result in manifold and 
highly predictable and specifiable changes in an agents facial expression, voice, stance, 
endocrine system and autonomic nervous system activity.  Emotions (at least some of 
them) then just are the manifold and coordinated set of changes induced in an agent by 
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an automated and neurally “hard-wired” modular appraisal mechanism.  To token a 
particular emotional response under Ekman‟s account just is for a particular emotion-
program to be activated and the manifold and coordinated alterations to unfold.   
That each emotion can be specified and differentiated by physiological 
manifestation, as Ekman suggests, is an empirical claim.  While work is ongoing, there is 
significant evidence of physiological and autonomic nervous system differentiation of 
the basic emotions.46  Given the available evidence, Ekman maintains, there is sufficient 
support for our thinking there to exist at least seven discernable and distinct human 
emotion/affect programs – the “basic emotions” - which roughly track the vernacular 
emotion terms of “disgust,” “contempt,” “anger,” “fear,” “joy,” and “sadness.”47   The 
existence of a seventh basic emotion “surprise/startle” is currently under debate. That 
automated, autonomous and non-cognitive processes mediate startle is not under 
dispute.  Rather, what is at issue is whether startle should be considered an emotion at 
all.   
In addition to the automated appraisals undertaken by these emotion programs, 
cognitive processes too may be engaged in appraisal under the dual-systems account 
outlined.  That is, in keeping with the general framework of Zajonc‟s account, Ekman‟s 
model is a dual-system one insofar as there are both discrete and autonomous emotional 
appraisal mechanisms and the processes of cognition.  And so, automated appraisals 
                                                     
46 Ekman, Levenson & Friesen 1983; Levenson, Ekman & Friesen, 1990; Levenson, Cartensen, 
Friesen & Ekman, 1991. 
47 Ekman is not relying on analysis to specify emotion kinds. Our vernacular term “fear” for 
example and what “fear” is according to the basic emotion program account may be very 
different things.  This follows, for Ekman‟s basic emotion programs need not track all instances of 
what vernacularly we might consider fear - such programs may include more or less than our 
vernacular emotion categories suggest.  Put another way, because the affect program account 
requires, as Griffiths (1997) argues, conceptual revision, there is no reason to think that these 
programs must or should track our existing folk emotion categories. 
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and cognitive appraisals, since they are undertaken in parallel, may match or they may 
differ, thus providing a means by which to contend with one of the puzzles confronting 
the cognitivist approach.  Specifically, under this two-systems account there would no 
mystery as to how one could both believe that one has no reason to be afraid of X, while 
fearing it nonetheless.   
While Ekman considers them distinct systems, he is, of course, not claiming that 
they are entirely non-interactive.  Rather, given the evidence from affective priming it is 
clear that affective appraisals influence cognitive ones.  Likewise, since it is also clear 
that thoughts (i.e., internally generated quasi-perceptual images) can give rise to 
emotions, Ekman is not claiming that affect programs cannot be activated by what a 
subject comes to believe.  And so, while the particular mechanisms of affective and 
cognitive appraisal are distinct (i.e., mediated by distinct systems), affective appraisals 
can influence cognitive processes and the output of cognitive processes may be accepted 
as input into the automated appraisal system, thus allowing for belief, once evaluated by 
the automated appraisal mechanism, to result in an emotional response.  
CLARIFYING THE NATIVIST CLAIM OF AUTOMATED APPRAISAL THEORY  
It is worth further clarifying the nativist aspect of Ekman‟s claim.  He is not, of 
course, suggesting that all people are afraid, for example, of the same things. And so, the 
particular stimuli that will activate an emotion program are not entirely innately fixed.  
It is, however, clear from Ekman‟s findings that the “output” of each emotion program 
is innate and species-universal.  And so, while subjects from differing environments 
(including whatever culture they are apart) may not, for example, fear the same 
particular things, all normal people will generate the same emotion-specific 
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characteristic responses to evolutionarily recurrent situation types.48 Emotions, Ekman 
explains, “evolved for their adaptive value in dealing with fundamental life 
tasks.”(Rosenberg & Ekman, 1994 p.216) And so, there are, he continues, commonalities 
in the kind of stimuli that will elicit an automated, complex and coordinated emotional 
response in humans.  Put another way, Ekman suggests that while it need not be the 
case that we all fear the same particular stimuli, we do all express and experience fear 
and we do all express and experience fear in response to the same kinds of evolutionary 
recurrent situations.  
The “input” aspect of the appraisal mechanism, while not entirely innately fixed 
(i.e., we can learn to respond emotionally to new stimuli) is, however, heavily 
evolutionarily constrained.  And so, in addition to the considerable evidence that all 
normal humans respond with fear, for example, to looming objects, snake-like shapes, 
displays of teeth, and growls, Ekman, drawing upon Seligman‟s (1971) learning 
preparedness account, suggests that our evolutionary history has (pre)disposed us to 
make particular associations with greater ease.  That is, we are (pre)disposed to quickly 
learn to respond emotionally to certain kinds of stimuli – if these obtain in the 
environment.49  And so, while we may not all respond with fear to same kinds of things, 
                                                     
48 There is, however, a body of evidence from animal studies suggesting that some fear-inducing 
stimuli are innate in the “input” aspect as well.  For example, looming objects, snake-like shapes, 
displays of teeth and growls appear to serve as universal fear-inducing stimuli.  Additionally, 
there are a number of species-specific fear inducing stimuli – for example, mice will, though they 
have never seen a cat, exhibit a characteristic fear response in the presence of a feline scent.  
Similar results have been found with respect to disgust. Monkeys, too, appear to exhibit a fear 
response to snakes regardless of whether they have seen a snake before or seen a conspecific react 
to the presence of snake. C.f. Ohman, (1993, 2001)  
49 Likewise, we are also (pre)disposed to make some associations with less ease and others only 
after a considerable number of learning trials. Still others, it appears, we are (pre) disposed to not 
make at all.  We are then “prepared,” Seligman suggests, by our particular evolutionary history 
to make certain kinds of associations with greater ease than others.  For example, while we 
quickly learn many associations (some phobias, for example, are acquired with incredible ease in 
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we are, as a species, disposed to learn and to respond emotionally to the same kinds of 
evolutionarily recurrent situations and stimuli - were these to obtain in our particular 
environment.  As such, what causes the activation of a particular agent‟s automated 
appraisal mechanism will depend both upon our species-specific evolutionary history 
(via both certain “hardwired” stimuli and learning preparedness) and the agent‟s own 
particular interactions with his/her environment – which includes, of course, his/her 
culture. 
Likewise, while all normal subjects will respond characteristically to the same 
evolutionary recurrent situation types, there is also a role for learning with respect to the 
particular “display rules” employed.  And so, while both Americans and Japanese, for 
example, both exhibit the same characteristic emotional responses to the same kinds of 
stimuli, the manner in which these automated responses are ultimately “displayed” (i.e., 
communicated to others) is, as culturally dependent, clearly learned. 
Ekman‟s findings then provide reason for thinking that at least some emotions 
are innate and universal (pan-cultural).  However, if the automated appraisal account is 
to serve as a plausible alternative to the propositional attitude/cognitivist model, we 
need reason for thinking there to exist the kinds of automated affective appraisal 
module(s) postulated by, among others, Ekman and Zajonc. 
THE EVIDENCE FROM NEUROANATOMY 
 In outlining his “dual – pathway” model of emotion, LeDoux (1998) provides 
further support both for Ekman‟s automated appraisal approach and the dual-systems 
                                                                                                                                                              
some instances after only one learning trial), it is incredibly difficult to get children – and many 
adults - to be afraid of things like automobiles and handguns. C.f. Seligman & Hager‟s (1972) 
discussion of the “Garcia effect” (named after John Garcia) who found that rats can learn to 
associate taste with nausea, but not sounds or sights – thus suggesting that not all stimuli can 
come to serve as conditioned stimulus of an unconditioned response.  
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hypothesis outlined by Zajonc.  LeDoux argues that emotional appraisals are 
undertaken by means of two anatomically distinct pathways – the thalamo-amygdala 
“low road” and the thalamo-cortico-amygdala “high road.”  I will provide a brief review 
of his account and findings. 
THE THALAMO-AMYGDALA PATHWAY: “THE LOW ROAD” 
 Normal rats, when presented with a paradigm in which a footshock (US) follows 
the presentation of an auditory stimulus (CS), quickly learn to associate the tone (CS) 
and the footshock (US).  Of surprise was the finding that the abalation or lesioning of the 
auditory cortex had absolutely no effect on the ability of the rats to develop conditioned 
responses.  While cortical involvement is unnecessary for the development of the 
conditioned response, conditioning is entirely prevented when the rats‟ auditory 
thalamae were ablated.  Such findings, LeDoux explains, are relevant for in order for 
conditioning to occur, “the audiotory stimulus has to rise through auditory pathways 
from the ear to the thalamus, but does not have to go the full distance to the auditory 
cortex.” (LeDoux, 1998 p. 152)  This is, of course, relevant for these findings suggest that 
emotional learning and appraisal neither relies upon nor requires cortical involvement.  
Since the role of the thalamus, all agree,  is decidedly “non-cognitive” – it is often 
attributed the role of a processing-inert relay-station (Zigmond et. al., 1999) – it would 
appear that the processes by which rats respond with fear to (new) stimuli is not a 
“cognitive” one.  Rather, LeDoux suggests, this process is subserved by an autonomous 
and dedicated non-cognitive affective (sub)system – an automated affective learning and 
appraisal module.50 
                                                     
50 Again, the term “cognitive” (about which the Lazarus-Zajonc debate revolves) is unhelpfully 
retained to some degree in LeDoux‟s discussion.  The non-cognitivist claim, once again, is not 
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 Through further ablation studies in conjunction with WGA-HRP tracer injection 
experiments, LeDoux (1992) discerned that by lesioning the connections between the 
thalamus and the amygdala, conditioning could be completely prevented.  Since, as a 
number of studies confirm, ablation of the amygdala completely prevents conditioning, 
it is then the amygdala and not the thalamus that is responsible for mediating emotional 
conditioned learning and appraisal.  This direct thalamo-amygdala pathway, which 
functions entirely independently of any cortical involvement (and thus “thinking”) 
relying only upon the minimally processed information relayed to it from the thalamus, 
is significant for,  
The fact that emotional learning can be mediated by pathways that bypass the 
neocortex is intriguing for it suggests that emotional responses can occur without the 
involvement of the higher processing systems of the brain, systems believed to be 
involved in thinking, reasoning and consciousness. (LeDoux, 1998 p.161) 
 
 These findings also lend support to Ekman‟s claim that, while the output of the 
automated appraisal module is fixed, the kinds of stimuli that will trigger an emotional 
response need not be.  Via the mechanism of emotional learning set out by Cahill et. al., 
(1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996) and LeDoux (1995, 1998), it is clear that subjects can come 
to learn to respond emotionally to a vast range of “trigger” stimuli.  However, the kinds 
of stimuli that will serve as triggers (i.e., inducers of an emotional response) will be, 
LeDoux claims, directly influenced by our species-specific (pre)dispositions to make 
particular kinds of associations – in the manner suggested by Seligman‟s learning 
preparedness model.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
that affective appraisal occurs without information processing of any kind but rather that it 
occurs independently of those information processes that are involved in belief-fixation.  The 
cognitivists hold the view that all emotions are either belief-identical or belief-dependent. 
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THE THALAMO-CORTICO-AMYGDALA PATHWAY 
 McCabe et al., (1992) explored the role of sensory-specific cortical involvement in 
the development of conditioned responses.  Rabbits were presented with two similar 
auditory tones, only one of which was paired with a foot shock.  The rabbits, in order to 
properly respond, needed to discriminate between the tones.  As expected, controls 
rapidly learned to distinguish between the tones, enacting a conditioned response only 
to the tone paired with the shock (CS+).  Rabbits however with lesions of the auditory 
cortex were found to respond to both tones as if either was indicative of foot shock. 
 In addition to the direct thalamo-amygdala pathway, a second pathway exists, 
LeDoux explains, in which crude representations of stimuli are relayed via the thalamus 
to sensory-specific cortical areas for further (in this case auditory) processing.  After 
further sensory-specific perceptual processing (i.e., refinement of the crude auditory 
representation), these representations are relayed (back) to the amygdala for 
(re)appraisal.  Importantly, however, much of the “processed” information relayed to 
the amygdala from the sensory-specific cortical areas is still decidedly non-cognitive (in 
Lazarus‟ sense) for the kind of processing undertaken is limited to modality-specific 
perceptual processes (e.g., visual, auditory or tactile “image” refinement). And so, while 
this “high road” pathway, we will see, serves to relay cognitively generated 
representations (i.e., quasi-perceptual images that are the result of “thinking”) to the 
amygdala for appraisal, much of what is shunted along this route are, given LeDoux‟s 
discussion, “cleaned up” image-representations that are the result of decidedly 





THE AMYGDALA AS AN AUTOMATED AFFECTIVE APPRAISAL MODULE:  
 Ablation, lesioning or damage of the amygdala has long been noted to “result in 
selective impairments in emotional perception and appreciation, as well as emotional 
expression in humans and animals.” (Eichenbaum, 2002 p. 280)  Drawing upon a 
number of earlier findings (Kluver-Bucy, 1937, 1939) LeDoux suggests that the amygdala 
functions “like the hub of a wheel” (LeDoux, 1998 p. 168) since it receives both crude 
(i.e., minimally processed)51 inputs from areas of the thalamus, further perceptually 
processed representations from sensory-specific cortical areas, as well as inputs from the 
hippocampus.  Through these pathways, LeDoux argues, “the amygdala is able to 
process the emotional significance of individual stimuli as well as complex situations.  
The amygdala is … involved in the appraisal of emotional meaning.  It is where trigger 
stimuli do their triggering.” (LeDoux, 1998 pp. 168-9)  
 The amygdala-realized affective appraisal mechanism, LeDoux argues, (though 
not in such terms) is modularly realized.  This follows for two principal reasons.  First, 
the amygdala alone mediates and maintains the conditioned learning of emotionally 
significant stimuli.  The lesioning studies clearly suggest that ablation of the amygdala 
results in an inability of subjects to respond emotionally to previously learned stimuli 
and to learn to respond emotionally to new stimuli.  Such patients are, in effect, 
emotional/affective amnesiacs.  Second, it is known that emotional memory and 
declarative/episodic memory are double-dissociable. Lesioning studies by LeDoux, 
Damasio & Bechara among a number of others establish that emotional/affective 
responses to stimuli are retained even when subjects are incapable of remembering any 
                                                     
51 For example, with respect to the visual case, the thalamus receives input directly from the optic 
nerve.  And so, while the information relayed has been “processed,” the processing is limited to 
that undertaken by the retina, which all agree is minimal. 
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of the declarative facts about the episode/event due to damage to the hippocampus.  
There are, LeDoux explains, 
Two different memory systems … one involved in forming memories of experiences 
and making these memories available for conscious recollection at some time later, and 
another operating outside of consciousness and controlling behavior without explicit 
awareness of the past learning … this system forms implicit or nondeclarative 
memories about dangerous or otherwise threatening situations … and are created 
through the mechanisms of conditioning. (LeDoux, 1996 p. 181)  
 
 Tranel (1993), undertaking a formalized version of Claparede‟s (1911) anecdotal 
findings, provides evidence for the dissociability of affective/emotional and declarative 
memory.  In a set of controlled situations, amnesic patients interacted with three 
researcher-cohorts: a “good guy,” who was invariably pleasant and accommodating of 
the subjects‟ requests), a “neutral guy,” who engaged the subjects in tasks that were 
neither pleasant nor unpleasant), and a “bad guy,” who was brusque, inhospitable, 
unaccommodating of the subjects‟ requests and who engaged subjects in a highly 
tedious and purposefully irksome task.  The subjects repeatedly interacted with the 
three cohorts in random order but always for a controlled amount of time over the 
course of five days.  After five days the subjects were asked to participate in two tasks. 
 In the first, subjects were presented with a set of four photographs of which one 
was one of the “guys” in the experiment.  Subjects were then asked questions such as 
“whom would you go to if you needed help?” and “who would you think is your 
friend?” While the subjects had no recollection whatsoever of ever having met any of 
those depicted, when the “good guy” was present in the photo array, subjects chose him 
over 80% of the time.  The “neutral guy” was chosen at chance levels and the “bad guy” 
was nearly never chosen. 
 In the second task, the subject was asked to look at an array of three photos of 
faces and tell the researchers what they knew about them.  As expected, nothing came to 
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mind – for they had no declarative memories of ever having met any of the confederates.  
However, when asked who among those depicted was a friend, the “good guy” was 
consistently chosen.  Anecdotally, Damasio recounts that one patient David, “even upon 
completion of the experiment … was found to hesitate and flinch when he came upon 
the „bad guy‟ in the hall and he was unable to explain his behavior.”(Damasio, 1999 p. 
46) 
 Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, Adolphs, Rockland & Damasio (1995) provide further 
evidence for both the double-dissociability of declarative and affective memory and for 
the localization of the automated affective appraisal mechanism in the amygdala.  In this 
study, human patients with bilateral damage to the (1) the amygdala, (2) hippocampus 
and (3) both regions were habituated to a set of colored slides and pure tones, some of 
which would serve as conditioned stimuli (CS+) and some of which would not (CS-).52  
During the conditioning phase, CS (slides or tones) were presented in random order to 
the subjects.  Following the presentation of a CS+ stimuli, an unconditioned stimuli (US) 
– a loud and obnoxious horn – was sounded. 
 Control subjects, as expected, exhibited rapid and robust conditioning to the CS.  
Patients, however, with bilateral amygdala damage failed to develop any conditioned 
response,53 while those with selective hippocampus damage exhibited normal 
conditioning.  Patients with damage to both regions were also found to be incapable of 
developing a conditioned response. 
 Following the conditioning task, subjects were asked a set of questions about the 
task (e.g., how many colors, name the colors, how many colors were followed by a horn, 
                                                     
52 Habituation is presumably necessary to remove the influence of the priming affect noted by 
Zajonc (1980). 
53 Both behaviorally and by SCR measurement. 
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name those colors) which aimed at assessing declarative memory performance.  Both 
controls and amygdala damaged subjects were able to correctly respond to the questions 
posed while those with pure and combined hippocampal damage were incapable of so 
doing. 
 Bilateral damage to the amygdala in humans, then, completely prevented the 
acquisition of a conditioned emotional response but had no effect on the ability of 
patients to recall factual information about the trial.  Bilateral hippocampal damage, in 
contrast, prevented the acquisition of factual information about the stimuli and pairings, 
but had no effect on the ability of patients to acquire conditioned emotional responses.  
Combined damage resulted in the inability of patients to acquire conditioned responses 
and the inability to acquire and recall factual information about the task. (Bechara et.al., 
1995 p.1117) 
 These findings provide clear support for a “double dissociation between 
emotional and declarative learning in humans” and thus for the existence of dissociable 
and localizable systems that mediate affective and cognitive appraisals. (Bechara et.al., 
1995 p.1118)  We have then from these double-dissociability findings, evidence for 
thinking that the amygdala-realized mechanism of affective appraisal maintains and 
relies upon a proprietary database of emotional/affective memory in the course of its 
processing.  Put another way, the automated affective/emotional appraisal mechanisms 
operations rely upon information that is encapsulated with respect to information 
available to other systems.  That is, at least some of the information available to the 
amygdala-realized appraisal system is not available to other systems and at least some 
information that is available to other systems is not available to the emotional appraisal 
process.  As automated, obligatory, rapid and encapsulated, the operations of the 
155 
 
affective appraisal system should be, as plausibly modular in design, amenable to 
modeling.   
 It is once again, however, worth stressing that Bechara & Damasio and LeDoux‟s 
use of the terms “appraisal” and “evaluation” in explaining the role of the amygdala 
(while potentially confusing in light of earlier discussion) should not be taken in the 
cognitive or “rational” sense of Lazarus and the cognitivists.  Rather, in keeping with 
Ekman‟s and Zajonc‟s hypotheses, these theorists maintain that the amygdala functions 
as a purely automated and autonomous processing system – an automated affective 
appraisal module. And so, while the input accepted may be crude thalamic relays, 
refined perceptual representations that are the result of sensory-specific cortical 
processing, or retrieved image-memories from the hippocampus, the appraisals 
undertaken by the amygdala itself are automated and autonomous - requiring neither 
cortical involvement nor “thinking” (i.e., higher-level cognition) in the way claimed by 
the cognitivist approach.   
 This is not to say, however, that representations generated by “higher-level” 
cortical processes cannot be accepted as input to the amygdala.  While LeDoux focuses 
on the operations by which perceptual-process generated representations are appraised, 
he acknowledges that the amygdala – as a rather general purpose affective appraisal 
mechanism – takes as input both perceptual images and cognitive images (i.e., quasi-
perceptual sensory image reconstructions).  Put another way, while the input to, and 
thus the content of, each appraisal may come from a number of sources (e.g., crude 
perceptual images from the thalamus or refined ones from modality specific cortical 
areas), the appraisal operation itself is decidedly modular and non-cognitive in Zajonc‟s 
sense.  While the process by which cognitively generated representations (e.g., beliefs or 
156 
 
suppositions) come to be appraised is not the focus of LeDoux‟s account, we will see, in 
Damasio and Bechara‟s model (to be discussed in the next chapter), an account of how 
this might be undertaken and realized. 
 While the amygdala-realized appraisal device is massively connected to 
numerous regions of the brain54 and, as such, exerts significant, though regrettably 
incompletely understood, influences on a number of systems, the output of this 
appraisal device is, by all accounts, “shallow.”  (c.f., Fodor, 1983 p. 86)  Since the 
amygdala-realized appraisal mechanism relies upon a clearly dissociable (and thus 
proprietary) database of affective memory, the appraisal operations undertaken are 
“encapsulated” with respect to information available to other systems.  Furthermore, 
since this structure is anatomically distinct, undertakes functionally dissociable 
activities, is automated, obligatory in operation and the output is “shallow” we have, so 
it would appear, reason for thinking it to satisfy the relevant criteria of a modularly 
realized system.  If so, then at least that aspect of emotion (i.e., that portion of what the 
emotions are) that is explicable in terms of the operations of an automated and 
autonomous appraisal system should be amenable to modeling in computationally 
feasible terms. If the operations of this automated and modularly realized appraisal 
device informs and influences practical reason and decision-making in the right kinds of 
ways, which remains to be shown, then consideration of emotion might be of some help 
                                                     
54 Amorapanth, LeDoux, & Nader, 2000; Naher, Majidishad, Amorapanth, LeDoux, 2001; 
Pitkanen, Savander & LeDoux, 1997; Pitkanen, Stefanacci, Farb, Go, LeDoux & Amaral, 1995; 
Adolphs 1999; Adolphs, Denburg & Tranel, 2000; Panksepp, 1998. 
Briefly, the central nucleus of the amygdala sends output projections to brain stem, basal 
forebrain, locus coruleus, dorsal motor nucleus of the vagus nerve, trigeminal and facial motor 
nuclei and lateral hypothalamus while the lateral and basal nuclei (of the amygdala) send 
afferent projections to the ventral striatum, cingulate cortex and orbitofrontal cortex.  Projections 
are also found to regions implicated in neuro-peptide and neurotransmitter manufacture and 




in explaining how we contend with some of the frame problems that arise in those 
domains.  
ON THE LIKELY INCOMPLETENESS OF THE “BASIC EMOTION” AUTOMATED APPRAISAL 
ACCOUNT  
 While the dual-systems model sketched by automated appraisal theory is 
supported (i.e., we have reason for thinking that at least some of what the emotions are 
are the result of automated and autonomous “non-cognitive” appraisal systems), the 
automated appraisal approach appears to be, given the current evidence, inadequate as 
a complete response to the question of “what the emotions are.”  Since there is no 
empirical evidence supporting the strong claim that all emotions are “basic” (e.g., there is 
no evidence supporting the claim that emotions such as love, Schadenfreude, ennui and the 
like are undertaken by discrete emotion-programs) it would appear that, at the very 
least, such a claim is premature.  Rather, in keeping with the general intuition 
underlying the cognitivist account, prima facie it does appear that at least some 
emotions are the result of “cognitive” appraisal processes.  That is, it does seem that at 
least some emotions might be belief-dependent (i.e., require “thinking”).  If so, that is, if 
any emotions are belief-dependent, then automated appraisal theory provides only a 
partial response to the question of what the emotions are.   
 Extending this line of reasoning to the limit, Griffiths argues for an eliminitivist 
stance toward “emotion” quite generally, suggesting that our vernacular use of the term 
actually refers to (at least) two entirely distinct activities.  Some of what we mean by 
“emotion” is explicable in terms of the operations of automated affective appraisal 
mechanisms.  Some, however, the belief-dependent emotions (i.e., the “higher cognitive” 
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emotions) are not likely candidates to be explained in terms of the operations of 
automated and autonomous appraisal modules. 
ON THE RELEVANCE OF THE DUAL-SYSTEM MODEL PROPOSED BY AUTOMATED APPRAISAL 
THEORY TO THE FRAME PROBLEM 
 If at least some emotional appraisals are undertaken by automated and 
modularly realized processes that operate independently of, prior to, and in parallel 
with cognition, then it is reasonable to think that emotion might inform decision-making 
and practical reasoning (i.e., cognition) in ways that are relevant to contending with 
some of the frame problems that arise in these domains.  Since the automated and 
autonomous appraisals are rapid and appear to be undertaken by operations that are 
modular in character, they should not be themselves prone to frame problems.  If so, 
then the emotional appraisal process should be amenable to modeling.  Since all agree 
that emotion influences cognition,55 if it does so in the right way (that is, if it helps to 
expedite and increase the accuracy of practical reason and decision-making) then we 
would have reason to think that bringing emotion (at least that aspect of what emotion is 
that is explicable in terms of the operations of an automated appraisal process) to bear 
might help explain how we contend with some of the frame problems that arise in these 
domains. 
CONCLUSION 
 The aim of this chapter has been modest.  I have not set out to answer the 
question of what the emotions are.  However, in setting out the propositional 
attitude/cognitivist account, I have suggested that we have reason for thinking this 
approach to be empirically problematic and methodologically questionable.  The 
                                                     
55 Even propositional attitude/cognitivist theorists would agree to this, for there seems little 




internal difficulties of this approach when taken in conjunction with the evidence for the 
existence of discrete and dissociable automated appraisal operations, suggests that the 
propositional attitude/cognitivist model is a problematic one as a complete account of 
what the emotions are.  And so, while it is possible (and quite likely) that some emotions 
might be belief-dependent, we have little reason for thinking them all to be as the 
propositional attitude/cognitivist approach maintains. 
 Rather, it would appear that some of what the emotions are are undertaken by 
automated affective appraisal modules operating independently of the operations of 
cognition (e.g., the “basic” emotions or affect programs).  However, as discussed earlier, 
whatever the complete answer to the question of what the emotions are ultimately turns 
out to be, if any of these happen to be belief-dependent, that is if any require prior 
“thinking,” then the automated appraisal approach would provide an incomplete 
response to the question of what the emotions are as well.  Since the evidence does not 
support the strong claim that all emotions are “basic” and at least prima facie it does 
appear likely that some emotions might be belief-dependent, we have reason for 
thinking this account as a complete response to the question of what the emotion are to be 
rather incomplete as well.56   
 Regardless of whether or not all emotions are reducible to the operations of 
dedicated appraisal modules, it is apparent that at least some of what the emotions are is 
explicable in these terms.  Since at least some emotional appraisals are undertaken by 
                                                     
56 There is absolutely no agreement on what a “higher cognitive” emotion is other than being 
something that is vaguely “emotional,” something that likely involves the fixation of a belief (and 
thus something that likely involves activity of the neocortex) and something that has not (yet) 
been shown to be undertaken by an automated appraisal process. Very loosely, the set of higher 
cognitive emotions is often taken to include emotions such as love, guilt, shame, embarrassment, 
pride, envy and jealously, though even many of these (shame and pride in particular) are posited 
as “basic” by some theorists. 
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automated, autonomous and modular processes, and emotion, all agree, informs and 
influences cognition, (e.g., the affective priming and anatomical findings outlined) it 
would not be unreasonable to think that emotion might be a plausible candidate for 
further consideration and investigation.   Put another way, if the propositional 
attitude/cognitivist approach is correct then emotion, as always belief-dependent, 
would not be, as a matter of principle, a viable candidate.57  If, however, the dual-
systems model proposed by automated appraisal theory is correct (even if only in part) 
and non-cognitive and cognitive processes operate independently and in parallel with 
the former informing and influencing the latter, then, at least in principle, emotion could 
be a candidate.  Just how viable a candidate it is will depend upon whether it informs 
and influences the operations of practical reason and decision-making in the right way  - 
that is,  whether it helps to expedite and increase the accuracy of these operations. The 











                                                     
57 As discussed earlier, this would amount to a circular and/or a non-starter proposal. 
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CHAPTER 5: EMOTION AND SOME FRAME PROBLEM INSTANCES  
 The previous chapter considered a number of prima facie objections to the 
proposal that emotion might be brought to bear on some instances of the frame problem.  
I argued that, with respect to these, we have little reason for thinking that – in advance 
of our considering specific proposals – emotion should be irrelevant to the frame 
problem.  Rather, since a dual-systems model58 in which the activities of automated 
emotional appraisal and cognition are undertaken by functionally distinct processes, is 
supported, we have reason for thinking that bringing emotion to bear on the problem 
should be, at least in principle, a plausible approach.  However, it is also clear that in 
order for emotion to be relevant to the frame problems that arise in practical reason and 
decision-making, it must be shown to interact with, inform and/or guide these 
operations in the right kind of way.  If so, then consideration of emotion might shed 
some light on the question of how we might contend with some of the problems that 
arise in these domains.  Specifically, since automated emotional appraisals are rapid and 
autonomous, and their operations are modularly characterizable (and thus model-able), 
if emotion can be shown to inform and influence practical reason and decision-making 
in ways relevant to helping us contend with the dual horns of the dilemma posed by the 
frame problem (i.e., speed and reliable correctness), then we would have reason for 
thinking that bringing emotion to bear might hold some promise for our understanding 
and eventually modeling these activities. 
 The automated operations of emotional appraisal (i.e., the “basic” emotions or 
affect programs) and those of cognition are, we have every reason to think, mediated by 
distinct processes.  That the two interact is, however, also clear.  Specifically, that what 
                                                     
58 C.f. Evans (2003) for a general introduction to and discussion of dual-systems models 
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one comes to believe may result in an emotional response establishes one direction of 
influence (e.g., my coming to think that I shall be attacked can result in my having an 
emotional response).  That the automated appraisal device influences and informs 
cognitive processes is also well established (e.g., the affective priming findings).  The 
question, of course, remains as to whether emotion occupies the proper relationship to 
the operations of practical reason and decision-making.   
In what follows I will examine how far consideration of emotion might go in 
helping us to understand how we might contend with some of the frame problems that 
arise in practical reason and decision-making.  Ultimately, I will suggest that bringing 
emotion to bear might help us in understanding how we contend with a number of 
instances of the problems.  Specifically, I will suggest that emotion might meaningfully 
be brought to bear in us helping to understand how we might contend with the 
attentional-direction, problem-sequencing, meta-planning/ends selection, and Hamlet‟s 
problem instances of the problem. 
 To situate discussion, I will begin by setting out a puzzle of practical reason and 
decision-making noted by Damasio & Bechara.  Following this, I will outline their 
somatic marker model which provides an account of how emotion informs and influences 
the operations of practical reason and decision-making.  Following this, I will consider 
how emotion might be brought to bear in helping us contend with some instances of the 
frame problem that arise in practical reason and decision-making.  
A PUZZLE:   
Curiously, damage to three brain structures – the amygdala, the primary 
somatosensory region of the parietal lobe (area SM1) and the 
ventromedial/orbitofrontal cortex (area VMF) -results in patients who are both 
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“emotionally flat,” “devoid of emotion” or otherwise “affectless” or “disaffected” and 
who exhibit profound deficits in practical reason and decision-making.  
 Given discussion in the previous chapter, that patients with damage to the 
amygdala are emotionally impaired (both in emotional learning and 
appraisal/response) should be of no great surprise since we have reason for thinking 
that much of what the emotions are is undertaken by automated appraisal processes 
realized in this structure.  That damage to the amygdala and thus the automated 
learning and appraisal operations realized there result in deficits in practical reason and 
decision-making is of interest.  That damage to area SM1 should have a role in emotional 
“feeling” is not wholly surprising given its function.  However that it should play a role 
in practical reason and decision-making is unexpected.  Finally, that damage to area 
VMF should result in deficits in practical reason and decision-making is not of particular 
surprise given that the frontal lobes quite generally (of which area VMF is part) are often 
considered to be the “seat of reason” where “executive” cognitive function resides.  
What is of interest is that in addition to exhibiting deficits in practical reason and 
decision-making, VMF-damaged patients are emotionally flat, as well.   
 Before setting out Bechara & Damasio‟s account, I will begin by discussing 
briefly the nature of the deficits exhibited by these patients.  In so doing, it will become 
apparent that damage to the amygdala and area VMF result in patients whose behavior 
uncannily resembles that of the robots employed by Dennett in his discussion of the 
frame problem.59    Simply put, damage to these areas appears to result in patients who 
                                                     
59 Very briefly, Dennett‟s first robot (R1) failed to retrieve the battery because it fails to consider 
an obvious implication of its plan (i.e., it fails to satisfy a suitable normative standard of 
correctness – its isn‟t “rational” enough). Because of this, it takes the bomb along too and is 
destroyed.  The second and third robots (R1D1 & R1D2) fail because they attempt to exhaustively 
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are stricken with/by a practical variant of the frame problem.60  That damage to these 
same areas results in concomitant deficit in emotion as well, is of interest, for it suggests 
that emotion might play a role in helping us to contend with some instances of the 
problem that arise in  practical reason and decision-making.   
 There are two interesting ways that one can fail in contending with the frame 
problem (in any domain). One can expeditiously arrive at incorrect conclusions (i.e., be 
fast but wrong) or one can (attempt to) arrive at conclusions “rationally” and thus non-
expeditiously (i.e., be right but slow).  Interestingly, damage to area VMF results in 
patients whose practical decision-making vacillates (in the same subject) between these 
two extremes  – either they choose quickly and often incorrectly or they are unable to 
choose at all, paralyzed by their own attempts at the exhaustive consideration of plans, 
options and implications. 
 With respect to the claim that VMF-damaged patients are, at times, paralyzed by 
their attempts to engage in the exhaustive consideration of options, plans, implications 
and outcomes (in much the manner in which I suggested an overly rational system 
might), Damasio provides the following account.  
I was discussing with a [VMF-damaged] patient when his next visit to the laboratory 
should take place.  I suggested two alternative dates, both in the coming month and just 
a few days apart from each other.  The patient pulled out his appointment book and 
began consulting the calendar.  The behavior that ensued … was remarkable.  For the 
better part of a half-hour, the patient enumerated reasons for and against each of the 
two dates: previous engagements, proximity to other engagements, possible 
meteorological conditions, virtually anything that one could reasonably think about 
                                                                                                                                                              
consider every implication of their plan.  Since exhaustive consideration is an intractable task and 
the bomb is on a timer, these robots too are destroyed because ultimately their reasonings are 
overly “rational.” 
60 While I will not directly consider the particular deficits exhibited by agnosognosics (SM1-
damaged) here, I will return to this in a later section.  Briefly, however, while damage to area 
SM1 does result in profound deficits in practical reasoning and decision-making as well as 
affectlessness, such patients also exhibit rather pronounced cognitive deficits particularly in 
judgment and belief-formation. 
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concerning a simple date. Just as calmly as he had driven over the ice, and recounted 
that episode, he was now walking us through a tiresome cost-benefit analysis, an 
endless outlining and fruitless comparison of options and possible consequences.  It 
took enormous discipline to listen to all of this … when we finally did tell him … that 
he should come on the second of the alternative dates … he simply said: „That‟s fine.‟ 
(Damasio, 1994 p. 193) 
 
 Furthermore, with respect to the frame problem-like nature of the behavior of 
VMF-damaged patients, Damasio provides the following discussion of a particular 
patient under his care.   
He needed prompting to get started in the morning and prepared to go to work.  Once 
at work he was unable to manage his time properly; he could not be trusted with a 
schedule.  When the job called for interrupting an activity and turning to another, he 
might persist nonetheless, seemingly losing sight of his main goal.  Or he might 
interrupt the activity he has engaged, to turn to something he found more captivating 
at that particular moment.  Imagine a task involving reading and classifying documents 
of a given client.  Elliott would read and fully understand the significance of the 
material, and he certainly knew how to sort out the documents according to similarity 
or disparity of their content.  The problem was that he was likely, all of a sudden, to 
turn from the sorting task he had initiated to reading one of those papers, carefully and 
intelligently, and to spend an entire day doing so.  Or he might spend a whole 
afternoon deliberating on which principle of categorization should be applied.  Should 
it be date, size of document, pertinence to case, or another?  The flow of work was 
stopped.  One might say that the particular step of the task at which Elliot balked was 
actually being carried out too well, and at the expense of the overall purpose.  One 
might say that Elliot had become irrational concerning the larger frame of behavior, 
which pertained to his main priority, while within the smaller frames of behavior, 
which pertained to subsidiary tasks, his actions were unnecessarily detailed. (Damasio, 
1994 p. 36) 
 
 That the patient exhibits both of the ways that one can fail to adequately contend 
with the frame problem is apparent.  At times, he decides rapidly, impulsively even, 
failing to consider the implications of his choices.  At other times, he appears to be 
cognitively paralyzed by attempts at exhaustive consideration.  That the patient should 
enter into a Rylean type regress with respect to which principle of categorization should 
be employed is particularly instructive in this regard. With respect to this VMF patient‟s 




[A]fter repeated advice and admonitions from colleagues and superiors went 
unheeded, Elliot‟s job was terminated.  Other jobs – and other dismissals – were to 
follow.  No longer tied to regular employment, Elliot charged ahead with new pastimes 
and business ventures.  He developed a collecting habit – not a bad thing in itself, but 
less than practical when the collected objects were junk.  The new business ventures 
ranged from home building to investment management.  In one enterprise, he teamed 
up with a disreputable character.  Several warnings from friends were of no avail, and 
the scheme ended in bankruptcy.  All of his saving had been invested in the ill-fated 
enterprise and all were lost.  It was puzzling to see a man with Elliot‟s background 
make such flawed business and financial decisions. 
 His wife, children and family could not understand why a knowledgeable person 
who was properly forewarned could act so foolishly … There was a first divorce.  Then 
a brief marriage to a woman of whom neither family nor friends approved.  Then 
another divorce. (Damasio 1994 p. 37) 
 
 And so, damage to area VMF results in both practical paralysis and expeditious 
but reliably poor decision-making, that is, in both of the ways that one can interestingly 
fail to contend with the frame problem. 
 With damage to the frontal lobes, one expects a degradation of cognitive 
function. (Luria 1980; Roberts et.al., 1998, Freeman, 1957) One might naturally object that 
perhaps Elliot‟s and other VMF-damaged patients‟ practical paralysis and impulsivity 
are due to a rather general – and purely cognitive – inability to reason effectively.  That 
is, before suggesting that emotion has anything whatsoever to do with the rather unique 
deficits exhibited by these patients, we need reason for thinking that these are not due to 
simple defects in attention, memory, or reasoning.  
 Of relevance to this concern are the findings that, unlike most frontal-lobe 
damaged patients, those with damage confined to the VMF/orbitofrontal regions 
consistently score well within the normal range on the standard battery of cognitive tests 
aimed at assessing abstract reasoning and decision-making. (Tranel et. al., 1993)  
Specifically, in addition to scoring well within the normal range on declarative memory, 
attentional, spatial, and IQ tests, VMF-damaged patients (quite unlike those with 
damage to other regions of the frontal lobe) are: (i) As adept as normal subjects at 
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generating options for action and alternatives in response to hypothetical situations; (ii) 
Found to outperform normal subjects in their abilities to generate the likely 
consequences of actions in hypothetical situations (i.e., they provide more – in number – 
consequences); (iii) As adept at predicting the likely outcome of hypothetical social 
interactions as normal subjects and (iv) As adept as normal subjects at undertaking 
means-ends reasoning in hypothetical social tasks. (Damasio, 1994 pp. 46-50; Tranel 
et.al., 1993) 
Such findings are of interest, for they suggest that VMF-damaged patients are 
quite capable of projecting consequences, generating plans and engaging in effective 
means-end reasoning on hypothetical tasks – at least as well as normal subjects.  
However, that VMF-damaged patients are capable of undertaking these tasks, and thus 
that their particular deficits are not due to a rather general defect in reasoning, only adds 
to the mystery.  For example,   
At the end of one session, after [the VMF-damaged patient] had produced an abundant 
quantity of options for action, all of which were valid and implementable, [he] smiled, 
apparently satisfied with his rich imagination, but added: „And after all this, I still 
wouldn‟t know what to do!‟ (Damasio, 1994 p.49) 
 
Two points may be drawn from this.  First, the particular deficits exhibited by 
VMF patients cannot be attributed to standard deficits in reasoning, attention, working 
memory or memory.  Second, that these deficits manifest when subjects are required, not 
merely to think about hypothetical options for action, but to act/choose is instructive, 
for it suggests that the particular deficits exhibited by these patients manifest late in the 





The results strongly suggested that we should not attribute [VMF-damaged patients‟] 
decision-making defect to lack of social knowledge, or to deficient access to such 
knowledge, or to an elementary impairment of reasoning, or even less, to an elementary 
defect in attention or working memory concerning the processing of the factual 
knowledge needed to make decisions in the personal and social domains.  The defect 
appeared to set in at the late stages of reasoning, close to or at the point at which choice 
making or response selection must occur. (Damasio, 1994 p. 50) 
 
 Returning then to our puzzle, damage to area VMF results in patients who 
appear to be stricken with a quite specific deficit and one that exhibits all of the 
hallmarks of (a practical variant of) the frame problem.  Sometimes, VMF-damaged 
patients act impulsively and thus disadvantageously by failing to consider the 
implications of their plans and actions – behaving like Dennett‟s robot R1.  At other 
times, these patients (like the robots R1D1 and R1D2) become, in effect, paralyzed by 
their own endless and exhaustive consideration of plans, outcomes, and implications – 
in much the way that I argued an overly “rational” system might.  By so doing, they fail 
to act/decide advantageously (i.e. correctly) by failing to act/decide at all. 61      
 Damage to the somatosensory region of the parietal lobe (area SM1) consistently 
results in profound defects in both the perception/appraisal and display of emotion.  
With respect to the latter, Damasio notes, for example, that “emotion and feeling are 
nowhere to be found” in these patients. (Damasio, 1994 p. 64)  While damage to region 
SM1 results in a number of other symptoms, most notably partial paralysis and the 
condition agnosognosia (i.e., the inability to sense and/or represent feedback from one‟s 
viscera and body - to “feel” one‟s bodily states), they also exhibit profound deficits in 
practical decision-making. (Damasio, 1994 p. 65)  Specifically, Damasio continues, 
agnosognosics “are unable to make appropriate decisions on personal and social 
matters, just as is the case with [VMF-damaged] patients.”(Damasio, 1994 p. 67)  And so, 
                                                     
61 Elliot for example, “was unable to choose effectively, or he might not choose at all, or choose 
badly.” (Damasio, 1994 p. 50) 
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that damage to area SM1 results in both deficits in practical decision-making and the 
perception and display of emotion, suggests that emotion might play some role in 
helping us to contend with some of the frame problems that arise in this domain. 
 While the role of the amygdala as an automated emotional learning and 
appraisal module has been discussed, it is instructive to note how damage to this region 
affects subjects‟ “real-world” practical reason and decision-making capacities.  
Anecdotal evidence of the real-world deficits exhibited by amgydala-damaged patients 
is hard to come by since cases of pure bilateral amygdala damage in humans are 
exceedingly rare.  Only one natural condition consistently results in selective bilateral 
amygdala damage, namely Urbach-Wiethe disease (an exceptionally rare autosomal 
disorder resulting in the calcification of the amygdala).   Those patients available for 
study are described as exhibiting significant deficits in real-world practical reasoning 
decision-making as well as demonstrating “improprieties and irrationalities” in social 
behavior. (Tranel & Hyman, 1990 p. 349, p. 352 and p. 354).   A particular Urbach-Wiethe 
patient under his care, exhibited, Damasio recounts, 
A lifelong pattern of personal and social inadequacies.  There is no doubt that the range 
and appropriateness of her emotions are impaired and that she has little concern for the 
problematic situations in which she gets herself.  The „folly‟ of her behavior is not 
unlike that found in [VMF-damage patients] or patients with agnosognosia. (Damasio, 
1994 p. 69; c.f. Nahm, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1993) 
 
 One might object, noting that perhaps such patients‟ practical deficits are 
attributable to some rather general defect in reasoning.  If so, the concern continues, then 
there would be no reason to think emotion to be particularly relevant to the problem.  
With respect to this, Siebert, Markowitsch & Bartel (2003) studied nine Urbach-Wiethe 
patients finding that with respect to the standard battery of attentional, working 
memory, spatial, verbal and visual memory and executive function tests, (Siebert et. al., 
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2003 pp. 2628-9 and p. 2631 table 4) “patients showed cognitively little deviation from 
normal subjects, while they differed emotionally.”(Siebert et. al., 2003 p. 2627)62    And so, 
the profound real-world deficits in practical reasoning and decision-making exhibited 
by amygdala-damage patients do not appear to be due to a rather general deficit in 
cognitive function or reasoning capacity.   
THE IOWA GAMBLING TASK  
 Since VMF and amygdala-damaged patients clearly exhibited deficits in “real-
world” practical reason and decision-making that are undetectable by the standard 
battery, Bechara and Damasio developed a paradigm “designed to simulate real-life 
decision in terms of uncertainty” – the Iowa Gambling Task – in order to better 
understand the puzzle posed by these patients. (Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2003 p. 
357)   
While there are a number of versions of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), all are 
quite similar and all rely on the same paradigm in which there are four decks of cards 
(A,B,C, and D) from which subjects are to choose.  The decks are “stacked” in the 
following manner: Per every ten cards selected from deck A, the subject will receive 
reward cards yielding in total $1000 and punishment cards inflicting a loss ranging from 
$150 to $350.  In fact, for every 10 cards selected from deck A, subjects receive $1000 but 
are forced to pay out $1250, resulting in a net loss of $250.  For every ten cards selected 
from deck B, there are rewards totaling $1000 but there is one punishment card of $1250.  
                                                     
62 It should be noted, however, that while Siebert et.al., found no remarkable deficits in the 
planning functions of the nine Urbach-Wiethe patients studied, the one patient studied by Tranel 
& Hyman (1990) did exhibit some planning deficits as well as some marked deficits in verbal 
memory.  Urbach-Weithe disease can result in calcification of the regions surrounding the 
amygdala (including aspects of the hippocampus) and at least some of the discrepancies may be 
attributable to this. 
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For every 10 cards selected from this deck as well, then, there is a net loss of $250.  Per 
every ten cards selected from deck C there is a net gain of $500 and five punishment 
cards inflicting losses of $25 to $75.  And so, for every ten cards selected from this deck, 
there is a net gain of $250.  Similarly, for every ten cards selected from deck D there is a 
net gain $500 and one large punishment card of $250.  The net gain per every ten cards 
selected from this deck, then, is also $250. 
And so, decks A and B, and decks C and D, are equivalent with respect to net 
losses and net gains respectively.  Decks A and C have a higher frequency but smaller 
punishments, while decks B and D have lower frequency but larger punishments.  As 
Bechara et. al., explain, “decks A and B are disadvantageous because they cost more in 
the long run.  Decks C and D are advantageous because they result in an overall gain in 
the long run.”(Bechara Damasio, Damasio & Lee, 1999 p. 5474) 
In addition to monitoring the cards selected by subjects, skin conductance responses 
(SCRs) described as “physiological indices of an anatomically controlled change in 
somatic state (Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000 p. 299) which provides “a measure of 
somatic state activation” (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Lee, 1999 p. 299) and which are 
best understood as the physiological manifestation of an automated emotional response, 
are recorded at different intervals during the task.  Specifically, SCRs recorded from 
subjects are divided into three category-epochs. (1) Reward SCRs that are generated after 
the selection of cards resulting in an immediate monetary gain; (2) Punishment SCRs that 
are generated after the selection of cards resulting in an immediate monetary loss, and 
(3) Anticipatory SCRs which “are generated previous to turning cards from any given 
deck, i.e., during the time period the subject ponders from which deck to choose.” 
(Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Lee, 1999 p. 5474) 
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While control subjects rapidly (within twenty or so card selections) come to select 
from the advantageous decks, patients with damage to either the amygdala or the VMF 
fail to generate any aversion to the bad decks and no preferences for the good decks, 
exhibiting ultimately a stable preference for the bad decks. (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio 
& Lee, 1999 p. 5477 figure 2; Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000 p. 298 figure 2; Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio & Lee, 1999 pp. 5475-6; Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000 p. 297; 
Damasio, 1994 pp. 212-222)  Put another way, damage to either area VMF or to the 
amygdala results in patients who consistently choose poorly. 
Examination of the SCRs of the subjects during the selection period of the task 
provides further insight to the roles of these areas in practical reason and decision-
making.  Control subjects were found to generate significant SCRs after the selection of 
cards regardless of their deck of origin.  However, while SCRs were generated to cards 
from all decks, controls generated higher amplitude SCRs in response to the selection of 
a card that punished the subject with monetary loss. (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Lee, 
1999 p. 5478 figure 4).  Patients with amygdala damage, as expected, failed to generate 
SCRs to any of the cards selected. (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Lee, 1999 p. 5479)  
Such findings are consistent with the results obtained by Morgan & LeDoux (1995) and 
Morgan et. al., (1993) discussed previously with respect to the role occupied by the 
amygdala in emotional appraisal and learning in rats. And so, in keeping with Ekman 
and Zajonc‟s models, discussed in the previous chapter, damage to the amygdala in 
humans significantly interferes with the generation of emotional responses to both 
immediately rewarding and punishing stimuli (i.e., in emotional appraisal) and renders 
subjects unable to acquire new learned conditioned responses.   Likewise, in keeping 
with Morgan & LeDoux‟s (1995) findings, damage to the VMF alone results in no 
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impairment in the ability of patients to generate normal (i.e., control-level SCRs) 
responses to immediately rewarding and punishing stimuli. Put another way, VMF-
damage patients and controls (but not amygdala-damaged patients) generated SCRs to 
immediately rewarding and punishing stimuli.  Patients with damage to either the 
amygdala alone or to both the amygdala and area VMF “were impaired severely in the 
generation of either reward or punishment SCRs.” (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Lee, 
1999 p. 5478)  
 When presented with the gambling task, normal subjects come to generate 
anticipatory SCRs before selecting cards from the various decks.  The SCRs of the control 
group, Bechara et. al., note “develop over time (i.e., after selecting several cards from 
each deck, and thus encountering several instances of reward and punishment) … [and] 
become more pronounced before selecting cards from the disadvantageous decks (A and 
B).” (Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 1999 p. 299)  Of particular significance were the 
findings that, unlike the robust anticipatory SCRs generated by controls before selecting, 
neither amygdala-damaged nor VMF-damaged patients generated anticipatory SCRs 
before choosing. 
 That amygdala-damaged patients should fail to generate anticipatory SCRs is 
unsurprising since such patients have lost the capacity to both generate emotional 
responses to stimuli and the capacity to come to learn new emotional “inducers” or 
“triggers.” Simply put, because they lack the underlying machinery necessary for 
emotional appraisal, amygdala-damaged patients fail to generate anticipatory SCRs for 
the same reason they fail to generate reward and punishments SCRs. 
 That VMF-damaged patients decide disadvantageously (i.e., “myopically) and 
are incapable of generating anticipatory SCRs is puzzling, for the amygdala and thus the 
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capacity to generate emotional responses to immediately rewarding/punishing 
selections is intact in these patients.  Adding to the puzzle, Bechara et. al., found that 
normal subjects come to consistently select from the “good” decks, though they are 
unable for some time, if ever, to explain why they do so.  Specifically, upon completion 
of the task, 70% of normal subjects attain what Bechara et. al., term the “conceptual 
stage” whereby subjects are able to form correct opinions about both (i) which decks are 
objectively “good” and which “bad” and (ii) how they should choose.  And so, while all 
normal subjects rapidly come to decide advantageously, most are eventually able to 
form correct opinions about how they should choose and why. 
 Amygdala-damaged patients, in contrast, both consistently decide poorly and 
are entirely incapable of attaining the “conceptual stage.” Such patients quite literally 
have no opinion whatsoever (nor do they even have “hunches”) about the goodness or 
badness of any of the decks.  Put another way, amygdala-damaged patients both 
invariably make poor decisions on the gambling task and have absolutely no idea about 
how they should choose.  That damage to the amygdala should result in the inability to 
attain the conceptual stage (i.e., to dramatically interfere with a subject‟s ability to arrive 
at correct conclusion about how she should choose) is of interest, for it suggests that 
emotion might play a role in the operations of practical reasoning. 
 Of further interest, is the finding that while all VMF-damaged patients 
consistently chose poorly, 50% attained the “conceptual stage” – forming correct 
opinions about which of the decks were good/bad and how they should go about 
choosing.  That is, 50% of VMF-patients fixed correct beliefs about how they should 
choose, yet all (still) consistently chose disadvantageously.  This result confirms the 
earlier discussed (behavioral/anecdotal) evidence in which VMF-damage patients, who 
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“knew better” (and who really do appear to know better) still invariably made decidedly 
poor plans and decisions in real-life situations.    
Having set out this puzzle, I will turn next to outlining Bechara and Damasio‟s 
proposal – the somatic marker hypothesis – which provides a systematic account of the role 
played by emotion in practical reason and decision-making.   
BECHARA AND DAMASIO‟S SOMATIC MARKER HYPOTHESIS 
 Bechara and Damasio propose that emotion plays a critical role in the heuristic 
direction of practical reason and decision-making (i.e., in “cognitive guidance” Damasio, 
1994 p. 130)  by helping to automatically cull from further consideration plans and 
response options that are (likely) to be disadvantageous, while “highlighting” that is, 
both drawing attention to and increasing the desirability of, those options that are 
(likely) to be advantageous.  Specifically, by exploiting the automated processes of 
emotional appraisal during deliberation, emotion helps to both expedite and increase 
the accuracy of the operations of practical reason and decision-making.  While I will 
return to the issue of how this proposal might help us to understand how we contend 
with some instances of the frame problem, I will, for now, focus on outlining the somatic 
marker hypothesis. 
 Damasio explains that during deliberation but, 
Before you apply any kind of cost/benefit analysis to the premises and before you 
reason toward the solution of the problem, something quite important happens:  When 
the bad outcome connected with a given response option comes into mind, however 
fleetingly, you experience an unpleasant gut feeling. (Damasio, 1994 p. 173) 
 
 Specifically, with respect to the operations of practical reason and decision-
making, these “gut feelings” or somatic markers serve to, “Force attention on the 
negative outcome to which a given action may lead, and functions as an automated 
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alarm signal which says: beware of danger ahead if you choose the option which leads 
to this outcome.” (Damasio, 1994 173)  Such somatic markers (i.e., feeling-image signals), 
Damasio continues, “may lead you to reject, immediately, the negative course of action 
and thus make you choose among fewer alternatives.”(Damasio, 1994 p. 174)  Somatic 
markers, Damasio explains,   
Assist deliberation by highlighting some options … and eliminating them rapidly from 
subsequent consideration.  You may think of it as a system for automated qualification 
of predictions, which acts, whether you want it or not, to evaluate the extremely diverse 
scenarios of the anticipated future before you. Think of it as a biasing device. (Damasio, 
1994 p. 174) 
 
By so doing, somatic markers,  
Protects you against future loss, without further ado, and then allows you to choose from 
among fewer alternatives.  There is still room for cost/benefit analysis and proper 
deductive competence, but only after the automated step drastically reduces the 
number of options. (Damasio, 1994, p. 173) 
 
 Somatic-markers, Damasio explains, are “feelings” generated from 
“secondary emotions” which “have been connected, by learning, to predicted future 
outcomes of certain scenarios.” (Damasio, 1994 p. 174)  And so, during deliberation 
and quite automatically, “when a negative marker is juxtaposed to a particular 
future outcome the combination functions as an alarm bell.  When a positive 
somatic marker is juxtaposed instead, it becomes a beacon of incentive.” (Damasio, 
1994 p. 174)  Damasio continues,  
My idea is that somatic markers (or something like them) assist the process of sifting 
through such a wealth of detail – in fact, reduce the need for sifting because they 
provide an automated detection of the scenario components which are more likely to be 
relevant. (Damasio, 1994 pp. 174-5) 
 
At base then, Bechara and Damasio‟s claim is a straightforward one.  When 
abstracted from the neuro-anatomical details, the somatic marker hypothesis suggests 
that emotion-induced feeling is exploited heuristically - as a non-compensatory (i.e., one-
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reason) cue - during deliberation.  Put another way, based upon induced feeling alone, 
some plans or options are rejected outright and given no more consideration (i.e., we 
stop thinking about these), while others are rendered more desirable and attentionally 
highlighted.   
Having set out the general claim, I will next consider the proposal in greater 
detail.  I will begin by explaining the distinction marked by Bechara and Damasio 
between “primary” and “secondary” emotions, which relies upon the distinction 
between primary and secondary inducers (of emotion).63  Primary inducers are  
Stimuli that unconditionally, or through learning (e.g., conditioning and semantic 
knowledge) can (perceptually or subliminally) produce states that are pleasurable or 
aversive.  Encountering a fear object (e.g., a snake), a stimulus predictive of a snake, or 
semantic information such as winning or losing a large sum of money are all example 
of primary inducers. (Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2003) 
 
The primary emotions then are analogous to the basic-emotions and affect 
programs discussed in the previous chapter.   
Secondary inducers are, Bechara explains,  
Generated by the recall of a personal or hypothetical emotional event or perceiving a 
primary inducer that generates “thoughts” and “memories” about the inducer, all of 
which, when brought to memory, elicit a somatic state.  The episodic memory of 
encountering a snake, losing a large sum of money, imagining the gain of large sum of 
money, or hearing or looking at primary inducers that bring to memory “thoughts” 
pertaining to an emotional event are all examples of secondary inducers. (Bechara, 
Damasio & Damasio, 2003) 
 
                                                     
63 Perhaps relating primary and secondary emotions to earlier discussion of the “primary 
emotions” will help to alleviate potential confusion.  Both primary and secondary emotional 
responses, as is clear from Damasio‟s discussion, are undertaken by automated mechanisms of 
affective appraisal (i.e., the mechanisms of the “basic emotions.”)  The sole difference between 
primary and secondary emotion lies in the “reality” of the inducer.  Primary emotions are 
triggered by immediate and “real” situations, while secondary emotions are triggered by 
suppositionally entertained “thoughts” (i.e., episodic memories of past situations or hypothetically 
entertained situations.)  Put simply, secondary emotions should not be taken to be somehow 
unique with respect to the basic operations of emotional appraisal nor should they be taken in 
contrast with the “basic” emotions.  Both primary and secondary responses are undertaken by 
means of the same automated mechanisms of emotional appraisal processes and are in this 
respect both “basic.” 
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 Bechara and Damasio argue, drawing upon LeDoux, that the amygdala is the 
principle region implicated in the generation of “primary emotions,” that is, in 
emotional learning and appraisal and the triggering of emotional responses to primary 
inducers. Area VMF is the principal substrate implicated in the appraisal, learning and 
generation of secondary emotions, that is, in the triggering of emotional responses to 
secondary inducers (e.g., memories and suppositional or hypothetical “thoughts”.)  
Having marked this distinction and explained some necessary terminology, I can now 
turn to outlining Bechara and Damasio‟s Somatic Marker proposal.  To do so however, 
some discussion is needed of what “feeling” is under this account.  This, in turn, 
requires that I present briefly the role of area SM1 in this account.    
Bechara and Damasio suggest that the generation and storage of somatosensory 
images are the provinces of area SM1.  Specifically, area SM1 generates “on-line 
representations … of what our body state is now” (Damasio, 1994 p. 152) by 
continuously monitoring and mapping all moment-to-moment bodily/somatic 
occurrences.  It is also maintains “off-line” representations of some of these somatic 
states in somatosensory pattern memory.  (Damasio, 1994 p. 150).  Direct pathways relay 
information from the viscera, musculoskeletal positioning – including facial expression 
and bodily stance – blood vessels, blood pressure and heart rate to the somatosensory 
cortices, where a “snapshot” representation, body-state map or somatosensory state 
image of the subjects internal milieu or Korpersgefuhl is generated on-line and in real-time. 
(Damasio, 1994 p. 144)  This process, Damasio explains, “of continuous monitoring … of 
what your body is doing … [and the generation of] a multifarious view of the body 
landscape … is the essence of what I call a feeling.” (Damasio, 1994 pp. 143-4) 
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 And so, area SM1 generates both “on-line” images of the subject‟s 
somatic/visceral state at a given moment and serves as the repository of somatosensory 
feeling-image memory.  In so doing, SM1 maintains a set of “off-line” somatosensory 
feeling memories both of our body states between emotions (i.e., “when it is not shaken 
by emotion” and therefore what the subject‟s somatic homeostatic state tends to be like) 
and of our body-state when an emotional response is enacted. 
 Whenever an amygdala-realized appraisal occurs and an emotion is induced, 
manifold alterations in the somatic state of the subject come to manifest in the manner 
proposed by Ekman and Zajonc.  The role of area SM1, then, is simply to create a map or 
somatosensory-image “snap-shot” of the particular physiological state induced.  
“Feelings” just are these body-image snapshots generated or mapped by area SM1.64 
 Having set out what feelings are and the mechanism by which they are 
generated, we can now consider the role proposed by Bechara and Damasio for area 
VMF.  The principle function of area VMF, they argue, is in the construction of “fact-
feeling” sets whereby perceptual and quasi-perceptual images (i.e., recalled or 
hypothetical imaged content) come to be juxtaposed with and indexed by 
somatosensory feeling.  Put another way, area VMF serves to “mark” or “tag” images 
(i.e., both perceptual images and quasi-perceptual images of the content of “thoughts”) 
with the feeling that is or comes to be induced by them.    
With respect to the feeling-tagging of perceptual images, let us suppose that one 
has an automated emotional response to some stimuli (a snake, for example) which 
results in a primary emotional response and a set of manifold physiological changes to 
                                                     
64 Note too that qualia need not play a role in Damasio & Bechara‟s account of what feelings are.  




be realized.  While area SM1 is busy constructing a somatic map of these induced 
physiological changes (i.e., a “feeling” of the emotion induced), perceptual processes are 
going about generating a detailed perceptual image of the inducing scene.  These two 
images, Bechara and Damasio explain, are relayed to a “convergence zone” (i.e., a 
dedicated working memory buffer) in area VMF whereby the two images are juxtaposed 
and a fact-feeling set is created.  The role, then, of area VMF is to “tag” incoming 
perceptual images (the perceptual representation of the snake scene, in this example) 
with the particular “feeling” induced, creating a fact/feeling pair.  This fact/feeling set 
is then stored as a “dispositional representation,” in memory, that is, in a form that can 
be, when retrieved, reconstructed by or reconstituted in sensory-specific cortical regions. 
 With respect to the tagging of secondary inducers, Bechara and Damasio offer 
the following account.  Drawing upon Kosslyn & Koenig‟s model (later significantly 
elaborated by Milner & Goodale, 2006), Bechara and Damasio suggest that the content of 
“thoughts” are represented imagetically by means of the modular operations of sensory 
specific cortical regions.  Put another way,  they suggest that the content of “thoughts” 
are, by means of the modular operations of sensory specific cortical perceptual 
processes, reconstructed or reconstituted as quasi-perceptual images (i.e., as visual, 
auditory, olfactory and so on “pictures”).  And so, for example, before processing (i.e., 
before we can “think” about them) episodic/declarative memories of a particular event 
(the memory of seeing a snake, for instance) are relayed to the visual cortex where a 
quasi-perceptual image of the content of this memory is reconstructed using the same 
processes that are employed directly in perception, in effect, in reverse. (Milner & 
Goodale, 2006)  
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Regarding the tagging of quasi-perceptual images, (i.e., multimodal sensory 
cortex constructed images of the content of recalled or hypothetical “thoughts”), there 
are two mechanisms proposed.  First, via the “body-loop”device, quasi-perceptual 
images are relayed through sensory cortices (which reconstruct the content of these 
thoughts as visual/auditory etc., images) directly to the amygdala for emotional 
appraisal.  If the (quasi-perceptual) image serves an inducer or trigger, an automated 
emotional response is generated and, via the workings of SM1, a feeling image is 
constructed.  Once relayed to the convergence zone, the “thought” (or more precisely, 
the quasi-perceptual image of the content of the thought) comes to be “tagged,” indexed 
or marked by the feeling (somatosensory image) induced, in the same manner as 
perceptual images are marked. 
In cases in which a quasi-perceptual image has been previously feeling tagged 
and stored in memory (i.e., in cases in which a fact/feeling set exists), the feeling-
memory – but not the emotional response itself - is reconstructed in area SM1 and 
relayed to the convergence zone whereby the full fact-feeling set is reconstituted.  This 
“as-if” loop mechanism, by relying upon area SM1-mediate feeling memory, allows for 
an emotional appraisal of secondary inducers (i.e., thoughts) to be undertaking without 
the need for direct appraisal by the amygdala.  By bypassing the body-loop appraisal 
device – and thus the necessarily serial and time-consuming process of generating an 
emotional response and mapping the physiological alterations that ensue – secondary 
inducers (i.e., episodic memories or suppositional “thoughts”) may be quite rapidly 
appraised with respect to the feeling that has been juxtaposed with the image. 
One may object to the model offered by questioning what reason we have for 
thinking that the fact/feeling sets generated should be preferentially encoded into 
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memory in the manner that Damasio & Bechara suggest.  Since, as we will see, the 
somatic marker account relies heavily upon these fact-feeling sets being retained and 
maintained in memory, we need some reason, the concern continues, to think that these 
sets should be preferentially remembered.   
That emotion influences memory is well established.65  Quite generally, and with 
respect to this concern, these findings confirm that emotionally significant material is 
preferentially remembered.  With regard to the mechanism by which emotion influences 
the preferential encoding of material to memory, McGaugh & Cahill offer the following 
explanation. 
 The presence of the peripheral hormone epinephrine (adrenaline) is known to 
significantly enhance memory.66  McGaugh & Cahill argue that since activation of the 
amygdala (i.e., emotional appraisals) invariably result in hypothalamic and brainstem 
activation, which in turn results in the release of epinephrine, emotionally arousing 
material (i.e., episodic/declarative “facts”) comes to be preferentially encoded to 
memory.  That amygdala activation is responsible for inducing the epinephrine cascade 
resulting in the preferential encoding of “factual” material to memory is established by 
Canli, Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli & Cahill (2000).  And so, LeDoux, drawing upon McGaugh 
and Cahill‟s findings explains, 
                                                     
65 Bower, 1981; Bower, Gilligan & Monteiro, 1981; Gilligan 1982; Matt, Vasquez & Campbell, 1992; 
Watkins, Mathews, Williamson & Fuller, 1992; Ellis, Thomas & Rodriguez, 1984; Burke & 
Mathews, 1992; Mayer &Volanth, 1985; Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman & Evans, 1992; Mayer, 
McCormick & Strong, 1995; Bower, 1981; Bower, Monteiro & Gilligan 1978; Teasdale & Fogarty, 
1979; Snyder & White, 1982; Bower & Mayer, 1985; Blaney, 1986; Eich, 1995; Eich & Macaulay, 
1989; Fiedler, 1990; Forgas, 1991; Forgas 1993; Forgas, 1995; Forgas & Bower, 1987; Eich & 
Macaulay, 2000; Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994, Ingram, 1984; Teasdale, 1983; Teasdale & Clark, 
1982; Teasdale & Russell, 1983, Phelps 1998, Siebert et. al., 2003. 
66 McGaugh et. al., 1993; Cahill, Prins, Weber & McGaugh, 1994; Cahill et. al., 1994; Cahill & 
McGaugh, 1995; Cahill et. al., 1996; McGaugh, Cahill, & Roozendahl, 1996; McGaugh 2004, Davis, 
1992; Davis, 1994, Eichenbaum, 2000; Rolls & Treves, 1998; Rolls 2000. 
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When the amygdala detects an aversive emotional situation, it turns on all sorts of 
bodily systems, including the autonomic nervous system.  The consequence of 
autonomic nervous system activation of the adrenal gland is the release of epinephrine 
[which] interacts with systems that are also active at the time, such as the hippocampal 
system that is forming the explicit memory of the situation. (LeDoux, 1998 p. 207) 
 
 And so, we have good reason to think that emotionally significant (“factual”) 
material is preferentially encoded to memory - because it is emotionally significant - in 
the manner assumed by Damasio & Bechara‟s account.   
 Having briefly set out the machinery of Bechara and Damasio‟s model, I will 
return to the Iowa Gambling Task in order to set out the role proposed for emotion in 
practical reason and decision-making. 
 That amygdala-damaged patients should generally choose poorly 
(disadvantageously) is explicable in terms of their inability to generate “primary 
emotions.”  That is, since damage to the amygdala impairs patients‟ abilities to both 
perceive the emotional significance of stimuli and learn to respond (emotionally) to new 
stimuli, patients are incapable of appraising the emotional significance of situations, 
including, in this case, the outcome of any of their selections.  It is for this reason that no 
reward or punishment SCRs are generated.  It would be, however, highly unlikely that 
when the perceptual image is relayed to the convergence zone in area VMF for 
fact/feeling juxtaposition that there should be no feeling present to be linked.  Rather, in 
the absence of an emotional response, it is quite reasonable to think that perceptual 
images would be linked to/with the subject‟s prevailing feeling state – in this case a 
somatosensory image of bodily homeostasis (i.e., a baseline body state “unshaken by 
emotion”).  And so, it would be improper to suggest that amygdala-damaged patients‟ 
deficits lie in their inability to tag perceptual images with feelings.  Rather, their problem 
lies in the inability to generate emotional responses.  As such, each selection scene is 
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tagged with same rather mundane feeling-image – physiological homeostasis.  In this 
respect then each selection (and thus each fact-feeling set generated) is, for these 
patients, entirely devoid of emotional and thus motivational significance.67   
 With respect to the question of why amygdala-damaged patients fail to choose 
advantageously, Bechara and Damasio offer the following explanation.  Since amygdala-
damaged patients are incapable of emotionally responding to objectively 
rewarding/punishing card selections, the fact-feeling sets generated in area VMF lack an 
informative feeling component – in effect, marking all “facts” with the same 
commonplace feeling image of homeostasis.  Understood in this way, each selection and 
outcome is no more or less rewarding or punishing than any other.  During deliberation, 
suppositionally entertained quasi-perceptual images of the scene of selecting from each 
deck are generated and subjected to a round of emotional appraisal.  Since each option 
is, upon appraisal by the body or as-if loop devices, found to be equivalent with respect 
to the information provided by emotion-induced feeling (all are neutrally marked), none 
is taken to result in a state of affairs that is any better or worse than any other.  And so, 
Damasio and Bechara continue, the outcome of each option is, as emotionally neutral, 
motivationally equivalent. 
Underlying the somatic marker account is the claim that feeling is exploited 
heuristically in practical reason and decision-making to cull negatively marked plans 
and options from further consideration while highlighting for further consideration and 
                                                     
67 Clearly, there should be other factors influencing the body-maps and thus the feelings created.  
For example, something as simple as a decrease in blood sugar would result in a change in the 
subject‟s somatic state and thus in the kind of feeling generated and juxtaposed.  And so, while 
the “factual” aspect of amydala-damaged patients sets are likely tagged with the subjects 
prevailing body-state, I intend here that such states are only emotionally homeostatic (i.e.,  with 
respect to those changes in physiology induced by emotion).  
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rendering more desirable those positively marked.  Since amygdala-damaged patients 
cannot generate emotional responses, the feeling component of their fact/feeling sets is 
limited to the feeling-image of homeostasis.  And so, since all fact/feeling sets are 
feeling equivalent, the feeling-cue cannot be exploited by the stopping and decision 
heuristic proposed by Damasio and Bechara‟s account.  Simply put, the feeling-cue 
based heuristic cannot function because, since each feeling is neutral, the cue is 
uninformative.   
 Returning to the IGT then, during deliberation, quasi-perceptual images of each 
option-scenario are generated and suppositionally entertained.  The anticipated 
emotional response/feeling brought to bear on each option is the same – feeling neutral.  
And so, it is reasonable to suggest that amygdala-damaged patients exhibit no 
anticipatory SCRs, because the suppositionally entertained images of any response option 
is projected to result in a neutral feeling – the same as any other.  As Damasio explains, 
“Failure to evoke somatic states after winning or losing money would preclude the 
reconstitution of such somatic states when deliberating a decision with future 
consequences.”(Damasio, 1999 p. 5480)  The thought, then, of choosing from any deck is 
appraised as neither likely to be rewarding nor punishing – just mundanely neutral.  As 
feeling-neutral, each option tagged is, for the amygdala-damaged patient, 
motivationally neutral as well – no option is taken to result in a state of affairs that is any 
more or less desirable than any other.   
That amygdala-damaged patients are entirely incapable of forming any opinion 
(much less a reliably correct one) about which decks are good/bad and about how they 
should choose (i.e., of attaining the “conceptual stage”) is of interest, for it suggests that 
emotion might directly inform practical reasoning.   
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While Bechara and Damasio offer no explicit account of why amygdala-damaged 
patients should be incapable of attaining the conceptual stage, the following proposal 
can be offered.  Since amygdala-damaged patients are incapable of finding states of 
affairs emotionally significant (i.e., rewarding or punishing) they are radically impaired 
in their ability to value (and thus to “care about”) any particular outcome any more or 
less than any other.  A natural hypothesis then is to suggest that during deliberation, 
patients are likewise incapable of assigning a value to the outcome of any of their actions 
on the IGT.  And so, if they are incapable of valuing any state of affairs over any other, 
they would fail to take precautions to guard against those options that are objectively 
“bad” (i.e., punishing.)  Put somewhat differently, if these patients can value neither 
their current situation nor those states of affairs that will result from their actions, then 
there is, from their perspective, nothing to pursue and nothing to guard against.  There 
is, in short, no problem in need of solving.  And so, one plausible conjecture for why it is 
that amygdala-damaged patients fail to attain the conceptual stage on the IGT is that it 
fails to (be taken to) present a problem.  Furthermore, since they experience no 
emotional response to any given outcome, they can assign no value (positive or 
negative) to them.  And so, since all states of affairs are value-neutral, perhaps such 
patients are unable to form an opinion about how they should decide/choose, because 
from their defective perspective, there is nothing upon which to ground such judgments.   
Underlying the somatic marker hypothesis is the claim that emotion-induced 
feeling is exploited heuristically to both focus attention upon and fix (i.e., increase or 
decrease from neutral) the desirability of particular response options.   It is generally 
accepted that attentional focus, by preferentially enlisting cognitive resources, results in 
cognitive focus (Adolph, 2000). Simply put, we preferentially “think about” those things 
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that we attend.  That the emotional landscape of amygdala-damaged patients is 
profoundly flat – nothing is any more emotionally significant than anything else – 
suggests that attentional resources would not be preferentially directed upon material 
that a normal subject would find emotionally significant.  Furthermore, being incapable 
of assigning values (positive or negative) to these, such patients are also unable to fix the 
desirability of those options entertained.  And so, it is reasonable to suggest that these 
patients are doubly impaired, for not only are their quite normal cognitive resources not 
preferentially enlisted or directed to “think” about the material, but such patients are 
also incapable of valuing and thus fixing the desirability of any of the options brought to 
bear. 
That VMF-damaged patients should decide disadvantageously is explained, 
Bechara and Damasio continue, in terms of their inability to effectively employ the 
machinery of the secondary emotions.  That is, since the amygdala is intact and these 
patients are perfectly capable of generating reward/punishment SCRs in response to 
their selections, they are quite capable of generating primary emotions in response to 
learned and unlearned stimuli.  They are also capable of generating feelings of the 
emotions induced since area SM1 is intact in all patients.  The particular deficit in 
practical reason and decision-making exhibited by VMF-patients then, is attributed to an 
inability to effectively construct and maintain “fact/feeling” sets, which in turn 
precludes feeling from being heuristically exploited during deliberation.  
And so, in the case of VMF-damaged patients, emotional responses are generated 
to each selection.  Feeling-images of the induced physiological changes are generated in 
area SM1.  Simultaneously, images of the scenario itself are being generated by 
perceptual processes.  It is at this point, however, that the process breaks down, for 
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damage to the VMF precludes these two kinds of information from being linked.  
Therefore, while perceptual images of each “factual” selection are generated, and 
emotion-induced feeling images are generated of the response to each selection, there is 
no fact-feeling set created.  There are “facts,” and there are “feelings,” but the former are 
never properly tagged or marked by the latter.   
In order to avoid confusion, it should be noted that since VMF – damaged 
patients can attain the “conceptual stage,” they are seemingly capable of pairing images 
and feelings in one sense – that of recognizing the co-occurrence of particular facts and 
feelings.  However, what they are unable to do is to pair (i.e., to assign) particular feeling 
tags to/with particular factual images.  This in turn, results in their inability to 
transitively fix (“by dint of juxtaposition” with feeling) the value or desirability of any 
particular outcome.  That is, VMF-damaged patients, while capable of recognizing that 
some facts and feelings are co-occurent, are unable to “pair” the two such that the “body 
images give to other images a quality of goodness or badness.” (Damasio, 1994 p. 159) It 
is, then, this latter sense of “pairing” that is Damasio‟s focus.  
During deliberation, suppositionally entertained quasi-perceptual images of 
selecting from each deck are generated.  In normal subjects these images would be 
emotionally appraised and the feeling induced juxtaposed.  By means of this, the 
desirability of the perceptual or quasi-perceptual images itself is (transitively, via the 
juxtaposition with induced feeling) fixed.  VMF-damage however precludes this 
information from being brought to bear since the quasi-perceptual images arrive for 
consideration untagged by feeling.  Since there are no feeling-markers affixed to the 
options, anticipatory feeling cannot be exploited heuristically to highlight or cull options 
during deliberation nor to render them respectively more or less desirable.  And so, like 
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the amygdala-damaged patients, no option is any more or less emotionally and hence 
motivationally significant (i.e., rewarding, positive, preferable, desirable or punishing, 
negative, aversive) than any other.  However, unlike amgdala-damaged patients who 
tag images with the neutral feeling of emotional homeostasis, VMF-damaged patients 
are incapable of marking these images with any emotion–induced feeling at all.  Options 
are, for them, not just feeling-neutral but entirely emotionally feeling-less.  As such, each 
option is, with respect to its desirability, equivalently emotionally and hence 
motivationally neutral.    
 On the IGT, normal subjects generate primary emotional responses and feelings 
to each card selection and, via the operations outlined, fact-feeling sets are created.  At 
the outset, since there is no feeling-history to exploit, during deliberation none of the 
suppositionally entertained scenes of each option is emotionally highlighted (positively 
or negatively).  As such, no option is taken to be any more or less desirable than any 
other.  That for the first twenty or so trials subjects choose randomly supports this.  
However, each card selection and induced primary emotion and fact/feeling set 
generated provides additional information.  As Bechara et. al., explain, area VMF 
functions to, 
Establish a linkage between the disposition for a certain aspect of a situation for 
instance, the long-term outcome for a type of response, and the disposition for the type 
of emotion that in past experience has been associated with the situation. (Bechara, 
Damasio & Damasio, 2003 p. 360) 
 
Over time and with repeated interactions with the environment, Damasio & 
Bechara explain, since the role of the VMF is to  “integrate effectively all of the somatic 
information triggered by the amygdala” (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Lee, 1999 p. 
5480)  a summed, averaged, or otherwise integrated feeling of what selecting from each 
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decks feels like on balance comes to be generated and dispositionally encoded.68  During 
deliberation, quasi-perceptual images of the “scene” of selecting from each deck are 
generated and suppositionally entertained.  Via appraisal by the as-if loop device the 
retrieved “somatic state that integrates the numerous and conflicting instances of reward 
and punishment encountered with individual cards draws from each of the decks “ is 
reconstituted (Bechara, 1999 p. 5480) and the on balance feeling is reconstructed.  This on 
balance feeling is then juxtaposed with the representation of the suppositionally 
entertained scene.  By means of this, each option entertained comes to be marked by the 
feeling that has on balance resulted.  Those options that are on balance positively feeling-
marked are highlighted – they command attention and are rendered more desirable.  
Those that are on balance negatively marked are, as undesirable, culled from further 
consideration.  Since, Bechara explains, feelings “influence the decision to select from, or 
avoid, that deck.” (Bechara, 1999 p. 5474) during deliberation subjects heuristically 
exploit the on-balance feeling tags associated with each options anticipatorily, to direct 
attention upon and motivate the pursuit of those options that are likely to be more 
rewarding than not.  
 It is of interest that normal subjects decide correctly long before they have fixed a 
belief/opinion about which decks are good/bad and thus about how they should choose.  
This suggests that the feeling-heuristic is exploited not only to guide practical reason by 
limiting the number of options made available for consideration (as Damasio suggests) 
but also that, at least sometimes, the heuristic is exploited directly as a decision-rule.  
                                                     
68 It should be noted that at this time the precise method by which feeling-images are integrated 
over time/trial is not known.  That frequency and amplitude should be factors seems clear given 
the IGT findings.  However, that either is more significant seems unlikely, given that no 
preference is exhibited between the bad decks nor between the good decks. 
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That is, since normal subjects come to decide and decide correctly and do so at least 
sometimes in the absence of belief about how they should choose, at least in some cases, 
it would appear that practical decision-making is itself undertaken by heuristic and 
automated processes.  
FEELING, MOTIVATION AND “BASIC VALUE” 
With respect to the question of how emotion helps in assigning or fixing the 
desirability of response options, Damasio offers the following account.  Since it is “by 
dint of juxtaposition, [that] body images give to other images a quality of goodness or 
badness,” (Damasio, 1994 p. 159), it is transitively, by means of juxtapositional tagging, 
that the goodness/desirability or badness/undesirability of particular response options 
comes set.  (Damasio, 1994; Bechara et. al., 2000).  We are, Damasio contends, innately 
averse to particular bodily states (i.e., negative feeling states). Transitively, we are averse 
to (i.e., find undesirable) any option the outcome of which is or comes to be negatively 
(i.e., un-preferably) feeling marked.  Likewise, we are innately disposed to find other 
somatosensory feeling states preferable (i.e., positive feeling states).  Via feeling tagging 
and this set of innate dispositions to find particular states preferable, transitively we find 
those response options that are positively (i.e., preferably) marked desirable.  In this 
manner, the emotional tagging of response options serves to, in effect, mark/fix (and 
ratchet up and down from neutral) the desirability of particular response options - 
thereby directly motivating the pursuit or avoidance of particular response options 
during deliberation. (Damasio, 1994; Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000 p. 297)  By 
means of this, desirably marked response options come to preferentially command 
attention and cognitive resources in the manner outlined.   
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One might object here claiming that we have no reason to think that particular 
emotional responses and the feelings induced to be “valenced” (i.e., positive/negative) 
in the manner proposed by Damasio & Bechara‟s account.  With respect to this concern, 
some account is needed of the nature of these cues themselves – specifically, discussion 
is needed of how feelings are valenced in ways that makes them exploitable in the 
manner suggested by Bechara and Damasio‟s account.   
Damasio suggests that species possess a set of innate “basic values” which “are 
the collection of basic preferences inherent in biological regulation.” (Damasio, 1994 p. 
155)  This collection of preferences, Damasio continues, forms an innate and fixed feeling 
hierarchy in which particular feelings just are more preferable than others.69  It is a 
feeling‟s location in the hierarchy that fixes its valence.  Those preferred somatosensory 
states (i.e., feelings) are positively valenced, while those un-preferred or aversive ones 
are negatively valenced.  Similarly, Rolls (1998, 2000) describes an analogous hierarchy 
but does so in terms of an innate set of species-specific dispositions or taxes.  And so, in 
much the same manner in which plants have a taxic disposition for states of affairs that 
maximize access to sunlight (i.e., they are disposed to grow toward it), so too are other 
species taxically drawn toward certain states (i.e., those prefered) and away from others 
(those to which we are averse).70   
                                                     
69 It is unclear from Damasio‟s discussion whether the proposed hierarchy is species universal or 
whether there is some minor degree of individual variation in preference ordering.  The latter 
seems, at least prima facie, more likely. 
70 The difference here might not be worth noting but the distinction between the two approaches 
lies in how preferred and aversive come to be determined. For Damasio what makes a state a 
“good” one is that it is located high in the feeling preference hierarchy.  It is because it is 
preferred that we seek these out.  Rolls takes the opposite approach suggesting that those states 
of affairs towards which we are highly taxically driven are those that we most prefer while those 
that we are highly driven to avoid we are highly averse to.  That both Damasio and Rolls suggest 
that the preference hierarchy and taxic drives are innately fixed and species specific, suggests that 
ultimately there is little, if any, real difference between their claims. 
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In effect, Bechara and Damasio suggest, as does Rolls (1998, 2000) that these basic 
values and the preference hierarchy generated from them enables feeling to serve as a 
“common currency” – that is, a noncompensatory (i.e., singular) cue - by which feelings 
and, thus transitively any tagged perceptual or quasi-perceptual images, may be 
compared and evaluated.  That is, since feeling states are themselves hierarchically 
ranked with respect to desirability, and feeling-images tag perceptual and quasi-
perceptual images, transitively “by mere dint of juxtaposition,” the (perceptual and 
quasi-perceptual) images of situations and options themselves come to be ranked - with 
respect to their desirability or preferableness.  By means of this value/desirability-fixing 
device, Damasio suggests, emotion influences practical reason and decision-making 
directly by marking and thus ratcheting up or down from neutral the desirability of 
particular response options.  So doing, in turn, serves to increase or decrease motivation 
to pursue or avoid these (options or lines of inquiry) during deliberation. 
ON EMOTION AND SOME INSTANCES OF THE FRAME PROBLEM 
 Having discussed a puzzle of practical reason and decision-making and outlined 
Bechara and Damasio‟s proposal, I will turn now to considering how emotion might 
help us in contending with some particular instances of the frame problem that arise in 
practical reason and decision-making. 
EMOTION AND ATTENTIONAL DIRECTION  
 In Chapter 1, I argued that the frame problem is best understood to be a 
constellation of related problem kinds.  One instance of which is the problem of 
attentional direction.  Any finite and physically realized system capable of attending at 
all is faced with the frame problem instance of determining which “things” it is to attend 
and which it is to ignore.  The attentional direction frame problem, then, is the puzzle of 
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how a system could expeditiously attend to those things that are relevant while 
efficiently ignoring those that are not. 
As I argued previously, arriving at an all-things-considered or rational (in 
Fodor‟s sense) conclusion about what is to be attended is both computationally and 
normatively untenable.  That any system attempting to direct attention rationally has no 
hope of ever doing so follows for two reasons.  First, any rational (in Fodor‟s sense) 
system would immediately be forced to contend with a Rylean (1949) regress with 
respect to arriving at a conclusion about what particular standard should be employed.  
That is, any rational system must, before doing anything else, arrive at a conclusion 
about what criterion of, for lack of a better term, “attention-worthiness” should be relied 
upon.  Moreover, it must, if it is to be a rational system, arrive at this conclusion 
rationally.  We have, as I argued in Chapter 3, reason for thinking that no finite system 
that goes about arriving at conclusions in this way could succeed. 
Second, even if we assume that such a system could (somehow) determine which 
standard it is to apply, it would, as a rational system, be faced with a computationally 
intractable  task.  Specifically, in order to arrive at a conclusion about what “things” 
should be preferentially attended, such a system would need to first, consider each 
“thing” and second make a rational determination as to its attention-worthiness.  So 
doing, of course, requires that each “thing” be attended and given rational 
consideration.  
That any system engaged in a rational process of attention-direction would be 
effectively cognitively/attentionally paralyzed, when taken in conjunction with the 
uncontroversial claim that normal humans are not attentionally paralyzed, suggests that 
some automated heuristic is (or set of heuristics are) at play that assists in directing our 
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limited attentional resources.  There are a number of reasons for thinking this a plausible 
suggestion.  First, that one‟s attention can be “grabbed” in a somewhat reflex-like 
manner often in the absence of belief and often in spite of one‟s beliefs, supports the 
claim that attention is directed, at least in part, by automated heuristic processes.  For 
example, most can think of a situation in which one‟s attention has been drawn to 
something while s/he was otherwise engaged in thinking, perhaps quite deeply, about 
something entirely unrelated.  Likewise, most have found themselves in a situation 
where one‟s attention is drawn quite automatically to something that one believes 
she/he should not be attending.  While there are many examples, most rather lurid, 
seeing someone with a pronounced physically deformity provides a suitable example.  
One “knows” not to stare, but one‟s attention is drawn nonetheless.  That we can decide 
what we should attend and still rapidly and automatically attend to the “wrong” things 
(with respect to what we have decided we should attend) provides further support for 
the claim that attention is at least in good part automatically and heuristically directed. 
In discussing Damasio‟s somatic marker proposal - in which emotion, by 
transitively fixing the desirability of particular images and options, facilitates 
deliberation by highlighting and/or culling options for and from further consideration - 
an additional strand emerged that, while briefly touched upon above, warrants separate 
discussion.  The influence of emotion on attention has received considerable treatment 
in the literature.71  The majority of these studies focus on establishing the existence of an 
                                                     
71 Etcoff & Magee, 1992; Bargh, Chaiken, Govender & Pratto, 1992; Greenwald, Klinger & Liu, 
1989; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Niedenthal, 1990; Niedenthal & Kitayama, 1994; Pratto & John, 
1991; Clark & Isen, 1982; Ingram, 1984; Bower & Forgas 1987; Lang 1984; Teasdale, 1983; 
Niedenthal & Showers, 1991; Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994; Martin, William & Clark, 1991; 
Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; MacLeod, Mathews & Tata 1986; Mathews & Klug, 1993; Mathews 
& MacLeod 1985; Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; Dagleish & Watts, 1990; Hunt & Ellis, 1999; 
Kraiger, Billings & Isen 1989; Berkowitz 2000. 
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affective/emotional attentional congruency effect – the phenomenon whereby a subject‟s 
current emotional state directly influences the stimuli preferentially attended in the 
subject‟s environment.  Specifically, subjects are found to preferentially attend to those 
stimuli that are emotionally “congruent” with/to their current emotional state.  And so, 
for example, anxious subjects attend preferentially to the objects of their anxieties (e.g., 
arachnophobes preferentially attend to spiders and show significant disregard for other 
stimuli.) (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986; MacLeod & 
Mathews, 1991; Beck & Clark, 1988; Martin & Williams, 1990)  Similarly, employing a 
variant of the “affect priming” studies discussed in the previous chapter, Neidenthal & 
Setterlund (1994) found that subjects in whom an emotional state of “joy” had been 
induced preferentially attended to “happy” stimuli (e.g., positively emotionally valenced 
words like “joy” and “cheer”) while those in whom a “sad” state had been induced 
preferentially attended to “sad” stimuli (e.g., negatively emotionally valenced words like 
“despair” and “weep.”)  The emotional/affective state attentional congruency effect is 
also readily apparent in subjects with generalized anxiety disorders (Mogg, Mathews & 
Wienman, 1987), panic disorders (Ehlers, Margraf, Davies & Roth, 1988; McNally, 
Reimann & Kim, 1990) and post-traumatic stress disorder (McNally, Kaspi, Reimann & 
Zeitlin, 1990).   
Since at least some of what emotions are is explicable in terms of the operations 
of automated appraisal mechanisms, and the amygdala, we have every reason to think, 
is the structure mediating these appraisals, I will turn now to considering the role 
occupied by this structure in the direction of attention.  That the amygdala exerts 
considerable influence on the operations of attentional direction and guidance is well 
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established.72  Holland, Han & Gallagher (2000), for example, found that the central 
nucleus of the amygdala (the principle output region of the structure) and its pathways 
to the substantia nigra and dorsal striatum are directly implicated in the direction of 
attention.  Specifically, Holland et. al., (1999) found that rats with ablated central nuclei 
are entirely incapable of exhibiting a “conditioned orienting response” to stimuli that 
have been, through conditioned learning, associated with reward and punishment.  
Normal rats, in contrast, exhibit a robust orienting response toward previously learned 
stimuli, preferentially attending to those stimuli that are rewarding and punishing.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, that the amygdala is responsible for both 
the maintenance of emotional memory (it serves as both a mechanism of conditioned 
learning and repository of emotional memory) and appraisal of the emotional 
significance of stimuli is well established.  Complete amygdala ablation, recall from 
previous discussion, results in an inability to respond to emotionally significant stimuli 
and an inability to learn to respond to new stimuli – subjects are in effect incapable of 
finding stimuli emotionally significant.  The environment is for these subjects entirely 
devoid of emotional significance/value.   
Lesioning of the central nucleus aspect of the amygdala (the principle output 
region) does not affect the learning of new stimuli nor does it affect the ability to 
emotionally appraise stimuli.  However, by lesioning this aspect and thus effectively the 
connection between the amygdala and those regions directly implicated in attentional 
control, subjects become incapable of exploiting the information provided by the 
amygdala to direct attention toward emotionally significant stimuli. 
                                                     
72 Helmuth, 2003; Gloor, 1992; Kapp, Whalen, Supple & Pascoe, 1992; Rolls, 1999; LeDoux, 1996; 
McDonald, 1992; Halgren, 1992; Kapp, Supple & Whalen, 1994; Holland & Gallagher, 1999; 
Holland, Han & Gallagher, 2000. 
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Similarly, the amygdala is directly implicated in the process whereby surprising 
or novel stimuli are preferentially attended.  Holland & Gallagher (1993) and Han, 
Holland & Gallagher (1999) note, for example, that rats with ablation of the central 
nucleus (of the amygdala) or lesioning of its connections to the basal forebrain, exhibit 
no “surprise induced enhancements,” failing to preferentially attend to novel and 
surprising stimuli in their environment.  That is, while normal subjects rapidly 
orient/attend to those features of the environment that are novel/unusual, those with 
damage to the amygdala are entirely incapable of doing so.   
Furthermore, Cahill et. al., (1994, 1996), Adolphs et. al., (1997) and Baxter & Chiba 
(1999) demonstrate that the substantia nigra and nucleus basilis regions of the basal 
forebrain are directly implicated in the regulation of attention in both sustained and 
selective attentional tasks.  Earlier, Carli, Robbins, Evenden & Everitt (1983) found that 
basal forebrain lesioning significantly impairs the performance of rats on a sustained 
attentional task, dramatically interfering with their ability to maintain attention over 
time.  Of particular interest are Holland & Gallagher‟s (1993) findings that identical 
behavioral results are obtained following ablation of or lesioning to the connections 
between the central nucleus of the amygdala and the regions implicated in attentional 
direction (i.e., the substantia nigra and striatum).  This implies, Holland & Han conclude, 
that while areas of the basal forebrain are responsible for the mechanics of attentional 
direction, it is the amygdala (via projections to these regions) that is responsible at least 
in part for determining how (i.e., upon what) attention will be directed.  And so, via 
automated influences on structures in the basal forebrain and striatum, the amygdala-
realized emotional appraisal module,  Adolphs (2000) explains, “helps to select 
particular aspects of the stimulus environment for disproportionate allocation of 
199 
 
cognitive processing resources; in other words, the organism preferentially processes 
information about its environment that is most salient.”  
And so, while the details of the operations of attentional direction are still under 
study, it is clear that in all species that possess an amygdala or analogous limbic 
structures, (i) there are defined anatomical pathways from the amygdala to regions 
implicated in attentional control, (ii) ablation or lesioning of the amygdala or its 
connections results in the cessation of the orienting response toward emotionally 
significant stimuli, (iii) ablation or lesion of the amygdala or its connections eliminates 
surprise-induced enchancement of attention, and (iv) ablation of the amygdala 
dramatically interferes with the guidance and maintenance of attention on both 
sustained and selective tasks.73  
We can, then, arrive at a conclusion about one way in which emotion might help 
us contend with a few of the frame problem instances that arise in these domains.  
Specifically, with respect to the attentional direction instance of the problem, emotion 
clearly plays a role in directing attentional resources upon emotionally significant 
material.  That such an heuristic should be far more expeditious than the “rational” 
alternative is clear.  That the contents of emotional memory are composed of unlearned 
and learned “triggers” both of which are evolutionarily constrained (either innately 
fixed or governed by species-specific learning preparedness rules) provides reason for 
thinking, as Ekman (1983), Izard (1991, 1993), LeDoux (1996), Damasio (1994), Panksepp 
(1998) and Cosmides & Tooby (1990) suggest, that emotion preferentially directs 
attention toward stimuli that are of evolutionary significance.  The influence of emotion 
                                                     
73 Muir, Dunnett, Robbins & Everitt, 1992; Muir, Everitt & Robbins, 1996; Pang, Williams, Egeth & 
Olton, 1993; McGaugh et. al., 1992; McGaugh, Cahill & Roozendaal, 1996; McGaugh, 2004; Baxter 
& Chiba, 1999. 
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on attention serves, in effect, as LeDoux (1996) argues, as an automated “early warning 
system” alerting us to the presence of evolutionary significant states of affairs (e.g., 
dangers, rewards, punishments). Insofar as attention enlists cognitive processes (Simon, 
1967; Kosslyn & Koenig, 1994; Rolls, 1999; Adolphs, 2000), that is, insofar as we 
preferentially “think” about those things to which we attend while ignoring (i.e., 
cognitively ignoring) those unattended, emotion serves the heuristic function of 
directing and limiting what it is that we “think” about and the lines of inquiry pursued. 
Likewise, via the mechanisms outlined by Damasio in which the preferable-ness or 
desirability of particular (images of) states of affairs and response options come to be 
transitively fixed, emotion serves to (by ratcheting up or down the desirability of 
options and thus our motivation to pursue or avoid these respectively) further facilitate 
attention and guide deliberation by directing the ends and lines of inquiry pursued. 
It is, of course, highly unlikely that emotional significance should be the only 
heuristic at play directing attention.  Rather, it is far more likely that there are number of 
such processes.  It is also clear that we can, in the absence of emotionally significant 
stimuli, consciously direct our attention (e.g., I can attend to a footnote, astrological 
chart, line of code, particular DNA sub-sequence or any other potentially emotionally 
banal thing).  However, in much the way that Simon (1967), LeDoux (1996), Ekman 
(1983), Damasio (1994), Panksepp (1998), and Cosmides & Tooby (1990) suggest, it is 
also quite clear that emotional appraisals automatically interrupt these other processes.  
And so, regardless of what I might be thinking about and wherever else my attention 
might be directed, attention will be automatically and immediately drawn to 
emotionally significant material.   
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That relying on this heuristic to direct attention should be far more expeditious 
than the rational alternative seems apparent.  However, the question remains as to how 
“good” such an heuristic would be.  And so, we need some reason to think the attention-
directing heuristic outlined to satisfy the normative horn of the frame problem.  There 
are a number of reasons for thinking this quite likely with respect to the rather global 
ends of survival/fitness.  The amygdala (and the limbic structures quite generally) is a 
phylogenically ancient brain structure that serves the same function in all animals that 
have one.  It is far older than the neocortex and thus has had the benefit of millennia of 
natural selection.  Given the manner in which natural selection operates it is quite 
reasonable to think that there were animals that directed their attention differently (i.e., 
based upon some other criteria).  It is also quite reasonable to think that the inability to 
preferentially attend to dangers, rewards, punishment, disgusting things, surprises and 
the like would have resulted in the demise of this line.  And so, we have at least some 
reason for thinking that this automated attentional directing device makes salient those 
things that are, given our particular evolutionary history, relevant. 
This establishes only the likelihood that relying on such an heuristic was at some 
point beneficial.  However, with respect to the gross categories of dangers, threats, 
rewards, punishments, surprises and the like, we have no reason for thinking the 
current environment to be markedly different from that of our ancestors.  That is, at least 
some (if not all) of the unlearned inducers/triggers are still present in the current 
environment – animals still growl and bare their teeth, food still rots, excrement still 
abounds, objects still loom, the world is still full of surprises and so on.  The same would 
appear to hold for learned triggers. The current environment, we have every reason to 
think, is both full of dangers, threats, surprises, disgusting things etc., and patterned in 
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ways that can be exploited by mechanisms of conditioned learning (i.e., the current 
environment is not random).  That we can today find states of affairs rewarding, 
punishing, threatening etc., and that we can associate these responses with their 
inducers supports this.  And so, since the attentional direction heuristic is the result of 
evolutionary pressures and we have reason for thinking the current environment to be, 
with respect to the gross categories of emotionally significant things, relevantly 
analogous to those of the past, we also have reason for thinking that relying on this 
heuristic should be beneficial today.  Put another way, automatically orienting toward 
dangers, rewards, punishments, surprises and the like, is very likely to be as useful a 
strategy today as it was on the savannahs of the past.   
PROBLEM-SEQUENCING AND META-PLANNING 
By influencing, in an automated and obligatory manner, motivation and 
attention, emotions might play a role in helping us contend with the problem-
sequencing and, via this, the meta-planning puzzles. 
Suppose that one is engaged in some highly cognitive and rational task – 
undertaking some mathematical proof, for example.  Suppose further that a tiger stalks 
in, a fire alarm sounds, or some other (learned or unlearned) emotionally significant 
stimuli is introduced.  Assuming that these are, in fact, “triggers” or “inducers” of the 
relevant sort, attention is quite automatically redirected and motivation is shifted.  With 
respect to our mathematical aims, the presence of a tiger or the fire alarm is not likely to 
be directly relevant.  However, with respect to fitness/survival, these are quite relevant.  
In this regard, then, the tiger or alarm is relevant to our mathematical endeavors, for we 
have here a good example in which solving the wrong problem first will make it such 
that one cannot solve the other.  Somehow, we must expeditiously determine whether to 
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continue with our proof and then think about the tiger, or sequence these problems the 
other way round.   
The modest point I am making is that whatever we were thinking about (and 
thus whatever immediate ends we might have been pursuing), is interrupted quite 
automatically by the influences of the automated emotional appraisal mechanism on 
motivation and attentional direction.  We immediately stop thinking about the proof 
(i.e., we both cease attending to the proof itself and no longer have the immediate goal of 
contending with that puzzle) and focus instead quite automatically on the current tiger-
filled situation.  In so doing, we cannot help, as Adolphs (2000) suggests, but enlist those 
cognitive processes that were engaged in thinking about math to start thinking about the 
current tiger-filled situation.  In so doing, a simple problem-sequencing operation has 
been undertaken quite automatically and without the need for our having to arrive 
rationally at a conclusion about this.  Likewise, by automatically maintaining or 
sustaining attention on emotionally significant material (tigers in this case), emotion 
helps to keep those cognitive processes enlisted, focused on the situation at hand (and 
not the math), again, without the need for our having to first arrive at an all-things-
considered rational conclusion.  Furthermore, by means of the operations of 
motivational direction outlined by Damasio‟s proposal, we come to have a much 
stronger immediate desire to avoid the tiger-filled situation than we do to contend with 
the math puzzle.   
This is, of course, not to say that attention cannot be redirected away from the 
tiger.  There are, so it would appear, two possible means by which attentional 
redirection might occur.  First, the feeling preference hierarchy provides one means by 
which this might be occur.  Were some situation to obtain that is appraised to be more 
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emotionally significant than the one under current consideration, that situation - since it 
is, in effect, more emotionally “pressing,” (i.e., the feeling generated is markedly lower 
or higher on the preference hierarchy and thus of lesser or greater desirability) - would 
come to command attentional and cognitive resources.  For example, let us suppose then 
that we are, once again, working on our proof and a fire alarm sounds.  This, assuming it 
is a learned trigger, would command attention and redirect immediate motivational 
aims - we would stop thinking about our proof.  However, were a tiger to now stalk in, 
we might very well find this situation to be more emotionally “pressing” (i.e., resulting 
in a feeling state to which we are more averse) than that induced by the alarm.  We 
might, via the influences on motivation and attentional direction, stop thinking about the 
fire alarm and start thinking about the tiger.  By means of the influence on motivation, 
attention and, via this, cognitive resources, might come to be redirected quite 
automatically in this manner.   
Second, via the “high road” pathway proposed by LeDoux, attention might come 
to be redirect attention away from the tiger and back onto the proof.  For example, once 
attention has been focused and motivational and cognitive processes engaged (in 
thinking about the tiger situation rather than math) we might come to realize, via 
processing by other consumer subsystems, that the tiger is, for instance, leashed, trained 
or stuffed.  That scene (i.e., the image constructed following further processing), when re-
appraised, might no longer hold any emotional significance – it might no longer be an 
undesirable one or one to which the agent is averse.  And so, assuming that the agent 
has not learned to respond emotionally to stuffed toy tigers, (i.e., such things do not 
feature as “triggers”), the ersatz tiger would (as no longer an emotionally and hence a 
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motivationally significant situation) also no longer commands attention.74  And so, by 
freeing attentional and cognitive processes from considering this further, we return to 
whatever it was we were thinking about.   
Again, the point here is a modest one.  That we are compelled to attend to and 
thus “think” about emotionally significant material and stop thinking about whatever it 
was that previously had our attention/cognitive resources, is a simple heuristic device 
for problem-sequencing and, by way of this, meta-planning.  Since it is such a simple 
heuristic (relying upon only one cue) we have good reason to think it to be highly 
expeditious and, in any case, every reason for thinking it far more expeditious than the 
computationally burdensome “rational” alternative.   
META-PLANNING: PROBLEM-SETTING AND ENDS-SELECTION 
 Drawing upon above discussion and Bechara & Damasio‟s model, emotion might 
help us in contending with the meta-planning instance of the problem by serving as an 
automated problem-setting and ends-selection heuristic.  As discussed previously, one 
natural hypothesis with respect to the deficiencies exhibited by amygdala-damaged 
patients is that they are, in effect, incapable of valuing states of affairs and thus of 
valuing and hence desiring particular states of affairs over others.  That they are 
incapable of so doing suggest that they are also unable to set situations as posing 
problems for themselves.  For example, if one is incapable of finding an objectively 
punishing outcome undesirable, then one is also incapable of taking the current 
situation to be a problematic one.    Likewise, if one cannot “care about” or desire any 
state of affairs any more than any other, then one also cannot care about any of the states 
                                                     
74 Even the surprise-induced enhancements would decline as we become habituated to the 
presence of the tiger. 
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of affairs that might result from one‟s action.  Since the amygdala-damaged are 
indifferent to both the current situation and all of the possible outcomes (none are taken 
to be rewarding or punishing), from their perspective, there really is no problem posed 
by this or any other situation.75     
And so, one plausible suggestion for why it is that amygdala-damaged patients 
are unable to attain the conceptual stage is that they fail to set the task as posing a 
problem for them.  That is, if one really cannot assign a value (e.g., desirable or 
undesirable) to any of states of affairs, then one, in effect, fails to have not losing as one 
of one‟s goals (i.e., one fails to be motivated by this prospect). The amygdala-damaged, 
then, might fail to contend effectively with both real-world problems and those of the 
IGT because, from their perspective, no problems are posed (by and of them).  In 
contrast, damage to area VMF appears to have a different effect in this regard.  These 
patients know that situations in the world and the IGT pose problems for them.  They 
also know that these situations require consideration and are motivated to contend with 
them (some, in fact, even know how best to contend with them), they just fail to do so 
effectively. Their deficit lies not in the inability to set situations as posing problems, but 
rather in the inability to effectively manage and contend with those that are set.   
Specifically, while damage to area VMF does not preclude subjects from appraising the 
emotional significance of current situations (i.e., finding actual outcomes 
rewarding/punishing), it does prevent them from appraising the emotional significance 
of future (i.e., hypothetically entertained projections) situations and outcomes.  With 
                                                     
75 The point I am belaboring here is a simple one.  Someone, somewhere is renting a car at this 
moment.  This person might get a blue, white, silver, green etc., colored car.  I truly do not care 
what color car this person gets.  Since I am indifferent, this situation poses no problem for me.  If, 
however, one is entirely indifferent to all states of affairs and thus all potential outcomes, then no 
situation would (be taken to) present a problem. 
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respect to the anticipated feeling (i.e., the feeling likely to result from their actions), 
VMF-damaged patients are no different from those with amygdala damage – all futures 
are emotionally and hence also motivationally equivalent.  
 It is then reasonable to think that emotion might help us contend with the meta-
planning instance of the problem by heuristically helping us to set situations as posing 
problems for ourselves.  A quite simple heuristic emerges from this: set as problematic 
those situations that are emotionally significant.  Furthermore, the degree to which a 
situation is taken to be problematic (for the system) is given by reference to the innate 
feeling hierarchy.  Those situations that are most emotionally significant (i.e., the most 
immediately un/desirable) are, via the sequencing operation, the most emotionally and 
thus motivationally pressing.   
    Put somewhat differently, before one can even begin thinking about how best to 
order the sequence in which one will contend with the problems posed of them, one 
must be able to discern that there are problems with which s/he needs to contend.  The 
automated mechanisms of emotional appraisal would appear to play a role here, helping 
to alert us to the fact that our current situation is problematic one and thus one in need 
of our consideration.  In so doing emotion might, when taken in conjunction with the 
motivational role proposed by Damasio‟s account, help in setting the ends and goals 
(and thus lines of inquiry) that will be pursued.  Understood in this manner, emotion, by 
setting situations as problematic helps to load the problem-sequencing queue by 
informing us that (i) some situation is, as un/desirable, problematic and (ii) that, at some 
point, we are to direct attentional and cognitive resources towards considering (i.e, 
“thinking” about) this further.  In so doing, emotion helps to direct both the lines of 
inquiry and ends pursued and the order in which those problems posed are considered.  
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Simply put, with respect to meta-planning, emotion appears to help us in determining 
both what to think about (i.e., with what situations we should contend – the 
“problematic” ones – and thus with what ends are to be pursued) and when we should 
think about it (i.e., the most emotionally/motivationally “pressing” first, then the next 
and so on).  
 Relying on a simple one-cue heuristic to determine whether a situation poses a 
problem (for the system) and thus presents something with which it must contend, 
should be far more expeditious than the rational alternative whereby the 
“problematicity” of each situation must be rationally determined.  Along the same lines 
as those discussed previously, so doing would require the rational system to arrive at a 
conclusion (and do so rationally) concerning which standard of “problematic” it is to 
employ.  That it should be sufficiently normatively “good” to satisfy (a suitably 
weakened version of) the second horn of the dilemma posed by the frame problem is 
likely as well. 
While the role proposed above for emotion in helping us to contend with some 
instances of the frame problem that arise in practical reason is rather indirect, (i.e., it 
relies upon the influences of emotion on motivational and attentional direction), 
Damasio argues that emotional feeling is exploited directly in helping us to contend with 
the meta-planning and problem-sequencing instances of the problem.  And so, with 
respect to the cognitive paralysis brought on by the endless consideration of options and 
implications exhibited by VMF-damaged patients, Damasio explains, 
An automated somatic marker would have helped the [VMF-damaged] patient in more 
ways than one.  To begin with, it would have improved the overall framing of the 
problem.  None of us would have spent the amount of time the patient took with this 
issue, because an automated somatic marker device would have helped us detect the 
useless and indulgent nature of the exercise.  If nothing else, we would have realized 
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how ridiculous the effort was.  At another level, sensing the potentially wasteful 
approach, we would have opted for one of the alternative dates the equivalent of 
tossing a coin or relying on some kind of gut feeling for one or the other date.  Or we 
might simply have turned the decision over to the person asking the question and 
replied that it really did not matter, that he should choose. 
In short, we would picture the waste of time and have it marked as negative; 
and we would picture the minds of others looking at us, and have that marked as 
embarrassing.  There is reason to believe that the patient did form some of those 
internal “pictures” but that the absence of a marker prevented those pictures from 
being properly attended and considered. (Damasio, 1994 pp. 193-4)  
 
 And so, by exploiting the body-loop or as-if loop marking devices, Damasio 
suggests that the feeling generated of the automated appraisal of the imagined “scene” 
of undertaking a perseverative and exhaustive consideration of the options and 
implications would come to be marked negatively.  By somatically “warning” us in this 
way (i.e., marking that scene as undesirable), attentional, and via this cognitive 
resources, are drawn away from the particular planning task itself and focused onto the 
meta-planning task.  That is, we stop thinking about particular options (e.g., plans and 
reasons for meeting on Tuesday rather than Thursday) and start thinking about whether 
we should be contending with this problem at all and, if so, if we should be contending 
with it in this way.   
 It is worth noting, however, that, given the role proposed by the VMF in Bechara 
and Damasio‟s model, there is no reason to think that this meta-planning or problem-
sequencing heuristic should be inflexible.  Rather, since the VMF functions to 
somatically mark or tag both perceptual and quasi-perceptual  (i.e., suppositional or 
hypothetical) images, and there is reason to think, given LeDoux‟s findings, that 
“factual” inducers may be highly complex and abstract, the feeling generated in 
response to such scenes could be highly context-sensitive.  Through learning and the 
construction of fact-feeling sets, particular contextual, normative and social standards 
might very well be incorporated into the appraisal process.  And so, in situations in 
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which one has come to learn that a higher standard of accuracy than is usually expected 
applies, the feeling-marker apparatus could be sufficiently flexible to accommodate this 
context-specific information by means of the operations outlined.  For example, one 
might come to learn that in some specific problem-contexts what usually constitutes an 
“embarrassing” display of detailed consideration does not apply.76 
HAMLET‟S PROBLEM: STOPPING AND DECISION RULES 
In situations in which there is remarkable uncertainty about the future and in which the 
decision should be influenced by previous individual experience, such constraints 
permit the organism to decide more efficiently with short time intervals. … In the 
absence of a somatic marker, options and outcomes become virtually equalized and the 
process of choosing will depend entirely on logic operations over many option-
outcome pairs.  The strategy is necessarily slower and may fail to take into account 
previous experience.  This pattern of slow and error-prone decision behavior we often 
see in [VMF] patients.  Random and impulsive decision-making is a related pattern. 
(Damasio, 1998) 
 
 And so, Bechara and Damasio are proposing a quite simple heuristic for 
facilitating decision-making and practical reason - that emotional feeling tags (i.e., 
somatic markers) are automatically exploited as noncompensatory heuristic cues for 
both culling and highlighting particular plans and options.  By means of this “cognitive 
guidance”(Damasio, 1994 p. 130) heuristic, the set of plans and options is limited in size 
via culling, while motivational, attentional and cognitive resources are directed upon 
those that are highlighted.    And so, during deliberation, Damasio contends, the set of 
options upon which reason is applied is pre-limited by this automated 
culling/highlighting device. It is worth noting too, that via the “as-if loop” device set out 
                                                     
76 For example, detailing the reasons why one should visit Damasio‟s lab on one day versus 
another might very well be highlighted as embarrassing, while taking that much care when 
deciding, for instance, when to invade Normandy would not. That the “factual” aspect of the 
fact/feeling set can be complex, abstract or highly contextually specific seems clear from both 
LeDoux‟s and Damasio & Bechara‟s discussions. 
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by Damasio, which bypasses the necessarily serial and thus slow “body-loop” appraisal 
mechanism, the tagging and culling/highlighting process should be quite expeditious.   
In this respect, then, emotion-induced feeling tags serve as a cue that is exploited 
by an automated heuristic stopping rule which, when operational, prevents our further 
considering (i.e., attending to, thinking about and pursuing) particular options and 
plans.  Furthermore, once the set has been winnowed (i.e., once particular options have 
been automatically culled from further consideration), Damasio & Bechara suggest that 
these same feeling tags, in effect, serve double-duty as a cue that, by transitively fixing 
the desirability of options themselves, is exploited by an automated heuristic decision 
rule.  The feeling tag associated with each response option is, by ratcheting up or down 
(from neutral) the desirability of a particular response option, directly exploited to guide 
decision-making by both serving as a rudder on attention and cognition and motivating 
the pursuit/avoidance of particular options.  That normal subjects choose correctly even 
when they have no opinion about how they should choose and VMF-damaged patients 
choose poorly even when they have correct opinions about how they should choose, 
suggests that feeling might be heuristically exploited as a noncompensatory cue to guide 
decision-making.      
 Fodor‟s Hamlet‟s challenge is the puzzle of when to stop “thinking” and 
choose/act.  Earlier I argued that no rational (in Fodor‟s sense) system could be expected 
to adequately contend with this problem given the regress that must be (rationally) 
anchored.  Put another way, no finite system that attempts to arrive at a conclusion 
rationally could contend with this problem, for none can be expected to arrive at a 
rational conclusion about when to stop thinking.  As such, no rational and finite system 
should ever be expected to choose.  And so, as I argued, rational consideration results in 
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cognitive and, by way of this, practical paralysis.  Since we do choose and we do not 
appear to be instantiations of a rational system, I suggested that it is reasonable to think 
that we contend with this puzzle heuristically.  Bechara and Damasio‟s account provides 
a parsimonious explanation of one way in which we might contend with this problem as 
well as providing a model by which this heuristic might be realized.  Simply put, we 
“stop thinking” about those options that are likely to result in undesirable states of 
affairs – that is, those that are negatively feeling-tagged.  Likewise, with respect to the 
decision aspect of Hamlet‟s puzzle, we choose or act when a suitably desirable (i.e., 
positively feeling-marked) option is discerned.   
More globally, emotion might play a further role here by helping us in 
determining when to stop thinking about a particular problem posed.  That is, we stop 
thinking about a particular problematic situation when it is no longer emotionally and 
thus motivationally significant.  Particular problematic situations would no longer be 
emotionally significant when they no longer obtain.  Put another way, we stop thinking 
about a problematic situation when it ceases to pose a problem for us (i.e., when the 
current situation is no longer motivationally aversive).  In this respect then emotion 
might also serve as simple means by which we are alerted that some satisfaction 
condition has been met.  That is, given some problem posed and some suppositionally 
entertained plan under consideration, we stop thinking and act when so doing results in 
a state of affairs in which a problem is no longer taken to exist (i.e., one that is not 
appraised to be undesirable/aversive).  
 With respect to the tractability horn of the dilemma, the noncompensatory 
feeling-cue heuristic stopping and decision rules described by the somatic marker model 
should be far more expeditious than the rational alternative of cognitive paralysis.  
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Relying on one cue to winnow/highlight options is, of course, much less 
computationally burdensome than the rational alternative that requires that all of the 
available evidence be considered.  Furthermore, not only would we expect one-cue 
strategies like those proposed by Damasio and Bechara to be much less computationally 
intensive than the rational (in Fodor‟s sense) alternative, they are also more efficient 
than traditional “benchmark” rational decision-making tools or strategies (e.g., Dawes‟ 
rule, Franklin‟s rule and multiple linear regression) that consider only a great deal of the 
available information (Gigerenzer, 1999).  That simple heuristic stopping and decision 
rules should be far more expeditious and far less computationally demanding than more 
complex processes that consider all or most of the available evidence, however, is of no 
great surprise.     
While certainly expeditious, one might naturally object that no heuristic, 
particularly any as simple as those proposed by Damasio, could  possibly be sufficiently 
accurate, reliable or otherwise “good” to satisfy the normative horn of the frame 
problem.  Underlying this concern is the intuition that any gains in speed must come at 
the price of a decrease in accuracy.  That is, the concern runs, since noncompensatory 
heuristics are simple, computationally frugal, rapid and, by design, fail to consider all of 
the available information (in fact, considering very little), they cannot adequately satisfy 
the normative horn of the dilemma. 
 While the IGT and the real-world deficits exhibited by VMF and amygdala-
damaged patients are compelling, there may be resistance to the idea that a 
noncompensatory heuristic like those underlying Bechara & Damasio‟s proposal could 
be adequately normatively “good.”  Such resistance might lead one to reject the proposal 
outright (and look to another explanation) on the grounds that in principle the one-cue 
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decision-heuristic posited is far too simple to possibly satisfy the normative horn of the 
dilemma. And so, we need reason for thinking, independently of Bechara and Damasio‟s 
claims, that one-reason decision-making could be sufficiently accurate. 
 In Chapter 3, I argued that the normative standard underlying Fodor‟s 
pessimistic conclusion should be weakened in light of its in principle unsatisfiability.  
While I did not specify how this normative rationality principle should be weakened, as 
this was not my aim, that it should be weakened to something that is at least satisfiable 
by a finite and physically realized system seems clear.  In assessing the normative 
“goodness” of any necessarily irrational (in Fodor‟s sense) procedure, we cannot 
demand the impossible – and thus should not demand complete correctness.  Rather, all 
that is needed is reason for thinking such heuristics to be “good enough.”   
With respect to this, that an heuristic is accurate/correct at a rate that is only 
slightly better than chance, it is worth noting, would be sufficient to establish the modest 
point that that heuristic helps in contending with the frame problem, assuming of course 
that is also expeditious.   We have, however, reason for thinking very simple heuristics 
like those proposed by the somatic marker account to be capable of far greater accuracy 
than chance. 
 Gigerenzer (1999) investigated the accuracy, robustness and computational 
requirements of a number of decision-making strategies.  Both simple heuristics that 
relied upon one-cue (noncompensatory) stopping and decision rules and complex and 
computationally intensive “rational” strategies were examined.  The aim was to 
determine how accurate a simple heuristic can be that (1) fails to incorporate all of the 
available evidence and (2) is noncompensatory, that is, that relies upon only one cue.  
While we need not go into the particular details, Gigerenzer‟s team found that with 
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respect to accuracy, the three simple “fast and frugal” one-cue heuristic rules 
investigated outperformed the computationally intensive “rational” strategies (e.g., 
Dawes‟ rule, Franklin‟s rule and Multiple linear regression) that consider all of the 
available information.  (Gigerenzer et.al., 1999 p.87) Likewise, by eliminating the 
problem of data “over-fitting” which plagues classical (rational) strategies, these simple 
heuristic strategies were also found to be remarkably robust. (Gigerenzer et. al., 1999, pp. 
109-110, pp. 127-136)    
For present purposes, the upshot of Gigerenzer‟s findings is that “more is not 
always better” when it comes to determining both when to stop “thinking” about 
options and when to decide/choose among them.  Rather, the evidence suggests that 
under conditions of uncertainty “less is more” since one-cue stopping and decision-rules 
can be as accurate and flexible as computationally intensive rational strategies and are 
decidedly more computationally lean and expeditious.  He explains, 
Fast and frugal heuristics that embody simple psychological mechanisms can yield 
inferences about a real-world environment that are at least as accurate as standard 
linear statistical strategies embodying classical properties of rational judgment.  This 
result liberates us from the widespread view that only “rational” algorithms, from 
Franklin‟s rule to multiple linear regression, can be accurate. (Gigerenzer, 1999 p. 95) 
It should be noted that I make no claims about the psychological plausibility of 
the particular heuristics investigated by Gigerenzer‟s team.  For present purposes, I need 
not weigh in on the question of whether these particular heuristics are employed by us.  
What is significant is the result that, contrary to our intuitions, one-reason stopping and 
decision heuristics can be as accurate as the classical rational alternatives.  And so, since 
very simple heuristics can be both expeditious and accurate, we have no reason for 
thinking that the feeling-based heuristic stopping and decision rules outlined by Bechara 
& Damasio necessarily violate the normative horn of the frame problem. 
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 One of the ways that fast and frugal heuristics gain their competitive advantage 
is by exploiting cues with high “ecological validity.”  The ecological validity of a cue, 
Gigerenzer explains, “is the relative frequency with which the cue correctly predicts the 
criterion defined with respect to the reference class.”(Gigerenzer et. al., 1999 p.84)  
Simply put, a cue has a high ecological validity if it is highly predictive of some other 
criterion.  For example, that a city is a national capital is a very good indicator that it has 
a very large population.  As such, this cue has a high ecological validity with respect to 
population size. 
 We have reason for thinking the ecological validity of feeling-markers likely to 
be high.  This follows for a number of reasons.  First, Bechara‟s findings on the IGT are 
instructive in this regard.  That normal subjects generate anticipatory SCRs before 
selecting from any deck and that higher amplitude SCRs are recorded before subjects 
select from “bad” decks, suggests that anticipatory feeling is, in fact, highly predictive of 
the objective disadvantageousness of options and outcomes on the IGT. 
 Second, the IGT results aside, the operations of emotional learning and appraisal 
undertaken by the amygdala are the result of millennia of evolutionary pressures (i.e., 
the amygdala and other limbic structure are phylogenically ancient).  This suggests that 
the kind of stimuli that feature as unlearned triggers or inducers of emotion should be 
those that are evolutionarily significant and thus relevant to survival/fitness.  
Furthermore, drawing upon Seligman‟s learning preparedness account, the particular 
learning rules undertaken in the amygdala are, we have reason to think, evolutionarily 
fixed, as well.  This suggests that the kinds of things that result in an emotional response 
(both the learned and unlearned triggers) are those that are of evolutionary significance 
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and thus relevant to survival/fitness.  One must, of course, be careful, for what had a 
high ecological validity in some past environment need not today. 
 As discussed previously, the current environment presents many of the same 
unlearned triggers as those of past environments.  These unlearned inducers still 
correlate with the same kinds of (evolutionarily significant) problems posed of our 
ancestors.  For example, both then and now, rotten food and excrement abound and 
cause illness or death.  This suggests that, with respect to the unlearned inducers, it 
should be as beneficial to mind these now as it was then.   
 Furthermore, it seems quite reasonable to suggest that, with respect to emotional 
significance, the current environment should not be radically different from that of our 
ancestors.  Then, as now, there are rewards, punishments, dangers, threats, disgusting 
things, surprises and so on.  Since the underlying nature of these do not appear to have 
radically changed, if it was beneficial to mind these then, it should also be beneficial to 
do so today.  That is to say, with respect to the conditioned/learned inducers, while the 
particular kinds of things that might come to be learned to be rewarding/punishing etc., 
might change with the environment (e.g., a cappuccino versus a quick sip at a feces-free 
watering-hole), that the environment still affords us rewards, punishments etc., has not. 
 At base, however, the validity of the cues exploited by the heuristics outlined by 
Bechara and Damasio rely upon iterative interactions with and feedback from an agent‟s 
particular environment, as the IGT results indicate.  This suggests that the ecological 
validity of feeling markers should increase over time.  Consider the IGT as an example.  
At the outset, subjects sample randomly from each of the decks.  This is so, Bechara & 
Damasio explain because the integrated fact-feeling set is highly uninformative.  In 
essence, the agent has had insufficient interactions with the environment to generate a 
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sufficiently informative on balance feeling for each deck.  And so, at the outset, no deck is 
taken to be any more desirable than any other.  Over time, however, normal subjects 
come to choose from the “good” decks.  This is explicable by their having had sufficient 
interaction with and feedback from (i.e., feedback of their emotional responses to) the 
environment to generate exploitable on balance feeling tags for each deck/option.  And 
so, over time the integrated on balance feeling that comes to be associated with each 
response option (i.e., each deck) should become a more reliably indicator of how it will 
likely feel to enact each response option.  That the on balance feeling is generated from 
individual appraisals of the outcome of particular card/deck selections, suggests that, 
over time and with repeated interaction with a stable environment, how an option 
comes to feel on balance should come to be highly predictive of whether it is likely to be 
on balance rewarding or punishing.  That all normal subjects come to generate unique 
and substantial SCRs before choosing from the bad decks, suggests that the on balance 
feeling that comes to be associated with these decks is highly indicative of an objectively 
punishing outcome.  That feeling cues come to, over time, correctly predict the likely 
outcome of selecting from each deck (with respect to reward and punishment) provides 
good reason for our thinking feeling to, over time, come to be a cue with a sufficiently 
high ecological validity.   
 It is, then, at least reasonable to suggest that the ecological validity of feeling 
markers should increase over time with interaction with non-random environments, like 
the IGT.  Our environment, we have reason to think, is a sufficiently stable one.  It is also 
quite reasonable to think that each normal human has been, since infancy, generating 
and fine-tuning the on balance feeling component of myriad integrated fact-feeling sets.  
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If so, then it is quite reasonable to think that feeling should be, in normal adults, a cue 
with a sufficiently high (and ever increasing) validity.   
Clearly, there are limits to the usefulness of this particular cue and thus limits to 
the heuristic itself.  For example, in cases in which there is no fact-feeling history upon 
which to rely (i.e., in truly novel “factual” situations that are not analogous to anything 
that we have previously experienced), feeling would be quite uninformative.  However, 
it is also quite reasonable to think this might be quickly remedied. Any completely outré 
situation would, precisely because it is so novel, preferentially command attention and 
thus cognitive resources in the manner outlined.     
Likewise, to the extent that the current environment does differ from that of our 
evolutionary past, one would expect characteristic breakdowns of the emotion-based 
heuristics to result.  That is, in much the same manner in which Kahneman and 
Tversky‟s (1972) findings point to the existence of particular (evolutionary based) 
cognitive biases, it would not be unreasonable to suggest the same with respect to the 
emotions.  However, while an interesting and highly plausible conjecture (that the 
current environment should result in some characteristic breakdowns of the emotion-
based heuristics proposed), there are no studies (analogous to those undertaken by 
Kahneman & Tversky) directly considering this question.  Discerning those modern-day 
situations in which the emotion-based heuristic rules outlined are less beneficial, or even 
detrimental, would be, of course, of great interest.  So doing would also go some 
distance in helping us to better understand the extent and limits of the normative 





ASSEMBLING A MODEL: GLOBAL WORKSPACE THEORY AND SOMATIC MARKERS 
 Damasio and Bechara‟s account readily lends itself to incorporation into the 
existing Global Workspace model of cognition discussed in Chapter 3.  Sketching this 
will, I think, help to clarify our subsequent discussion of how emotion might help us to 
understand how it is that we contend with some instances of the frame problem that 
arise in practical reason and decision-making.  
By integrating the two accounts, a picture emerges of how emotion might 
interact with and facilitate practical reason and decision-making in ways relevant to 
contending with some of the frame problems that emerge in these domains.  And so, in 
addition to the set of modularly realized consumer systems proposed by Baars‟ account, 
each of which undertakes local computational transformations on representations in the 
global workspace and release these back into the workspace whereby other systems can 
(if, drawing upon Barrett‟s metaphor, they accept representations of that “shape”) 
engage in further processing, there are the three additional sub-systems outlined by 
Damasio and Bechara‟s model.   
And so, given the role occupied by emotion in motivational and attentional 
direction, emotion might initially guide or act as a rudder on cognition by, in effect, 
releasing into the workspace representations of some problematic scene.  So doing might 
effectively drive out or put on temporary hold whatever was in the workspace and thus 
whatever it was that we were thinking about including whatever immediate ends we 
might have been pursuing.  By means of processes undertaken by manifold perceptual 
consumer sub-systems, objects or situational features might come to be recognized.  
Images of the refined scene would, in turn, be relayed back for another round of 
appraisal in the manner suggested by LeDoux‟s account.  This refined image will, in 
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turn, either serve as an inducer or not.  If so, the refined image will be attended/relayed 
to the global workspace and tagged with the feeling induced.  So doing would 
effectively mark the desirability or problematicity of the image of that scene.  Via, the 
motivational influences outlined by Damasio, this highlighting mechanism would serve 
to help direct the ends and thus the lines of inquiry pursued.  This, in turn, would 
(re)direct attentional resources on the problem posed thus maintaining it in the working 
memory of the global workspace.  Once the problematicity of the situation is fixed and 
motivational and attentional resources directed upon it (thus maintaining the problem 
in the workspace), manifold cognitive processes (i.e., other consumer sub-systems) 
would, once again, be enlisted in the manner proposed by Baars and Carruthers.   
If we assume that the situation, in fact, is an undesirable one (i.e., it poses a 
problem for the system), manifold processes engaged in planning such as those set out 
by Carruthers (2006), Milner & Goodale (2006) and Kosslyn & Koenig (1996) would be 
enlisted.  During deliberation about what one is to do, representations of the response 
options are, once retrieved or generated (as Damasio 1994 and Forgas 2000 suggest), 
made available to the global workspace.77  Via the modularly realized operations of 
sensory-specific cortical regions, outlined by Milner & Goodale (2006) and Kosslyn & 
Koenig (1996) and elaborated by Carruthers (2006), quasi-perceptual images of the 
content of these representations are constructed and internally rehearsed.  While we 
need not go into the details of the workings of this mechanism here, the idea is that the 
content of propositionally formulated “thoughts” come to be, via the interface between 
                                                     
77 Incorporating Baars, Milner & Goodale (2006) and/or Carruthers‟ (2006) proposal with respect 
to how a modular system might go about generating plans and response options, would allow 
for the workings of this stage of the deliberative process to be more fully developed.  Providing a 
detailed account of Carruthers‟ proposal and incorporating this into the model as well will, for 
the sake of brevity, not be undertaken here.   
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cortical regions (implicated in planning and executive function) and early sensory areas, 
“translated” into auditory/visual/olfactory etc. images – (i.e., multiple sense modality 
“pictures.”)  That is, the same modularly realized operations that are engaged in 
perceptual processing are exploited, Milner & Goodale and Kosslyn & Koenig argue, in 
effect, in reverse to reconstruct quasi-perceptual images of the content of entertained 
“thoughts.” The amygdala, we know, receives input from the thalamus and sensory 
specific cortical areas (e.g., visual, auditory, olfactory areas).  And so, via reconstruction 
in sensory specific cortical regions and the interface with these to the amygdala (i.e., via 
LeDoux‟s “high road” pathway) suppositionally entertained response options (i.e., 
“thoughts”) come to be emotionally appraised.  If the quasi-perceptual image (of the 
content of the representation entertained) serves as an inducer or trigger (of a primary 
emotion) then an emotional response will be induced and area SM1 will get busy 
generating a feeling-map of the physiological alterations that unfold.  This feeling is then 
juxtaposed with the image (of the content of the representation entertained) and the 
“scene” comes to be somatically marked.  So doing transitively fixes the desirability of 
the response option or resulting “scene” which in turn, given the innate set of 
dispositions/taxes for particular states of affairs, automatically motivates the pursuit or 
avoidance of that particular option, end, or line of inquiry.  And so, by means of these 
operations, internally rehearsed suppositionally entertained plans for contending with 
the current posed problem are appraised with respect to the feeling likely to result.   
There are a number of possibilities for how the heuristic stopping and decision 
rules proposed by the somatic marker account might be incorporated into the global 
workspace framework.  Drawing upon Barrett‟s enzyme metaphor, one possibility is 
that somatic/feeling “tagging” might affix (metaphorical) tags to representations.  
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Negative feeling markers might be of such a metaphorical “shape” that they make the 
representation to which they are affixed no longer process-able by other consumer 
subsystems – in effect resulting in these being ignored.  Similarly, a positive tag would 
do quite the opposite, allowing particular consumer subsystems to continue processing 
the representation and do so with the additional information provided by the tag.   Or, 
more in keeping with Damasio‟s line, the heuristic culling and highlighting operation 
might be undertaken by some subsystem that actively scans the workspace looking for 
negatively marked representations, removing from the set any that it finds.  So doing 
would leave only those sufficiently positively marked options remaining, highlighting 
them in this way.  Likewise, via both the feeling marking apparatus and the feeling 
preference hierarchy, the desirability of options would be “by dint of juxtaposition” 
transitively fixed, as well.  We are, via the taxic dispositions outlined by Rolls and 
Damasio‟s account, motivated to pursue those positively highlighted options the 
objects/outcomes of which are preferably marked (i.e., those outcome states of affairs 
that are desirable), while avoiding those the outcomes of which are negatively marked 
(i.e., those states of affairs that are undesirable).  Alternatively, and more in keeping with 
LeDoux‟s model of emotional appraisal and Milner & Goodale‟s model of action-plan 
construction, we might suppose that the output of those sub-systems engaged in 
response option generation might incorporate a cycle of emotional appraisal into their 
operations.  And so, each response option or plan generated would be, before it is 
released to the global workspace for further processing, emotionally appraised.  Those 
that are or come to be negatively tagged would not be released. 
While a number of possibilities can be offered, it is ultimately an empirical 
matter as to how these particular heuristics are implemented.  Similarly, the precise 
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nature of these heuristics is also unclear.  And so, for example, with respect to the 
stopping/culling operation, it may be that all options tagged with feelings below some 
threshold are culled.  It may be that only the “worst” (i.e., the least preferably marked 
with respect to the feeling hierarchy – or most undesirable) options are culled.  Likewise, 
with respect to the heuristic decision-rule proposed by Damasio, it may be that the 
“best” option (as given by the feeling preference hierarchy – the most desirable) is 
chosen.  It might be that the first positively marked option is selected or that the first 
positively marked option above some threshold is selected (some form of feeling 
satisficing).  This too is an empirical matter.  Damasio and Bechara make no conjecture 
and the IGT findings are not instructive in this regard.    And so, while we have good 
reason to think the operations outlined by Damasio to be readily incorporable into the 
existing global workspace framework, a complete model cannot, given the available 
evidence, be precisely specified. Discerning the particular stopping/decision rules 
employed would allow a more complete model to be set out.  Seemingly, some progress 
might be made on this question by testing subjects on a variant of the IGT in which all 
options are “good” but some are better than others. 
SOME EARLY RESULTS FROM ROBOTICS 
 Additional support for the claim that emotion, via the mechanisms outlined by 
LeDoux, Damasio & Bechara and Rolls, may help us to contend with some of the frame 
problems that arise in practical reason and decision-making can be found in some very 
recent work in the field of robotics (Canamero, 2003; Picard, 1997, 2002; Slomin 2001; 
Petta, 2003).  Germane to this, Shanahan (2006) constructed a robotic system that 
incorporated rudimentary emotional processes, specifically a scaled-down version of the 
body-loop appraisal device, into the framework of Baars‟ global workspace model.   
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 Shanahan‟s robot possessed an amygdala-analogue (based upon a network 
model of amygdala function proposed by Canamero) that, following a set of 
learning/training trails, set about appraising the “emotional” significance of objects in 
its environment (a simple box-world type environment).  This amygdala-analogue was 
incorporated into the global workspace architecture along the lines set out by LeDoux 
and Bechara and Damasio.  First, visual representations of the environment are relayed 
to the amygdala-analogue and its appraisals are exploited to highlight particular 
features.  In so doing and, via the framework outlined by global workspace architecture, 
a set of processes aimed at generating an initial (rather reflexive) response option are 
enlisted. In keeping with Damasio‟s model, instead of merely reactively undertaking this 
action, the system holds this action-plan “on veto” until a body-loop appraisal-analogue 
is undertaken.  And so, instead of merely reacting to its environment, initial responses or 
action-plans are stayed until the proposed action is “internally rehearsed” and an 
appraisal of this plan - considered suppositionally - is undertaken.  During deliberation 
about what it is to do, the robot exploits anticipated emotion to guide response selection 
in the manner outlined by the somatic marker model.  And so, before acting, Shanahan‟s 
robot considers what it will likely be like “emotionally” to have undertaken the plan 
under consideration.  And like Damasio‟s model, those plans the suppositional outcome 
of which come to be (via body-loop appraisal by the amygdala-analogue) negatively 
marked are, as undesirable, rejected from further consideration (i.e., the motivational 
veto is maintained) while those positively marked are highlighted. 
Clearly, the robot‟s cognitive/emotional architecture is quite simplified with 
respect to both Baars framework and Bechara and Damasio‟s model.  And so, for 
example, the integrative role of the VMF is either entirely absent or subsumed by the 
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amygdala itself – a departure from Damasio‟s proposal in either case.  Likewise, neither 
feeling nor somatic feedback play a role.  Furthermore, while LeDoux‟s apparatus of 
conditioned learning in incorporated into the amygdala-analogue, none of the learning 
mechanisms proposed by Damasio‟s model are included, thus preventing emotion-
induced feeling and thus feeling-markers from being integrated and updated on-the-fly 
following interactions with environment.  The robot‟s test environment is quite simple, 
as well – far simpler than any “real-world” situation.   It is, however, worth noting that 
this environment is no simpler than the blocks-world environments that gave rise 
initially to the frame problem.  These caveats noted, that this robot can expeditiously 
and successfully seek out “good” objects while avoiding the “bad” is a quite promising 
result.  Specifically, by incorporating the machinery of emotional appraisal and a body-
loop analogue device that appraises suppositionally considered plans and exploits 
emotions in an anticipatory fashion to guide response selection as Damasio and 
Bechara‟s model suggests, the robot is capable of successfully contending with its 
environment without effecting an exhaustive search of the problem space.  And so, 
while fully acknowledging the toy status of this result, that a robotic system 
incorporating emotion (i.e., a scaled-down version of Damasio & Bechara‟s proposal) 
into its decision-making or response-selection machinery can effectively and 
expeditiously decide what to do seems a promising early result. 
SOME OPEN QUESTIONS 
 Having outlined a number of ways that emotion might help us contend with 
some of the frame problems that arise in practical reason I will turn now to consider a 
few open questions.  Specifically, I have not explicitly considered how emotion might 
help us contend with the search and inference instances of the problem (i.e., finding the 
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“right stuff” in memory and making the right inferences without having to 
search/consider the totality of memory/the problem space).   
 Earlier, in considering a possible objection to the somatic marker account, I 
argued that emotion facilitates the encoding of factual (declarative/episodic) material to 
memory.  This faciliatory effect of emotion on encoding is well documented and we 
have a plausible neurological mechanism (Cahill & McGaugh‟s epinephrine hypothesis) by 
which such influences are realized.  And so, that the influence of emotion on encoding 
should be explicable in terms of the operations of a rather simple heuristic encoding rule 
– preferentially remember those events that are attended by an emotional response – 
seems to be a plausible conjecture. 
If so, emotion might help us in contending with the memory-encoding instance 
of the frame problem.78  Any finite system capable of remembering at all is faced, given 
that it cannot remember everything, with the puzzle of determining what it will 
remember.  Arriving at a rational conclusion about this is, for the reasons outlined in 
Chapter 3, untenable.  And so, I argued it is plausible to suggests that some heuristic or 
set of heuristics should be relied upon to direct the kinds of material preferentially 
encoded to memory.  Emotional significance does appear to be one such heuristic.   
Compared to the rational alternative for contending with the encoding problem, 
whereby the system must arrive at a rational conclusion about which things it should 
remember, which requires that a suitable standard for “remember-worthiness” be 
rationally discerned, the simple emotion-based heuristic rule should be far more 
expeditious.  And so, with respect to the tractability horn of the dilemma posed by the 
                                                     




frame problem, a system relying on such a simple heuristic should fare much better than 
a rational one. 
 Prima facie it is reasonable to suggest that preferentially remembering where, 
when and in what circumstances (i.e., the episode or event) in one‟s past one has 
encountered particular dangers, threats, rewards, punishments, surprises and the like 
should afford some benefit to practical reason and decision-making.  That is, relying 
upon this encoding heuristic whereby the details of an emotionally significant event are 
preferentially remembered, should be beneficial to, at the very least, the ends of 
survival/fitness.  Preferentially remembering where, when and details of the scene in 
which one was mugged seems to be, at least prima facie, a good strategy – if for no other 
reason than to help us to avoid going down that dark alley again in the future.   
However, we also have reason to think that relying upon this heuristic in at least 
some cases might be disadvantageous.  Simply put, there appear to be some 
events/episodes that are preferentially remembered because they are emotionally 
significant and which are either (i) irrelevant or (ii) we would be better off not 
remembering.  For example, with respect to the former, “flashbulb memories” or the 
“JFK effect” (or the Space Shuttle Challenger or 9/11 effects for those of younger 
generations) is well documented. (Schacter, 1996; 2001)   Nearly every American alive at 
the time remembers precise details about the moment in which they learned that 
Kennedy had been assassinated.  It is, however, unclear how preferentially 
remembering this should be relevant to practical reason or decision-making generally.  
Likewise, studies of posttraumatic stress disorder provide suitable examples of instances 
in which relying upon this encoding heuristic might be detrimental.  Given the current 
conjecture that PTSD patient‟s troubles are the result of their incessant rehearsal of the 
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memory of a particularly emotionally significant event, there appear to be cases in 
which the facilitatory effect of emotion on memory is detrimental.  PTSD patients, it is 
not unreasonable to suggest, would fare better were they capable of forgetting (i.e., or at 
least not preferentially remembering in the first place) the details of the particular 
traumatic/emotionally significant event.       
Intuitively, it seems quite likely that relying on this encoding heuristic should be, 
at least on balance, more beneficial than detrimental.  At least prima facie it appears 
likely that relying on the emotion-based encoding heuristic outlined should be more 
beneficial than relying upon a strategy that randomly (i.e., at chance) preferentially 
encodes material to memory.  That an heuristic succeeds (i.e., is accurate or otherwise 
normatively “good”) at a rate only slightly better than chance is sufficient to secure the 
modest point that that heuristic should help in contending with the frame problem – 
assuming, of course, that it is also expeditious.  However, while relying upon this simple 
encoding heuristic is likely to be, on balance, more beneficial than not, given the lack of 
available empirical evidence in support of this (modest) normative conjecture, no claim 
is warranted. 
And so, while emotion directly influences the kind of episodic/declarative 
material encoded preferentially to memory, which in turn suggests that emotion might 
be brought to bear to explain how the process of selective memory encoding might be 
expedited, there is no empirical evidence directly bearing on the normative question.  
Relying on the heuristic outlined might be, with respect to accuracy, on balance 
beneficial, detrimental or a normative wash (on balance neither helpful nor harmful). 
Damasio and Bechara‟s discussion of the nature of fact-feeling sets lends itself 
naturally to the idea that just as feelings can be recovered by attending to particular 
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facts, so too might facts be preferentially retrieved by attending to feeling.  This, when 
taken in conjunction with the ample empirical evidence that emotion directly influences 
the kinds of material retrieved from memory79 suggests that emotion might be 
heuristically exploited to expedite search, perhaps by preferentially enlisting particular 
search heuristics aimed at bringing emotionally congruent material to bear.80  Given the 
evidence, it is quite reasonable to think that a subject‟s emotion state is heuristically 
exploited to direct search of memory.  It is also quite reasonable to think that such an 
heuristic look-up device would be far more expeditious than one relying upon the 
exhaustive consideration of the contents of memory.  However, that this heuristic should 
afford a benefit to practical reason and decision-making is unclear.  That is, it seems 
quite plausible to suggest that bringing to bear (recalling from memory) those situations 
in which one contended (successful or unsuccessfully) with a similar problem kind (i.e., 
an emotionally analogous situation) during deliberation should expedite and afford a 
normative benefit to practical reason.  However, it also seems quite likely that the set of 
material preferentially brought to bear by this heuristic alone might be overly broad.  
That is, that at least some of the material that is brought to bear should be relevant to 
some current problem seems probable, but that some (if not much more) irrelevant 
                                                     
79 Bower, Gilligan & Monteiro 1981; Bower, 1981; Gilligan 1982; Teasdale & Fogarty 1979; Ingram, 
1984; Teasdale, 1983; Teasdale & Clark, 1982; Teasdale & Russel, 1983; Bower & Mayer, 1985, 
Blaney, 1986; Eich, 1995; Eich & Macaulay, 1989; Fiedler, 1990; Forgas, 1991; Forgas 1993; Forgas 
1995; Forgas & Bower, 1987; Eich & Macaulay, 2000; Eich, Macaulay & Ryan, 1994; Eich & Metcalf 
1989; Niedenthal & Stetterlund, 1994 
80 The affective state dependency effect, holds that emotional states function as context cues 
facilitating or inhibiting recall accuracy in much the same manner as situational or environmental 
cues have long been known to do. Simply put, subjects in whom a particular emotional state 
(“happy,” for example) has been induced will preferentially retrieve from memory (recall) 
emotionally congruent memories (“happy” ones).  Furthermore, while the subject‟s current 
emotional state facilitate the retrieval of emotionally like material from memory, it is also found 
to interfere with or inhibit the retrieval of emotional incongruent material.  And so, not only will 
a “happy” subject preferentially retrieve “happy” memories (and do so faster), they will have 
difficulty in recalling, for example, “sad” memories. 
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material should be brought to bear seems likely as well.  And so, while we have reason 
to think both (i) that emotion is likely heuristically exploited to help direct memory 
search (and thus to help limit in part the material brought to bear) during deliberation, 
and (ii) that such an heuristic should be far more expeditious than the rational 
alternative, it is less clear that relying upon it should afford a normative benefit to 
practical reason. 
And so, that, via its influences on memory search, emotion should play some 
further heuristic role in practical reasoning seems likely.  However, there is insufficient 
evidence to support the claim, at this time, that such an heuristic would adequately 
satisfy the normative horn of the puzzle.  So doing would require a much deeper 
understanding of the structure, workings and organization of human memory as well as 
an account of how these operations interact with those of practical reason. In addition, 
much more would need to be learned about the nature and specificity of the particular 
search heuristic proposed.  These are decidedly busy areas of ongoing research.  
Likewise, with respect to the inference problem it is reasonable to think that 
emotion should be exploited to preferentially enlist particular processing strategies.  
That VMF damage and amygdala damage results in impairment of practical reason (i.e., 
both groups are impaired in this regard) supports this conjecture. That emotion 
influences the kinds of processing strategies and “cognitive styles” employed is also well 
established.81  It is not unreasonable to think that, with respect to the tractability horn of 
                                                     
81 Schwarz & Clore, 1983 & 1988; Isen, Johnson, Mertz & Robinson 1985; Isen 1987 & 1993; Isen & 
Daubman, 1984; Isen, Niedenthal & Cantor, 1992; Isen & Kahn, 1993; Isen, Daubman & Nowicki, 
1987; Murray, Sujan, Hart & Sujan 1990; Arkes, Herren & Isen, 1988; Dunn & Wilson, 1990; Isen & 
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Schwarz, Bless & Bohner 1991; Carnevale & Isen 1986; Nygren, Isen, Taylor & Dulin 1996; 




the puzzle, relying on an emotion-based heuristic should be more expeditious than the 
rational alternative of exhaustive inference generation and consideration.  However, that 
such an heuristic would satisfy the normative horn is, at this time, unclear.  And so, 
while emotion does appear to automatically influence cognitive “style” and the kind of 
processing strategies preferentially employed (Isen, 1993; Forgas, 2001) which in turn 
suggests that emotion might be brought to bear to explain how such processes might be 
expedited, there is no direct evidence bearing on the normative question.  
That the linkages between particular emotions and particular learned and 
unlearned inferential strategies should be amenable to evolutionary explanation seems 
quite likely, as Panksepp (1995; 1998) and Cosmides & Tooby (1990) argue.  Establishing 
the normative component however would, drawing upon Gigerenzer‟s discussion, 
require our having reason for thinking emotion (or emotion induced feeling) to be a 
suitably ecological valid cue with respect to the selection of inferential strategies. Since 
there is no direct evidence bearing on this particular question, beyond providing some 
reason why it is likely that emotion should be relevant to this instance of the puzzle, to 
not overstep the available evidence, I will refrain from making any specific claim.  With 
respect to this, we must then wait for studies to be undertaken that examine both the 
nature of the particular cognitive strategies employed and the question of whether the 
particular cognitive/inferential strategies (“styles”) preferentially enlisted when agents 
are, for example, “afraid,” help agents in better contending with the particular 
threatening situation or problem posed. 
With respect to the planning problem, two points bear mention.  We have little 
reason to think emotion to play a direct role, other than perhaps in motivation and end-
selection, in the construction of short-term plans. (e.g., it is unlikely that in generating a 
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simple plan to pick up a glass of water, for instance, that emotion should feature 
heavily). That damage to the amygdala and area VMF leaves this capacity intact 
establishes this.  That the anecdotal evidence suggests that such patients are capable of 
generating and acting upon short-term plans (i.e., “myopic”) plans is clear, as well. 
However, we do have reason to think that emotion might play a role in motivation and 
meta-planning (problem setting, sequencing and ends selection).  If so, it is plausible to 
suggest that emotion might help to frame what we think about (what problems we 
consider and thus what plans we go about generating) and how we think about it.  As 
such, emotion might be relevant to the processes whereby complex plans come to be 
generated.  Insofar as the construction of a complex plan requires the setting of 
intermediate goals or sub-goals (i.e., the setting of sub-problems along the way), 
suggests, given its role in meta-planning, that emotion might play some role here as 
well.  That is, if the construction of complex non-trivial (i.e., multi-stage) plans, requires 
one to engage in a kind of meta-planning (i.e., to arrive at conclusions about which sub-
problems are relevant and thus which sub-goals to pursue), then emotion might 
plausibly be brought to bear on this question.  Furthermore, it would not be 
unreasonable to think that the influences of emotion on attention and motivation should 
play some role in the processes of complex plan generation, as well.  That is, by directing 
attentional resources inwardly upon those features of a suppositionally entertained 
quasi-perceptual images “scenes” under consideration (in the manner outlined by 
Kosslyn & Koenig 1996, perhaps) that are emotionally (and thus motivationally) 
significant, emotion might be relied upon to help us locate some of the potential 
“problems” that a sub-plan might generate.  Via motivational influences and the culling 
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and highlighting operation discussed, then, such sub-plans might come to be pruned or 
modified in light of this information (i.e., their desirability).   
That cycles of emotional appraisal should be undertaken during the operations 
of complex plan construction (e.g., to automatically cull particular sub-plans from 
further consideration) seems plausible, given the mechanics of both Damasio and 
Bechara‟s model and those outlined by Milner & Goodale. Forgas (1993, 2001), in 
outlining his affect infusion model, makes a similar conjecture.  Unfortunately, aside from 
providing reason for thinking the influences of emotion to increase as the novelty and 
complexity of the problem posed increases (i.e., affect highly “infuses” complex problem 
solving while only minimally influencing the operations by which we contend with 
trivial/common problem kinds), Forgas provides little discussion as to how this is 
realized and undertaken.   
However, even if emotion does feature in this way in the operations of non-
trivial planning, it is still entirely unclear that this should be a sufficiently normative 
“good” strategy.   That we have reason to think that the ecological validity of feeling 
cues should increase over time with interactions with a stable environments suggests 
that if emotion plays a role in the generation of complex plans in the manner outlined, 
then it is likely to - over time - come to be beneficial strategy.  That is, if it plays this role, 
then relying on emotion should come to be a normatively good strategy with respect to 
the culling and highlighting of sub-goals and sub-plans.  While a highly plausible 
conjecture, there is currently no empirical evidence bearing on the question.  That at 
least some of the behavioral deficits exhibited by patients with damage to area VMF or 
the amygdala might be attributable to an inability to engage in complex or multi-stage 
planning (e.g., intermediate problem fixing and sub-goal selection) seems plausible.  
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Specifically, that patients are prone to both impulsivity and perseverativeness during 
real-world planning and problem-solving, suggests that they may be impaired in 
recognizing sub-problems and/or in fixing sub-goals during a complex planning task.   
That the emotional tagging heuristic is of normative value, given earlier discussion, 
seems quite plausible.  Likewise, that this heuristic should be of value in complex 
planning seems a quite plausible suggestion.  However, for a number of reasons 
discussed earlier, while we have reason for thinking it a likely a normatively “good” 
strategy, there is no direct empirical evidence bearing on this specific question (i.e., the 
question of how normatively “good” the influences of emotion on the operations of 
planning and plan construction might be).  And so, as an empirical matter, we must wait 
on the evidence before the issue can be fully resolved. 
I have also purposefully focused on instances of the frame problem that arise in 
practical reason, leaving theoretical inference and belief-formation largely unconsidered.  
There is, however, reason for thinking that emotion might be relevant to at least one 
instance of the frame problem that arises in this domain.   
Drawing upon discussion by DeSousa, Dennett (1981) argues that our doxastic 
processes are involved in two distinct kinds of activities.  We are, claims Dennett, when 
we talk of the activity of belief-fixing really speaking of two mistakenly conflated kinds 
of mental activities.  Sometimes we are referring to the activity of belief-fixing (proper) 
and sometimes we are referring to the activity of opinion fixing.  Concerning the 
distinction, Dennett explains, “animals have beliefs about this and that, but they don‟t 
have opinions.  They don‟t have opinions because they don‟t assent.  Making up your 
mind is coming to have an opinion.” (Dennett, 1981 p. 304)  Two further points are 
raised by Dennett in differentiating these activities.  First, unlike in the case of belief-
236 
 
fixing, coming to have an opinion about something is best understood in terms of a 
“commitment to” or a “‟wager on” the likely truth of some entertained sentence.  
Second, unlike in the case of belief-fixation, all instances of opinion-fixing are, 
Species of judgment, and while such judgments arise from beliefs and are ultimately to 
be explained by one‟s beliefs, such judgments themselves are not beliefs … but acts, and 
these acts initiate states that are also not states of belief, but something rather like 
commitment.  [T]his decision [to assent] is first of all an act, an exemplary case of doing 
something … what is important is just that it is a choice point that terminates a process 
of deliberation or consideration that is not algorithmic, but at best heuristic.  At some 
point we just stop deliberating … and leap. (Dennett, 1981 p. 303) 
 
    If, as Dennett suggests, opinion fixing is an act – a something that we do, then the 
activity of assent should be considered a practical matter.  Since we have reason for 
thinking emotion to help us contend with some of the frame problem instances arising 
in practical reason and practical decision-making, if assenting is an act (that is, if part of 
our doxastic processes are practical) then it would not be unreasonable to think that 
emotion might help us to understand how we contend with at least some of the 
problems that arise in that domain as well.  That relying on an emotion-based heuristic 
to help us contend with the decision-problem of assent in theoretical reason would be 
expeditious is apparent.  That emotion influences judgment is, as noted earlier, well 
established in the literature.  That relying on such an heuristic is sufficiently normatively 
“good” is, however, unclear.  And so, while it is quite reasonable to think that emotion 
should play a considerable role in the operations of belief-fixation, given the lack of 
evidence (with regard to the normative horn or aspect of the puzzle), no conclusion is 
warranted. 
CONCLUSION   
 I have set out in this chapter to see how far the consideration of emotion might 
take us in helping us to understand how we might contend with some of the frame 
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problems that arise in practical reason and decision-making.  I have not, of course, 
claimed that emotion alone solves outright the frame the problem.  Rather, I have 
suggested that we have reason to think that some light might be shed on the question of 
how we contend with some instances of the frame problem arising in practical reason 
and decision-making by bringing emotion to bear.  And so, the aim of this chapter has 
been a modest one – to provide reason for thinking that some progress, with respect to 
aims of both understanding and eventually modeling the operations of practical reason 
and decision-making, might be made by bringing emotion to bear on the issue. 
To this end, I suggested that emotion might help us quite directly in contending 
with the attentional direction instance of the problem.  Given that any finite system‟s 
attentional resources must be limited, it is reasonable to think that this instance of the 
problem should be contended with heuristically.  Emotional significance appears to be 
one such heuristic, likely operating in tandem or competition with a number of others.  
Specifically, drawing upon Damasio‟s account, we have reason to think that the 
emotional tagging or marking operation directly influences motivation, which in turn 
helps to focus attention upon emotionally (and hence motivationally) significant 
material, by increasing/decreasing (from neutral) the desirability of (images of) 
particular states of affairs.  In addition to the account provided by Damasio, we also 
have reason for thinking that agents‟ current emotional states directly influence the 
kinds of material that are preferentially attended.  Since the operations of emotional 
appraisal are automated, autonomous and plausibly modularly realized, any system 
that exploits the information provided by emotional appraisal to direct attention should 
be far more expeditious than a rational (in Fodor‟s sense) one.  We also have reason for 
thinking that relying upon this attentional direction heuristic (i.e., attend preferentially 
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to that material that is emotionally and hence motivationally significant) should be a 
sufficiently normatively “good” strategy to satisfy the second horn of the dilemma 
posed by the frame problem. 
By directly influencing motivation and attention, we also have reason for 
thinking that emotion might fruitfully be brought to bear on the problem-sequencing 
instance of the puzzle.  Specifically, I argued that by directing attention upon 
emotionally significant material and by ratcheting up (from neutral) the desirability of 
particular images (of states of affairs and options), cognitive resources would come to be 
preferentially enlisted and brought to bear.  So doing, it is reasonable to suggest, would 
result not only in a shift in motivation (i.e., the ends pursued) and attention but also a 
redirection of cognitive resources – that is, we would come to preferentially think about 
the emotionally (and motivationally) pressing problem posed.  This in turn, instantiates 
a simple problem-sequencing heuristic: contend with emotionally significant situations 
first.  Taken in conjunction with the feeling preference hierarchy/ taxic dispositions 
outlined by Damasio and Rolls respectively, the automated operations of emotional 
appraisal might help in fixing the order in which problems are to be contended.  That is, 
it would appear that automated emotional appraisals are exploited to direct attention, 
motivation and cognitive resources upon the most emotionally (and thus 
motivationally) “pressing” problems first (i.e., the most un/desirable state of affairs), 
then the next and so on.  Such a sequencing heuristic, since it relies upon only one cue – 
the transitive marking of the desirability of states of affairs by feeling-image 
juxtaposition – should be far less computationally burdensome and thus more far more 
expeditious that the rational (in Fodor‟s sense) alternative.  With respect to the second 
horn of the puzzle, we have reason for thinking that relying upon this heuristic to be 
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sufficiently normatively good, as well.  Likewise, relying on this heuristic should be a far 
normatively better strategy than the rational alternative that would fail to arrive at any 
conclusion at all about how its problems should be sequenced. 
 Moreover, emotion appears to help in contending with the meta-planning 
instances of the frame problem.  Specifically, in addition to the assistance offered in this 
regard by influencing attentional direction and focus, somatic markers also appear to 
play a direct role in warning us that our current line of inquiry or planning is 
undesirable (e.g., fruitless or indulgent).  By means of the influences of this automated 
warning system motivational goals are shifted thus drawing attention away from the 
particular planning task or line of inquiry with which we are currently engaged, 
redirecting them upon the broader problem of whether we should be engaged in 
contending with this particular problem at all and, if so, in this way.  Furthermore, once 
this (meta-planning) end is set, this problem attended, and cognitive resources are 
directed upon it, plans for contending with that problem might come to be generated.  
Whatever options are generated (via the mechanisms proposed by Baars) would then be 
subject to additional rounds of emotional appraisal in the manner outlined by the 
somatic marker hypothesis.  Since emotion-induced feeling is exploited as a 
noncompensatory (i.e., singular) cue to both guide the ends, goals and lines of inquiry 
pursued and to (re)direct attentional and cognitive resources in the manner outlined, 
relying on this rather simple heuristic for contending with the meta-planning instance of 
the puzzle should be far less computationally intensive and thus far more expeditious 
than the rational alternative.  It should be, for the reasons discussed, sufficiently 
normatively “good” to satisfy the second horn of the dilemma, as well.  Again, relying 
on such an heuristic should be, at the very least, a normatively better strategy than the 
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rational one since no rational system could be relied upon to arrive at any conclusion at 
all with respect to the ends that it should pursue. 
 Similarly, I suggested that emotion might serve a role as a problem-setting 
heuristic that, in effect, helps alert us to the fact that some situation (real or imagined) is, 
as emotionally and thus motivationally significant (i.e., un/preferably tagged and thus 
un/desirable), one with which we should contend.  And so, the automated emotional 
appraisal device and its influences on motivation, attentional and cognitive direction 
might provide one means by which to explain how we might contend with the end/goal 
setting instance of the problem. 
 Consideration of emotion, I argued, might help us to understand how we might 
contend with the Hamlet‟s problem instance of the puzzle by serving an automated and 
heuristic “stopping rule” function in deliberation.  As a noncompensatory strategy, this 
stopping rule should be far more expeditious than the rational alternative.  We also have 
reason to think it a strategy that adequately satisfies that normative horn of the puzzle.  
Along similar lines, I suggested that emotion might helps us to contend with the 
decision-problem instance of the frame problem by serving as an automated and 
heuristic decision-rule.  Compared to the rational alternative, the noncompensatory (i.e., 
single cue) strategy outlined here should be far less computationally burdensome and 
far more expeditious.  Likewise, with respect to the normative aspect of the puzzle, we 
have reason to think this to be sufficiently normatively “good.” 
 Finally, I considered a set of open questions, conjecturing that while 
consideration of emotion should, for a number of reasons, hold promise for our coming 
to understand how we might contend with these instances of problem, with respect to 
241 
 
the normative issue, the current empirical evidence is insufficient to warrant any specific 
claim. 

























 I began, in Chapter 1, by considering the frame problem.  Having first set out the 
original and formal version of the puzzle that arose in artificial intelligence, I next 
provided an overview of some of the philosophical interpretations of the problem.  
Following this, I set out the underlying structure of the puzzle, focusing on explaining 
and clarifying the nature of the dual horns of the dilemma that all instances of the 
problem pose.  From this discussion, I concluded that “the” frame problem is not 
reducible to any one particular problem, but instead is a constellation of related problem 
instances.   
 Having set out the puzzle‟s underlying structure and a number of instances of it 
(e.g., attentional direction, memory encoding/search, inference, ends-selection, meta-
planning, problem-sequencing and Hamlet‟s problem), I turned in Chapter 2 to consider 
in greater detail Fodor‟s version of the problem and its application to computational 
psychology.  In presenting Fodor‟s arguments for the pessimistic conclusion, I mark and 
set about disentangling a number of distinct argument strains. 
 Following this exegesis and clarification, I focused in Chapter 3 on evaluating 
Fodor‟s argument in support of the pessimistic conclusion.  Specifically, I argued that 
Fodor‟s arguments rely upon an unsatisfiable and untenable normative principle of 
rationality.  Having set out this principle and argued that no finite and physically 
realized system could satisfy it, I turn next to consider Fodor‟s descriptive claim.  
Specifically, Fodor contends that because we at least sometimes arrive at conclusion 
rationally – that is, that we at least sometimes satisfy the normative rationality condition 
that he sets out – we are (at least sometimes) instantiations of a rational system.  Since, 
he continues, rational systems cannot be modeled, it follows straightaway that our 
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minds cannot be modeled either.  I argue, however, that we have no reason for thinking 
that we ever arrive at conclusions rationally (in Fodor‟s sense) and hence that it is false 
that we are (ever) instantiations of a rational system.  Since it is this descriptive claim 
that directly undergirds and motivates Fodor‟s argument for the pessimistic conclusion, 
and we have no reason for thinking it to be true, (and reason for thinking it false) we 
have, I argued, no reason for concluding that our doxastic processes are as a matter of 
principle unmodelable. 
 Rather, I argued that it is much more reasonable to conclude that we should 
reject Fodor‟s normative rationality principle in light of its unsatisfiability, replacing it 
instead by a weaker one that is at least in principle satisfiable by the likes of us.  Any 
weakening of Fodor‟s normative rationality principle, I argued, effectively undermines 
the set of in principle arguments offered by Fodor against the massive modularity and 
heuristics approaches.  And so I conclude, by weakening the normative rationality 
principle, as it appears that we must, it no longer follows that one must reject tout court 
“irrational” processes like heuristics and modules.  Since there is no reason to think that 
modules and heuristics, though “irrational” (in Fodor‟s sense), should be incapable of 
satisfying a suitably weakened version of the normative rationality principle and these 
operations are modelable (by design or by definition), we have no reason for thinking 
that these approaches should be untenable.     
 Having argued that both the massive modularity and heuristics approaches 
should not be rejected because they fail to satisfy Fodor‟s (unsatisfiable) normative 
rationality principle, I next considered an alternative model – namely Baars‟ Global 
Workspace framework.  Following an overview of Baars‟ proposal, I considered how 
bringing this approach to bear might help us in understanding how a system might 
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contend with some of the particular engineering (i.e., in practice as opposed to in 
principle) challenges set out by Fodor.  To this end, I considered Gigerenzer‟s “fast and 
frugal” heuristics approach and Barrett‟s discussion of modules as metaphorical 
enzymatic devices.  These, I suggested, when integrated into the general framework of 
the Global Workspace model, might provide a plausible account (and an alternative to 
that proposed by Fodor) of how at least some of the interesting activities of mind might 
come to be modeled.  
 In Chapters 4 and 5, I turned attention to considering some instances of the 
problem that arise in practical reason and decision-making.  Specifically, I consider the 
question of how much progress might be made in our understanding of these activities 
by bringing emotion to bear on the frame problems that arise in this domain.  I noted at 
the outset of this discussion two principal prima facie objections or challenges that must 
be met before it would be reasonable to think that emotion should be relevant to the 
frame problems arising in this domain.   
I considered, first, a set of related prima facie objections to the very idea of 
bringing emotion to bear on the problem.  The “irrelevance” objection, I argued, is 
grounded upon a particular view of what the emotions are – specifically, one in which 
all emotions are taken to be either belief-identical or belief-dependent.  And so, the 
objection runs, if all emotions are belief-dependent (or belief-identical) and if, as Fodor 
suggests, the operations of belief-fixation are infected with/by frame problems, then 
bringing emotion to bear on the problems that arise in any other domain (i.e., practical 
reason and decision-making) would serve only (and at best) to bring an operation that is 
already unmodelable, tainted, and stricken by the frame problem to bear on those 
instances of the problem that arise elsewhere.  Therefore, the objection concludes, the 
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very idea of bringing emotion to bear on the frame problem (in any domain) is viciously 
circular, an obvious non-starter, and an otherwise implausible proposal.   
Following discussion aimed at eliminating a potential source of confusion with 
respect to the term “cognitivism,” I provided an overview of the propositional attitude 
approach to emotion and then considered a representative sample of the empirical 
evidence relied upon to support the cognitivist account of emotion.  Having outlined 
this, I next argued that given both the inability of the cognitivist account to contend with 
a set of standard puzzles and the problematic nature of much of the empirical evidence 
relied upon, we have no reason for thinking that all emotion is belief-dependent as the 
cognitivists claim.  And so, while it is possible (and perhaps even quite likely) that some 
of what the emotions are are belief-dependent, we have, I concluded, no reason for 
thinking them all to be.  With respect to the “irrevelance” objection, if at least some of 
what the emotions are are belief-independent, then there would be no reason to think 
that these operations, when brought to bear, should necessarily import the belief-fixing 
frame problems into other domains. 
I considered next the automated appraisal or “non-cognitivist” account of 
emotion, concluding that while it is likely incomplete as an account of what the 
emotions are, it does provide a partial response to this question.  And so, following a 
review of the evidence, I concluded that at least some emotions appear to be realized by 
automated, autonomous (i.e., belief-independent or non-cognitive) and plausibly 
modular learning and appraisal operations. Given the simplicity of the learning and 
appraisal operations outlined by LeDoux, Damasio & Bechara, Ekman and Zajonc and 
their apparent modular nature, we have reason for thinking that these operations should 
be amenable to modeling.  We have then, I concluded, no reason to think that bringing 
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these to bear should serve only to import a prior frame-problem-infected operation into 
this other domain.  Rather, since at least some of what the emotions are are undertaken 
by automated, autonomous and modularly realized processes, it follows that, if these 
inform and influence practical reason and decision-making in the proper manner, that is, 
in ways relevant to helping us contend with the dual horns of the dilemma, then 
emotion might help us in contending with some of the frame problems that arise in the 
practical domain. 
In Chapter 5, I considered the second principal objection to the idea of bringing 
emotion to bear, which reduces to the claim that emotion, even if undertaken by 
automated and autonomous operations and even if it does in fact influence practical 
reason and decision-making, fails to inform these processes in ways that are relevant to 
helping us contend with the frame problems that arise.  That is, the challenge concludes, 
even if emotion does inform practical reason and decision-making, its influences are 
either detrimental or are on balance no more beneficial than detrimental.     
And so, in the final chapter I considered the issues of if and if so how emotion 
might help us in contending with some of frame problems that arise in the practical 
domain.  This required that reason be provided for our thinking that emotion might help 
us in contending with both horns of the dilemma (speed and accuracy).  With the aim, 
then, of seeing just how far we might get by bringing emotion to bear on some instances 
of the problem arising in practical reason and decision-making, I began by presenting 
both an overview of some germane and representative empirical findings and Bechara & 
Damasio‟s somatic marker hypothesis.  Having set this out, I suggested that emotion 
might be one means by which we contend with the attentional-direction, problem-
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sequencing, ends-selection, meta-planning and Hamlet‟s problems instances of the 
puzzle. 
That the emotion-based heuristics, as simple and noncompensatory, should be 
far less computationally demanding and thus far more expeditious than the rational (in 
Fodor‟s sense) alternative appears clear.  And so, I concluded that bringing emotion to 
bear on some instances of the puzzle should help us in contending with the tractability 
horn of the dilemma.  Furthermore, I argued that we also have reason for thinking these 
heuristic operations to increase the accuracy of the operations of practical reason and 
decision-making.  This, in turn, suggests that the emotion-based heuristics outlined are 
sufficiently normatively “good” to satisfy a suitably weakened normative rationality 
principle and thus the second horn of the dilemma posed by the frame problem. 
It would appear then that at least some of what the emotions are are undertaken 
by automated, autonomous and modularly realized (and hence frame problem un-
infected) operations of emotional learning and appraisal.  We also have reason for 
thinking these to inform and influence practical reason and decision-making in ways 
that would appear to help us contending with both horns of the dilemma posed (i.e., by 
both expediting and increasing the accuracy of these operations).  It follows from this 
that bringing emotion to bear on the puzzle might provide one promising approach for 
our coming to understand how we contend with some of the frame problems that arise 
in the practical domain.  
Following this discussion, I considered a number of open questions.  I argued 
there that we have good reason for thinking that emotion-based heuristics are exploited 
quite automatically to influence and direct the operations of memory encoding and 
search, non-trivial planning and assent or opinion-fixation in ways that should be far 
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more expeditious than the rational alternative.  That is, we have reason, I concluded, for 
thinking that emotion should be highly relevant in helping us to contend with the 
tractability horn of the dilemma as posed by these instances of the problem.  We also, I 
argued, have reason to think it likely that the emotion-based heuristics outlined should 
be sufficiently normatively “good” and thus that relying on these heuristics should help 
us in meeting the second horn of the dilemma as well.  However, while this seems a 
plausible conjecture, given the lack of empirical evidence with respect to the normative 
issue, no conclusion was warranted with respect to these particular instances of the 
puzzle. 
Emotion is no panacea.  It does not “solve outright” the frame problem.  I, of 
course, never claimed that it is or that it does.  Rather, I argued for a modest point – that 
consideration of emotion helps us to understand how we might contend with some of the 
frame problems that arise in the practical domain.  We have, I argued, good reason to 
think that it, via automated, autonomous and modular learning and appraisal 
operations, helps to expedite and increase the accuracy of practical reason and decision-
making.  Bringing emotion to bear on practical matters and integrating the emotional 
learning and appraisal operations outlined into Baars‟ existing Global Workspace 
framework, provides, I suggest, one plausible approach by which to explain how at least 
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